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General Editor

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A CONSERVATIVE DEALS WITH *GLASNOST*

By Daniel O. Graham, Lt. Gen., USA (Ret.)

The Problem

I have been a professional Soviet-watcher since 1948. I even bothered to learn Russian so that I could watch them better. Eventually, analyzing the goings-on behind the Iron Curtain became my profession.

Over the years, I learned to cast a jaundiced eye at the "reforms" of new Soviet leaders, from Malenkov (Stalin's immediate successor) onward.

I have seen fuzzy-headed academics wax euphoric over earlier Soviet "reforms" such as de-Stalinization. But I have always been able to count on the Soviets to restore common sense in the West by such crass behavior as planting missiles in Cuba, building a Berlin Wall or invading Afghanistan. I don't think I can count on the Kremlin this time around to restore the necessary measure of cynicism to Western analysis of the USSR.

The current onrush of euphoria in the West reminds me of my numerous trips to NATO headquarters in Brussels to represent the Army, CIA or DoD in the annual assessment of the Soviet military threat to Europe. It frequently occurred to me that the Soviets could cause NATO to become unglued if they had the wit actually to reduce the threat. "If the Soviets should withdraw one of their five armies from East Germany to the Western USSR," I used to tell my colleagues, "NATO would come apart at the seams. The *real* threat would be diminished only by the few days it would take to put that tank army back into East Germany, but the *perception* of threat would plummet and, with it, NATO's cohesion." Gorbachev is today showing that wit. He is removing the cement that holds NATO together, the *perception* of threat.

Conservatives and others concerned with national security had better understand what is happening in the Soviet Union, what is new and what is not new, what is real and what is not real, and what the root causes are. If we do not do so and do not communicate well our findings, a deadly euphoria may cripple both capability and resolve in the West.

No matter how wise conservatives may be, they will in all probability have to deal with a little-to-no-perceived-threat environment for at least a few years. This means sharp cuts in defense budgets no matter *who* is in power in Washington. Cuts in defense budgets will bring out the worst in turf-guarding by the several parts of DoD. This environment in the Pentagon is especially deadly to the new boy on the block with a claim on

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resources – SDI. In fact we have already seen parochial DoD interests moving to strangle SDI.

This turf-guarding reaction in the Pentagon is responsible for an incredible position recently taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in *opposition* to the White House and Secretary Carlucci. These military leaders joined the "wets" in the State Department to demand U.S. adherence to a "narrow interpretation" of the ABM Treaty and soft pedaling of the Soviet material violation of that treaty in its Krasnoyarsk Radar. This can be aimed at *nothing* other than the crippling of SDI by removing the program as a rival claimant for dollars.

Can the Soviets be clever enough to have added to their list of likely benefits from *glasnost* and *perestroika* the possibility that the JCS would help them scuttle SDI?

A more crucial question is: Can the JCS be made to realize that SDI may be the *only* strategic program likely to withstand a wave of euphoria? Can't they understand that SDI – not modernization of nuclear strike forces – is the one strategic program heavily supported by the taxpayer? Sen. Sam Nunn realizes that SDI, unlike any other program, is not totally dependent on the perception of the Soviet threat. SDI protects against accidental, unauthorized, or rogue nation launches. These threats are independent of what is going on inside the USSR – in fact, chaotic conditions inside the USSR can *increase* these dangers. The notion that the JCS can save other programs at the expense of SDI is shortsighted in the extreme.

In forty years of Soviet-watching, I have never seen the like of what is going on in the USSR today. All of my fellow so-called "Sovietologists" are in the same boat. Any analyst who says that he even remotely predicted the current state of affairs is deluding you, himself or both.

Most of Western intelligentsia, including the liberal and socialist press, will declare the millennium at hand, gloat over conservatives for having lost their "Soviet bogyman," and treat any reminders of continued totalitarianism in the Soviet empire as boorish behavior. They will, however, have *some* difficulty accepting the "peace in our time" aspects of internal Soviet politics without also accepting the "socialism is a failure" aspects.

There will be a tendency among conservatives, on the other hand, to spend so much energy resisting the idea of fundamental change that they will deny *any* change and fail to take due credit for the conservative policies which played a key role in forcing these changes on the Soviets.

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An Analysis

The goings-on in the USSR under the banners of *glasnost* and *perestroika* are truly extraordinary. Every day we read or hear another mind-boggling example of behavior and speech in the Soviet Union which not too many months ago would have cost the perpetrator a long stretch in prison or perhaps his life. The extraordinary events in the Soviet Union demand the reasoned attention of Americans. We must guard against an unwarranted euphoria, assuming as some do that the systemic struggle we call the Cold War is over. We must also guard against the ever-present urge to assume that the reformists are on *our* side, sympathetic to the interests of the Free World. That assumption leads to a policy which actively supports one group of Soviet Marxists against another – financially in the form of credits, politically in terms of treaties and agreements, and even militarily in the form of technology transfers. Invariably such a policy proposes support of those Soviet Communists in power against imaginary hard-liners. We must remember that Leonid Brezhnev, now being roundly denounced by the Gorbachev faction, was from time to time held up in liberal circles in the West as a man who must be bolstered by the United States in his struggles against "hawks" in the Kremlin.

On the other hand, those of us who have frequently (and justly) accused the left wing of Western opinion of sticking their heads in the sand and refusing to acknowledge the evil and threatening nature of the Soviet regime, must not emulate this kind of behavior in reaction to the strong winds of change blowing in the USSR.

There are grave dangers, primarily in terms of lost opportunities, if conservatives fail to analyze the new trends in the USSR carefully. Many conservatives have expended so much time and energy over the years trying to prevent the "wets" from ignoring the deadly threat posed by the Soviets that they react viscerally to any suggestion that the threat has diminished. Conservatives must resist that urge today and face the fact that the actual threat *has* diminished for at least the near term, and the *perceived* Soviet threat to the West has declined drastically. Conservatives will have a terrible time coping with the misperception of a drastically diminished threat if they hold to the fiction that it has not declined *at all.*

Now, before all my conservative brethren pile on, let me agree that the numbers of Soviet planes, tanks, ships and missiles have *not* diminished. In fact they have *increased* under Mr. Gorbachev's leadership. How has the threat diminished, then? It has diminished in terms of the cohesion of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, and in the likelihood of military adventures by the Soviet Union. The withdrawal from Afghanistan is at least partially the result of an inability of the Soviets to conquer the country even

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though it lies on her borders. This event *alone* makes the use of Soviet combat forces outside the borders of the USSR for the next several years highly unlikely.

The reliability factor has been used (and abused) to suggest that the Soviets dare not attack NATO because hostile East Europeans sit astride their lines of communications back to Russia. It has even been suggested that the non-Russian Warsaw Pact troops would mutiny if sent to war against NATO. In fact, the East European forces would probably be good allies of the Soviets so long as their side was winning. But exaggerated or not, the reliability factor has never been negligible. Given the impacts of *glasnost* and *perestroika* on the politics of East European Communist states, the probability of unreliable behavior of their armed forces in case of war with NATO *has to be higher* today than in the past, and growing.

By far the most important factors diminishing the likelihood of Soviet military action over the next several years are the very existence of *glasnost* and *perestroika* and their effects on Soviet politics. It is simply not believable that Mr. Gorbachev and his Politburo colleagues could launch a serious military aggression until they get their internal political house in order.

The Soviet system has never been able to deal effectively and simultaneously with both internal crisis and external expansion. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* show that Gorbachev and Co. have decided to attack internal problems and pursue only those foreign policy objectives that help in solution of those internal problems. That means pursuing a radical decrease in East-West tensions which will improve access to Western capital and technology needed to cure economic ills.

How long this set of policies will continue and the long range effect of them depends upon how real *glasnost* and *perestroika* are, and just *why* they have been introduced by Gorbachev.

There can be no doubt, even in the minds of the most cynical observer of Soviet behavior, that *glasnost* and *perestroika* are for real. The Soviets are masters of deceit, but not good enough to fake what is going on in the USSR these days. But if one is wise, he will first sort out what is new from what is *not* new.

There is nothing new in a rash of articles and speeches criticizing past Soviet leaders. It is the habit of new Soviet leaders to blame the country's problems on past leadership. Khrushchev denounced Stalin and had his carcass reburied in a less conspicuous spot. Gorbachev and Co. denounce Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Chernenko – but not Andropov who nurtured Gorbachev's rise to power. No news here.

Certainly it is *not* news when the Soviets launch another big "peace offensive." It is not news when the Soviets talk about "total disarmament."

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It is not news that Soviet industrial production of consumer goods is grossly inept and that Soviet agriculture cannot feed the people. And it is not news that a fresh crew of Kremlin leaders promise to fix these problems, and claim they were all caused by the bungling of their predecessors. And it is not even news when Soviet spokesmen wonder aloud whether certain free market forces could improve their creaky planned economy.

All the presumed "new" wrinkles in the Communist Party line and in Soviet internal policies have their historical precedents. And the much-heralded "softening" of Soviet foreign policy may turn out to be not a strategic retreat from the goal of world domination, but a tactical adjustment to reality—or at *worst* a different and more deadly attack on the West.

We should not be astonished that the Soviets seized on the ill-considered zero-zero option of the INF Treaty. It is of enormous benefit to them in reaching several long-sought goals: "Denuclearized" Europe; disrupted NATO; Pershing and cruise missiles out of Europe; and a euphoria in the West over arms control possibilities which is likely to finish off the SDI program—the latter being the stated prime goal of Soviet foreign policy.

We should not find anything remarkable in the Soviet willingness to cut their long-range forces in half if we cut ours in half—provided, of course, we scrap or cripple the SDI program by extending the ABM Treaty. One doesn't have to be a military genius to figure out some very good reasons for the Soviets to trumpet a 50 percent cut.

First, the Soviet strategic advantage in first strike missiles can be retained with half their current inventory of ballistic missiles *if* the remaining half still enjoys a free ride to U.S. and Allied targets. On the other hand, the utility of Soviet long-range missiles for intimidation or attack of the U.S. is virtually cancelled out should SDI actually be deployed. Further, the Soviets could cut their missile inventory in half without reducing the first strike weapons in that force at all, while the United States cannot reduce its retaliatory forces by half without also cutting in half the number of targets the Soviets would attack in a first strike! Perhaps the U.S. negotiators will resist the current unseemly craving for a quick START agreement and insist that the Soviets destroy some of their first strike missiles, the SS-18s and SS-19s. But even if the numbers of those missiles were cut in half, the Soviets would enjoy the same first strike advantages they enjoy today.

And if, as has been the pattern in deals with the Soviets, the U.S. negotiators yield to the demand to amend the ABM Treaty so that SDI cannot be deployed until sometime beyond the year 2000, the Soviets will be guaranteed strategic nuclear superiority for the forseeable future.

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This is the *least* the Soviets can gain from the 50 percent START cuts so warmly welcomed in Washington. It's all too likely that the U.S. negotiators will settle for something less than a 50 percent cut in first strike missiles *and* fold on SDI. Thus the Soviets would sharply *increase* their first strike capabilities vis-a-vis the West. So why should the Soviets *not* offer a 50 percent cut?

Another Soviet move that is perceived by many in the West as heralding a new era is the removal of troops from Afghanistan. But this too has its historical precedent. Shortly after WWII the Soviets were forced to withdraw an occupation force from the Iranian province of Azerbaizjhan by military defeat of a puppet regime set up by the USSR and by pressure from U.S. President Truman. That withdrawal was not a sign that Stalin's Soviet Union had mellowed; neither is the Afghanistan withdrawal such an omen. In both cases, the Kremlin pulled back in the face of strong indigenous resistance and strong U.S. opposition.

In addition to these major changes in policy, the Soviets are bending over backwards to present a smiling countenance to the West. This too should surprise no one. The Soviets are badly in need of Western hard currency loans. One does not approach his banker scowling and threatening if one badly needs a loan.

Are there *any* developments in the Soviet Union that *are* new and different? Yes, indeed, and those of us who have observed Soviet fakery long enough to avoid wishful thinking should all agree.

One of the truly remarkable aspects of the Soviet scene is the permitted and *published* views of members of the elites who criticize Marxist-Leninist *fundamentals.* Communist professors have stated that capitalist economies work and socialist economies do not. Others have voiced the heresy that there is not one monolithic Communist Party, but *two* parties, one reformist and one anti-reformist, "under the one banner of the CPSU." Factional fighting within the highest echelons of the Party (i.e. Yeltsin versus Ligachev) is open and public.

It really *is* news when Soviet journals criticize *Lenin,* pointing out that the Red Terror for which Stalin has been condemned was actually the brainchild of sainted Lenin. It is also news when party members publicly demand the resignation of *live* VIPs from the Communist Party, i.e., the venerable Andrei Gromyko.

These *are* new trends, and these actions and statements would have *certainly* resulted in arrest and severe punishment under any previous Soviet regime. Conservatives must deal with these developments wisely if we are to prevent a stampede into dangerous euphoria. Undiluted cynicism is not the answer; separating the wheat from the chaff, the reality from the hype, *is* the answer.

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And what then is *real* about *glasnost* and *perestroika*?

The basic reality is that three long-festering and fatal flaws in the Marxist-Leninsist system have at last burst into the open: injustice, inefficiency and deceit.

But why now? The Soviet system has *always* been unjust – even more unjust in the past than it is today. The Soviet system has *always* been grossly inefficient – the only products good enough to be successfully marketed abroad are *still* weapons and other military hardware; Soviet agriculture *still* can't feed the nation properly; and the Soviet system has *always* produced vast quantities of palpable lies, piling deceit on deceit. There has been no sudden aggravation of injustice, inefficiency and deceit which would explain these new policies.

Does all this mean that counterrevolutionaries, covert proponents of bourgeois democracy and free markets have seized control? Does it mean that Marxist "liberals" under Gorbachev have won a political struggle with Marxist "conservatives," who would prefer another Joseph Stalin? Does it mean that liberty has spontaneously bloomed in Russia?

No. And neither are the changes in the USSR the result of wise policy and diplomacy in the West. Quite the contrary, the actions of the U.S. and other Western governments over the years have, for the most part, tended to prop up the old order and delay this welcome denouement.

Western governments have usually reacted to Communist aggression and expansion behaving as Lenin said they would – yielding while the Soviets took two steps forward, reluctantly refusing to yield further, then falling all over themselves in eagerness to accept the "compromise" offered as the Soviets took the prescribed one step backward. And the Western governments even today seem all too inclined to follow Lenin's formula as Gorbachev takes a step backward, having encountered stiff resistance over the first seven years of the Reagan administration.

Another candidate for prime cause of real change inside the USSR is the *personality* of Mikhail Gorbachev. Given the penchant of the Western press to overplay personalities, *glasnost* and *perestroika* are already being treated as the personal brainchildren of Gorbachev. To any sober-minded student of Soviet affairs, this is a nonsense similar to the branding of SDI as a personal "dream of Ronald Reagan."

If we can't look to intensification of Soviet injustice and economic ineptitude, to the blossoming of counterrevolution, to clever Western policy or the power of Gorbachev's personality, what *is* it that is forcing change on the system?

What *has* changed and forced change is that which has always done so – technology. The rate of technological change since the advent of the microchip in 1972 has been entirely too fast for the Soviet Union's central-

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ized planning and troglodyte management to handle. Even the *best* managed and technologically *most advanced* sector of the Soviet economy – weapons production – has been put in grave danger of sliding into obsolescence by the effects of *one* product of this technological revolution – SDI.

The advent of the microchip and microengineered electronics equipment led to super computers. These computers not only make defenses against Soviet ballistic missiles possible, but they aid in the design of all manner of new products as well as in the management of manufacturing processes. The Soviet leadership is no doubt annoyed at not being able to keep up with the West in the manufacture of television sets, VCRs and personal computers. But the Soviet system is shaken to its foundations at the prospect of seeing its advanced weapons become obsolete, thus destroying the USSR's claim to superpower status.

This is why Soviet inefficiency has become a target for zealous revolutionary reform, or *perestroika.*

The same technological surge that had made SDI possible, makes *glasnost* inevitable. New technology makes it less and less possible for the totalitarian state to practice deceit and prevent public access to alternative views.

Earlier advances in the technology of communications – radio, high volume presses, and later television – helped the State, if so-inclined, to monopolize information and indoctrinate its citizens. Mass communications favored centralized control. In all probability, Hitler could never have mesmerized the entire German-speaking world without radio. The new revolution in communications technology has the opposite effect. It favors the individual against centralized authority. It results in personal computers, high speed printers, and modems which provide access to masses of data. This *de*centralizes control of information and ruins the indoctrination efforts of highly centralized political systems.

This is why the past and present deceits of the Soviet system are being so dramatically exposed today. They simply can no longer be hidden.

And with the exposure of deceits comes the assault on the injustices of the Soviet system. Stalin's crimes – and *even* Lenin's complicity in those crimes – cannot be covered up when the truth is out. The victims of Stalin no longer confine their rebuke to Stalin; they condemn the system which created him.

We must realize that the actual changes in the Soviet politico-economic system are being *forced* upon that system by technology. As conservatives, we can join others in hoping these trends away from totalitarian socialism continue, but we must insist on *reinforcing* the factor that is primary in

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causing the change – superior Western technology – not weakening it as the Left would have us do.

George Bush apparently understands this key fact. On 29 June he said, "With SDI, we focused the competition on our great strength, and the Soviets' great weakness, technology. Even though the Soviets have spent some $200 billion on their own strategic defenses, it was clear to them that if they couldn't convince us to abandon our program – as they tried to do in Reykjavik – they would never win the technological competition."

Those of us who dread the effects of another unjustifiable wave of debilitating euphoria in the West cannot base our warnings on fiction – that is, on insisting that the changes in the USSR are just an elaborate Potemkin village. Common sense response to *glasnost* and *perestroika* requires not a denial of what is going on, but a careful analysis of *why* it is going on.

Why would the Communist Party leadership (i.e., Gorbachev and his Politburo) permit, let alone encourage, *glasnost* and *perestroika*? Certainly these innovations are *not* designed to weaken the Communist State, destroy Marxism-Leninism or wreck the power base of the men who are launching these ideas. Nor did the CPSU under Gorbachev's leadership put these policies in motion in ignorance of the nature of perturbations they would engender. No indeed. Mikhail Gorbachev and associates are careful, long-term planners. They adopted *glasnost* and *perestroika* in the interest of preserving the Soviet politico-economic system (to include their own power within that system) and ensuring the ultimate victory of Communism over the "capitalistic imperialists" (i.e., the United States).

If *glasnost* and *perestroika* are well thought out and purposive policies designed to promote rather than negate the goals of Marxism-Leninism, what is the rationale behind them? This is the area of inquiry of most critical importance to the Free World.

The answer probably lies in a combination of negative and positive imperatives. On the one hand, new policies were required to avoid utter stagnation of the Soviet economy and to prevent a calamitous setback in the advance of Communism at the hands of politically bumbling but technologically superior non-communist states. On the other hand, if Western technological progress can be slowed appreciably, the Soviet Union will be able to score an enormous victory in the systemic struggle by seizing military and thus commercial control of near-Earth space.

Soviet superiority in space is already the perception of much of the world. The key ingredient of space power – reliable space transportation – is today a Soviet advantage, made obvious by the series of disastrous failures of U.S. and European space boosters including the Shuttle. It will

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take a thoroughly dedicated effort for the Americans to overcome the USSR in this area and there is no evidence that it will occur.

If the Soviet Union can undercut American prices to launch satellites *and* beat the U.S. hands down in booster reliability; and if the West can also be dissuaded from deploying defenses in space via SDI, the Soviet Union has a glowing opportunity to seize physical control of space. With control of space comes control of the planet Earth and the final victory of Communism.

In order to prevent the disastrous blow to Communism that would accompany a new surge of superior technology in the West *and* to facilitate a Soviet triumph by control of space, *glasnost* and *perestroika* are absolutely essential. They are the best available policies for extracting from the USSR *and* the Free World the means to achieve desired strategic ends, in particular the establishment of Soviet space control.

In order to seize control of space and thus to realize their hegemonic goals, the Communist Party needs from the Soviet people their maximum creativity. From the Soviet economy, the CPSU requires a large volume of high quality, high-tech products. From the West, the CPSU requires a record level of credits and transfer of technology.

The creativity of Soviet technicians and managers cannot be realized without more personal freedom. To keep up with the new surge of technology, these key people *must* be trusted with personal computers, printers, and access to real data. The productivity of Soviet high-tech industry cannot be enhanced by the rigid formulas of centralized socialist planning. The West could not be expected to provide large inputs of capital and technology while the Soviet military threat appeared menacing and the war in Afghanistan continued. The West could be expected to relax both its restrictions on credit and technology transfers to the Socialist bloc, and to reduce its own government expenditures on high technology/space efforts if Soviet internal repression were to be mitigated.

This is *one* explanation of *glasnost* and *perestroika* which is fully consistent with continuity of purpose in the CPSU. While it may not be the only analysis to meet this criterion, it certainly explains much in current Soviet behavior.

The adamant Soviet insistence that the U.S. scrap the space-borne element of SDI as the price of a cut in long-range nuclear arms suggests the critical nature of space technology in the Soviet view. The assassination of European scientists involved in SDI by Communist terrorists, and other frenetic efforts to sabotage the U.S. space program point to a Soviet conviction that space holds the key to the outcome of the "class struggle."

This view of the Soviet rationale for new policies explains the strong support of the Soviet military for Gorbachev even though his policies call

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ostensibly for reductions in Soviet nuclear striking power. The influential military apparatus probably *would* object to proferred arms reductions and a weakening of public discipline if it were not for their contributions to the promise of Soviet global military domination through space control. The Soviet marshals know the strategic value of SDI whether the Pentagon does or not.

Glasnost and *perestroika* are based, at least in large part, on the Soviet view that space is the future and that Communism must control it. U.S. and Western responses to *glasnost* and *perestroika* will not make sense unless we realize those purposes. Those of us who know that space is *indeed* the future have been insisting on space-borne defenses and an immediate expansion of our *general* space capabilities to facilitate deployment of those defenses.

In all this, SDI is key. The Soviets recognize it as an effective counter to their nuclear strategies, an effort that can cancel out a trillion-dollar investment in long-range ballistic missiles, and preempt their own efforts to establish a dominant position in space. But they also recognize SDI as the catalyst in the new surge of technology which is forcing fundamental changes on the Marxist-Leninist system. We must insure that our fellow Americans understand this as well and insist that their politicians act accordingly – that is, we must push SDI forward vigorously and agree to *no* constraints on SDI deployment.

Conservatives should remember the cyclical nature of reform policies in the Kremlin and make the case that most of these policies are not new and do not necessarily herald fundamental change in the Soviet totalitarian state. We must point out to our fellow Americans that totalitarian systems can "turn on a dime," that *perestroika* could come to mean a return to Stalinism simply because a handful of powerful men in the Kremlin so decide.

Mr. Gorbachev can be ousted in a few hours as was the case with Khrushchev, whose "reforms" were far less annoying to his opposition. Or Mr. Gorbachev can succeed in gulling the West into bailing him out with generous credits and transfers of technology. Or, sad to say, the Russian people, themselves, who have always tended to fear disorder more than tyranny, may turn on Mr. Gorbachev and demand a law-and-order, Stalinist regime.

None of these outcomes bodes well for the Free World. Conservatives, in tune with reality, should bend every effort to steer events toward increased security for the West and further loosening of the Soviet bonds on individuals and peoples. The key effort now is to maintain the telling pressures of technology on the Marxists, and that means full speed ahead on SDI.

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Word of Caution

The foregoing is one veteran Soviet watcher's view. It is based on a key assumption that *may* be wrong. That is: Gorbachev and his supporters are *reformers*, still dedicated to Marxism-Leninism, but convinced that drastic change is required to achieve that ideology's goals.

There is another basic assumption that cannot be ruled out by evidence at hand. That is: Gorbachev and his supporters are not reformers, but *heretics*. They believe that Marxism-Leninism has little or no validity these days, whatever its validity in the past.

In my view, both the weight of evidence and simple prudence dictate the assumption of "reformers" versus "heretics." But I hasten to add that Gorbachev is certainly *tolerating* heresy among Soviet intellectuals. Further, history is replete with heretics who started out as reformers.

If (as I assume) Gorbachev is a reformer, *glasnost* and *perestroika* are most vulnerable to reversal by decision of the Gorbachev faction itself if it becomes clear that his policies are failing to produce his reforms or are endangering the basic Soviet system. If, on the other hand, Gorbachev is a heretic, *glasnost, perestroika* and Gorbachev are most likely to be destroyed by a revolt of the orthodox Marxist-Leninists.

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SOME CONSEQUENCES OF A DECLINING SOVIET THREAT

By Robert C. Richardson III

In an accompanying article in this issue of the *Journal* Lt. General Graham discusses what may lie behind the new Soviet policies known as *glasnost* and *perestroika*. He points out some of the risks involved in overestimating possible reductions in the Soviet military threat. And, he warns both enthusiasts and skeptics of the dangers inherent in jumping to premature conclusions.

Ever since the Reykjavik summit meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev a perception has been spreading throughout the Free World to the effect that the Soviet military threat need no longer be a matter of great concern. People are beginning to believe that the Soviet Union is no longer an expansionist empire and as such will not, henceforth, threaten the West with possible acts of military aggression. *Perestroika* and *glasnost* are increasingly considered to be harbingers of peace in our time. Unfortunately, the Soviets recognize all too well the security implications of these Free World perceptions.

On November 7, 1987, at the anniversary of the Revolution, Gorbachev stated: "Our restructuring, with all its international consequences, is eliminating the fear of the Soviet threat, with (US) militarism losing its political justification."

Somewhat earlier Georgi Arbatov, the Soviet government's principle advisor on US and Canada, stated that: "Without this bugaboo (the Soviet threat), the 300 billion dollars per year American military presence in the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and Middle East, would be meaningless. Take away the specter of the Soviet threat and this entire costly edifice will crumble like a house of cards."

These Soviet forecasts are only partially true. The American military presence overseas is not all that is likely to crumble like a house of cards if, in fact, the Soviet threat is perceived as having vanished from the world scene. This being the case, and the trends in Western public attitudes being irrefutable, it would seem to be high time we looked seriously at all the consequences of a real, or perceived, reduction of the Soviet military threat before gleefully leaping to the conclusion that they are all desirable.

Ever since the end of WWII the possibility of Soviet military aggression has had a major impact on almost all the activities and policies of the major powers. This impact has been both direct and indirect. It has directly af-

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fected the scope and nature of the military establishments maintained since 1945 by the U.S. and its NATO allies. It has also, if indirectly, affected the social, political, and economic fabric of these nations.

For over 45 years the people of the Free World have lived in an environment conditioned, to a large extent, by a sustained Soviet/Communist military threat. Now, for the first time since the end of WW II, they face the prospect of its decline, if not its dissolution. The Soviet leopard appears to be losing its spots under the aegis of the Gorbachev regime. Can this be for real? Are the teachings, goals, and policies of Marx and Lenin really being abandoned by the new generation of Soviet leaders? Or, do the new Soviet attitudes merely reflect a decision on their part to return to a temporary period of detente in order to buy time in which to correct economic and technological weaknesses?

Obviously such questions should be answered before we, in the Free World, allow any irreversible military or social reactions to take place as a result of the new, real or perceived, world environment that Soviet actions portend. Even if Gorbachev and his supporters are sincere in their desire for a lasting change, how long can we count on their remaining in power? And, should the new Soviet attitudes turn out to be part of a temporary tactical maneuver to help them achieve the same old communist goals, would we be able to recover a credible and effective security posture? Democracies cannot reverse course as quickly as dictatorships. We cannot yo-yo between detente and Cold War the way that the Communists have done in the past.

Many US national activities, institutions, attitudes, and policies have been "threat driven" starting with the Cold War era of the late 1940s. The influence of the Soviet military threat has steadily increased over the years due to the sustained Soviet military buildup and their increasingly obvious efforts to achieve military superiority over the US and its NATO allies.

In response to the growing Soviet military threat, the Free World has taken extraordinary peacetime measures to protect itself and its way of life. Defense alliances and foreign policy commitments never before acceptable other than in times of war; standing armies that far exceed historical peacetime levels; social sacrifices to pay for these; and multi-billion dollar defense budgets and overseas force deployments that would have been inconceivable in the pre-WWII peacetime environment, are now accepted as normal. If we now take away this threat of military aggression, or even permit the emergence in the West of a delusion that it no longer exists, the consequences to our way of life will certainly be unpredictable and possibly serious. Freedom and/or prosperity in the West could even be at stake.

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In view of these possibilities, do we really want to gamble on the impact of *glasnost* and *perestroika* or should we not first identify and evaluate what we are getting into in an effort to "look before we jump?"

Some Obvious Direct Consequences

Direct effects of the Soviet military threat have ranged from peacetime increases in our military forces and weapons, as needed to maintain rough military equivalence with the Soviet buildup, to the establishment of peacetime alliances and overseas force deployments, such as NATO. The Soviet military threat has indisputably been a primary factor not only in driving up defense costs but also in US advances in high technology and in the use of space. It has also influenced US foreign policies as well as domestic politics and public attitudes. Presidential elections have been won or lost over issues such as the missile gap of the 1960s or the inadequacy of US defense spending in light of the shifting strategic nuclear balance in the late 1970s.

It stands to reason that any prospects of "peace in our time" will bring about changes in all of these sectors. Every president since Truman has reaffirmed the US commitment to the NATO Alliance and to the defense of Europe. We are also committed to protect Japan and maintain a major military presence in the western Pacific. Billions of US dollars are appropriated each year to keep US forces overseas for these purposes. Without a sustained Soviet military threat how long would this spending be justifiable given today's deficits? From whom would NATO protect Europe? How long would our Congress and the US public support overseas deployments, or even the existence of the NATO peacetime commitments? And, of more personal concern to Americans, what would happen to the millions of jobs and the income that depend entirely on the need to oppose Soviet sponsored military capabilities or cope with Soviet inspired national wars of liberation?

Much of the wealth in the US, and the high standard of living it buys, can be directly attributed to our technological progress since WWII. The ability of our free enterprise society to innovate; to push the state of the art in many if not all disciplines; and to compete in Space and in world trade can largely be attributed to past government investments in "cutting edge" defense research and development. In the 1940s these investments stemmed from the German and Japanese military threats. And, since the 1950s and 1960s, they have have been justified solely on the basis of the Soviet military threats.

We built nuclear weapons to defeat German and Japanese military aggression. Had we not done so it is unlikely that the world would have nuclear power today. Some could argue that this would probably have

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been just as well, but we also built intercontinental missiles, jet aircraft, long range bombers, and space systems in response to the Soviet threat.

Many of the sophisticated advances made in electronics were spinoffs from defense programs. US leadership in the development of computers, jet airliners, satellite communications and other space systems, came about as a result of defense research which was in turn primarily justified by the Soviet military threat. Can we really afford to lose our momentum in the one area – advanced technology – wherein we still hold an advantage over any and all would-be aggressors? Can we afford it on trade or economic grounds?

In the late 1950s the US pulled all stops in an effort to get into near space. This was solely due to the Soviet Sputnik and the obvious long term threat that Soviet military space capabilities would present if unopposed. Does anyone really believe that the Free World would now be relying on satellite based communication systems to the extent that we do, or that President Kennedy would have launched a program to put a man on the Moon in the 1960s, had the Soviets spent the money that Sputnik cost them on consumer goods or social welfare?

Our increasing standard of living since WWII has depended largely on innovations attributable to technological progress and on the opening up of new business opportunities and new frontiers such as in Space. What will happen if these types of efforts now all grind to a stop when there are no longer any military threats of consequence to justify the peacetime military research and development that resulted in most of these non-military benefits in the past?

Whatever the specifics, the fact remains that major changes are bound to occur in the Free World as a by-product of the changes now perceived as taking place in the USSR. There is also no rational basis for assuming that all of these changes will be desirable or stabilizing. As General Graham's article points out the Soviet changes in attitude may be either real or merely part of an elaborate Soviet disinformation effort to buy time and create more favorable conditions under which to pursue world domination. This could also be achieved by the Soviet acquisition of military control over near Space in lieu of nuclear superiority.

In any case, the direct consequences of allowing current Soviet developments to prematurely dismantle Western defenses could be fatal to the security of the Free World. Even if the most optimistic interpretation is accepted, and these are truly steps toward a 21st Century free of major military threats, the non-Communist world would indeed be foolhardy not to carefully consider their consequences and buy security insurance until all the questions can be answered.

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Any headlong rush to accept peace in our time – whether real or merely perceived – would seem to call for a "time out" in which to examine these, on the one hand, and to put in place security insurance programs such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), on the other hand. These actions need not conflict with the peace goals or agreements but would allow for a safe and preplanned and orderly transition along with the introduction of measures to cope with unacceptable consequences such as non-defense employment for workers and soldiers likely to lose their jobs.

Some Possible Indirect Consequences

If the obvious, direct, consequences of a perceived or real reduction in the Soviet military threat are being ignored and no security insurance is being considered, what can be said about the indirect, longer term, impact of these trends or the types of social and economic insurance that might have to be taken out to cope with them?

Few if any studies have been made of the role that military threats and war readiness may, or not, play in maintaining a healthy national economy and an acceptable social environment in modern nations. The presumption seems to be that anything nations and societies do that is prompted by the fear of war is inherently bad, wasteful, and detrimental to human progress and to the overall well being of the human race. Common sense analysis suggests that this is not necessarily so.

War, or the threat of war, has played a major role in how societies have existed and progressed throughout recorded history. There are few if any examples of nations of consequence surviving long periods during which they faced no military threats. Those that enjoyed long periods of relative peace, as did the Roman Empire, usually wound up by being destroyed by relatively backward and intellectually and socially inferior foes.

Some historians have postulated that a war threat is essential to maintaining the many key elements of the basic fabric of a healthy nation. If not periodically subjected to wars and/or revolutions the motivating forces required for social stability, economic growth, and national interests slowly disintegrate. Whether this is true or not is one thing. To ignore the possibility is another.

A cursory examination of the indirect problems likely to be raised should the Free World suddenly be faced with no military threats of consequence leads to some interesting conclusions.

Being ready for war has provided nations with a system for stabilizing their economies. Direct defense expenditures in Free World societies are not driven by the laws of supply and demand. As such, governments can

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and have used military spending to offset, balance or arrest undesirable but otherwise uncontrollable economic trends and forces.

Political authority in major powers can be traced in part to public recognition and acceptance of the need for authoritative leadership in order to maintain the nation's security. The war powers of most nations that stem from a credible external military threat greatly help them to control their constituencies. Nationalism is a function of patriotism and patriotism has historically peaked at the time of military aggressions or the threat thereof. Take away the cement that creates nationalism and patriotism, especially in today's environment of global communications, international businesses, interlocking monetary relationships, and growing population pressures, and national frontiers are very likely to disappear. One worlders would no doubt welcome this, but do most Americans want to share their standards of living, wealth and advantages with the rest of the globe?

A case can certainly be made that nations with no external military threats over a period of several decades, hence no collective incentive to oppose potential aggressors, will not survive as independent nations for very long. Without any threat of external aggression ever weaker and less effective governments develop as a result of a total lack of fear of the national survival consequences of internal divisiveness.

Military institutions have historically been a major factor in controlling social dissidence and destructive social trends and tendencies. Without the threat of retribution by military forces lesser nations or even individual groups within nations would not be deterred from anti-social acts such as piratage, kidnaping, or even revolution.

While one might argue that even in an era of world peace some forces would be maintained for these purposes, it is not likely that they would be of sufficient consequence to instill the fear, hence deterrent effect, that today's powers enjoy by virtue of their ability to divert the major military capabilities that were bought solely in response to the threat of Soviet aggression. Without having had a requirement to respond to the Soviet military threat for the past twenty years or more, would the US still have had the means at hand to deploy and sustain the forces now deployed in the Persian Gulf to protect nonbelligerent tanker traffic from Iranian terrorists. Would we have paid for and deployed the costly and sophisticated military satellite systems these forces now depend upon for both communications and reconnaissance?

One can even argue that such peace as the major powers have enjoyed since WWII can be largely, if not solely, attributed to the threat possed by Soviet atomic weapons. While arguing against the proclivity of peaceniks to advocate a return to conventional warfare, a well known French

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strategists, General Pierre M. Gallois, referred in his first book, *L'Age Nucleaire*, to the deterrent role these weapons have played, in these terms:

What seems remarkable is that there is such nostalgia for past methods of waging war. What is called the age of TNT (conventional war) started in Europe with the Battle of Crecy in 1346. The monopoly of gunpowder as the principal factor in destruction in wars, ended at Hiroshima in 1945 when atomic munitions were added to the classic chemical ones.

During these six centuries of gunpowder dominance, major wars were constantly being waged. Dr. Quincy Wright wrote that between 1482 and 1941, that is, between the end of the Feudal Age at the Treaty of Arras and the entry of the US into WWII, there were 278 wars. The inventory of damages and destruction and the killing of people that took place during these 559 years of almost continuous warfare would seem to be somber enough to preclude any desires to re-assemble the conditions that made it possible. Since 1945 the existence of atomic weapons, and the threat of their use, has limited the frequency of major war if not eliminated it for all practical purposes.

The Bottom Line

If the lack of major wars can, in fact, be attributed to the deterrent created by the threat of military forces equipped with atomic weapons, how can we be sure that the elimination of this threat will necessarily be to the advantage of the human race? At best, such a drastic change in the world environment leads to some curious and complex questions that should be debated and resolved before the US and its Free World allies rush headlong into accepting it.

This need not mean that we should resist the pursuit of peace and the reduction of military threats. What it does mean is that we should identify likely adverse effects of doing this too rapidly, buy insurance where appropriate, and devise replacement incentives and policies for the critical government and social activities that will be disrupted or eliminated if such a peace can in fact ever be brought about.

Should it turn out that either the Communist Party were to replace the present leadership with a classic hardliner of the Stalin variety, or should *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and Gorbachev's peace initiative and atomic weapon and missile reduction proposals merely be tactics to further the same old Communist objective of world domination but by other means such as Space control, premature acquiescence to these, no matter how attractive they might appear to be, could result in irreversible Free World actions that would jeopardize our freedom and security.

Do we really want to take such risks? And, if the answer is yes, as it is likely to be, though based more on emotions than intelligence, should we

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not at least buy a little security insurance by insisting on the deployment and maintenance of SDI-type defenses prior to massive reductions in offensive weapons and pending clarification of both Soviet motives and the consequences of lasting peace?

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SOVIET INTENTIONS IN SPACE

By Graham Kinahan

There has been a great deal of discussion in the press about the Soviet space program. Very little is said about possible motives behind these successful exploits, however. Since the U.S. space shuttle program has been grounded, we can only look with envy at their success – programs like the permanently manned MIR space laboratory, the routine launching of payloads, and grandiose plans to send cosmonauts to Mars within a few decades. Our technological lead is eroding and in some categories we are falling way behind.

The American space program, which once boasted of missions to the Moon, planetary probes to the outer solar system, and the prospect of cheap, reliable space transportation, has somehow hit the doldrums. We have failed to formulate, embrace, and articulate a comprehensive space policy. Without this we lack necessary funding and support.

It is not the scope of this article to review these shortcomings, however. Instead, it is proposed to focus on Soviet intentions. A critical examination of their objectives, by policy makers and the press alike, would serve to give strong impetus to our own space program.

The Soviet Union is experiencing profound change under its current political leadership. It has been suggested that the new climate in U.S.-Soviet relations would make joint ventures, among other developments in space, both possible and profitable. We must ask ourselves if this is in our national interest. In short, should our views regarding the transfer of space technology, the utility of a space station, and plans to revisit the Moon be altered by our perception of 'glasnost'?

It will be argued that although major political and economic reforms are taking place, which are possibly in the interest of the West, the Soviet leadership, nonetheless, is not renouncing its threatening space objectives. They seek to become the dominant power. While publicizing information about a limited number of civilian programs, they cloak their commitment to an aggressive military space program. They appear to promote international goodwill and make overtures for greater cooperation. However, they aim to deny other prospective space- faring nations tree access to the resources above.

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While many would have us believe that we are presently in a period of calm and tranquility, the opposite is true. The new Soviet leadership is employing public criticism and attractive euphemisms in a campaign to streamlie a Leninist society. In spite of this, there is little evidence that Gorbachev has departed from the ideological goals and political objectives of his predecessors. He faces formidable obstacles, however, and we should not be overly optimistic as to the success of his 'restructuring' campaign.

In order to transform Soviet society and compete effectively against the pluralistic societies and free market economies of the West, the Communist party must oversee a decentralization of its own authority. Whether this will breed complete chaos or a variant of 'enlightened despotism' remains to be seen. In the space arena, they continue to secure many benefits from their heavy investments. For one, they enjoy prestige throughout the world for their persistence and many triumphs. For another, they have an intuitive feel for the military utility of outer space – both for the possibilities of supporting operations on the ground below, as well as denying access to the 'high ground' and beyond to their enemies.

We must realize the magnitude of the challenge they pose and not be duped by lofty propositions to go, arm-in-arm with our Soviet brethren, to unlock the mysteries of Mars, for example. Let us remember the past, that our concern was not misplaced, that our efforts were not in vain, nor misdirected, and proceed forth with vigilance.

Since the dawn of the space age, we have to varying degrees been concerned about losing the race to the heavens. These sentiments have varied in intensity, ebbing and flowing according to our perception of the political climate between our two nations. For reasons of sovereignty, force projection, and even latent strains of 'Manifest Destiny' – as well as prestige – we have sought to have a presence in space.

For over thirty years, the two superpowers have been rivals in this arena. With the launching of Sputnik – the propaganda coup of the decade – Eisenhower had to put aside plans of diffusing the Cold War and scaling back government sponsored R & D. With a steady hand on the military bureaucracy and the purse strings, he committed the nation to a full-fledged military and civilian space program. We countered token examples of Soviet technological prowess with exploits of our own: Explorer I drew us even with Sputnik; Congress eventually created NASA; and President Kennedy set our sights on reaching the Moon.

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Khrushchev's initial successes had led Many Americans to question our way of doing business and our educational policies. With effort, we rebounded quickly. Any illusion that the Soviets would soon hold sway over the 'beacon of world prosperity and limited government' soon evaporated. However, we could never overlook the fact that there were serious stakes involved.

Khrushchev, one of the last of his kind, was a true believer in the inherent superiority of his communist society and was willing to act upon his impulses. He would be followed by leaders less willing to test the limits of 'the system'. Only Gorbachev, appearing almost thirty years later, would seek to make his mark in a similar fashion. Both men tried to shake the very foundations of Soviet society. Khrushchev was unsuccessful; it remains to be seen if Gorbachev will achieve a similar fate.

Khrushchev believed the space program would restore luster to Lenin's dictums: the words 'rocketry' and 'revolution' reverberating among the susceptible peoples of the world. He believed that the very essence of Sovietism meant the steady march of technology. In sweeping aside the excesses of his predecessor Stalin, and his lamentable economic and agriculturul track record, Khrushchev hoped to put some spark back into plans for world domination. With the 'correlation of forces' in his favor, Khrushchev believed he could overcome the odds.

But he failed to guard his flanks' he had not counted on such a recalcitrant bureaucracy and obstinate but powerful party apparatus. Lacking the Stalinist tools of repression, and having pricked the bubble of the 'personality cult', Khrushchev had little in the way of leverage left at his disposal. A succession of blunders, a brittle economy and an inadequate technological base, exacerbatcd by boastful rhetoric, were to prove his undoing. In addition, the Americans came thundering past with a steady stream of technological achievements, once again reaffirming those hallmarks of our nation, teamwork and innovative spirit.

Some two decades after Sputnik, America had put a man on the moon, launched interplanetary probes, established a global array of communications and remote sensing satellites, and conducted experiments in a space laboratory. The Soviets had fallen behind. Making only incremental changes with each mission, they were content with modest gains and gave up going to the moon. There were more important projects to which resources were devoted: the construction of intercontinental missiles. The potent

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threat of mighty SS-18s did give us pause. Yet, our access to space always appeared secure...until now.

Americans also diverted their attention to more earthy concerns, ranging from civil rights to the war in Vietnam. We overlooked the slow, steady advance of the Soviets. The U.S., the metaphorical 'hare', would one day be sufficiently distracted, placated, or overcome with self-doubt, so as to be restrained from streaking past the totalitarian 'tortoise'.

Kremlin leaders have observed this process in several instances. They employed shrewd tactics at the arms control table. We made little objection to the legitimization of their offensive military posture; we were duped into a decade of detente. Our outrage over the consolidation of Soviet rule in Czeckoslovakia and later in Afghanistan has dissipated; normal relations have resumed between the two superpowers.

In the last 15 years, the relative standing of the U.S. and Soviet space programs has changed. So has their character. Selective Soviet publicity now focuses on what appears to be strictly civilian programs. Their propaganda stresses the humanitarian and scientific aspects and keeps silent about the overwhelming and unambiguous military dimensions. Moreover, they point the finger at the U.S. Our lack of recent civilian space successes coupled with the high visibility of our Strategic Defense Initiative fans the fires of anti-American rhetoric. This lends false credence to the argument that we are responsible for the militarization of space.

A turning point in their attitudes towards space came in 1967. Before the USSR signed the Outer Space Treaty, the need to defend against possible attacks from outer space was stressed. Now they insist their exploits are all non-military. However, when their capabilities are matched with a basic understanding of their space doctrine, their true intentions are more clearly revealed. In the words of a recent Defense Intelligence Agency report: "Western analyses of the Soviet space program provide convincing evidence of Moscow's intention to acquire military superiority in outer space. Soviet military space capabilities illuminate Soviet objectives in outer space much more effectively than their statements do."

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS – THE REST OF THE STORY

By Ralph Westberg

Peace euphoria runs high. We can communicate with the new Soviet leadership. Negotiations have brought results – the INF Treaty is signed and further agreements seem promising. But do these changes and agreements increase our national security and herald in a peaceful world? To answer that question, we need to focus on the critical issue – the role of nuclear weapons. The following document steps back to look at "the big picture" to clarify our past, present and future doctrines on this subject.

The Problems

As a point of reference, it is important to identify the problems that are caused by nuclear weapons. An analysis of this subject brings up three basic situations that need to be addressed. They are:

1. Nuclear ICBM missile accident
2. Nuclear ICBM missile proliferation
3. Nuclear first strike

Because of the importance of each of these problems it is desireable to briefly explain them.

Problem Number 1: "The nuclear ICBM missile accident." Accidents inevitably occur whenever a combination of men and machines are mixed together. As a result, we need to address the problem of "when" and not "if" the nuclear missile accident will occur. The consequences of a nuclear missile accident are catastrophic since we have no defense today to stop even a single errant missile. Some of these missiles carry ten multiple targetable warheads. If one of these missiles happened to strike two or three major American cities with its multiple warheads, we would look upon untold devastation – possibly 5-10 million lives lost, 2-5 million people severely injured, an immediate doctor, hospital, and medical supply shortage; and many of the major banks would probably be bankrupted from the massive property losses. This would be an incredible disaster which possibly could stop our country economically in its tracks.

Problem Number 2: "Nuclear ICBM missile proliferation." Obviously since these weapons represent ultimate military power, many nations desire to have them in their arsenals. Unfortunately, as more nations deploy these weapons, it increases the chance of problem number 1, the nuclear missile accident. Also, we must address the haunting specter of

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some irrational dictator having four or five of these missiles. How will we handle that threat, since we don't have a defense to stop even a single missile.

Problem Number 3—"Nuclear first strike." Most Americans believe this is so far from reality that they discount the possibility of it happening. They forget Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately the possibility of such an attack is very high. During the past twenty years, there has been a shift of offensive and defensive weapons that now favors the Soviets over United States. Today if the Soviets utilize the advantage of a surprise attack and we respond, the percentage of population losses between the two countries would be very uneven. One civil defense expert estimated the ratio of American to Russian casualties in a nuclear war could be 20 to 1.

What is the reason for the disparity between these two numbers? First, the Soviets massive offensive buildup coupled with improved missile accuracy now gives them the potential of destroying our missiles in their silos and our bombers on the ground. Secondly, the Soviets defensively have deployed an anti-ballistic missile system (ABM), a massive air defense, and in addition they have an extensive civil defense program giving protection to many of their citizens. In comparison our offense is smaller and most of it has become dated and we do not have any meaningful defensive measures in place.

In war, the risk/reward ratio is of main consideration. If, to the Soviets, the risk is high and the reward is low, we are in a safe condition. However, if the risk is low and the reward is high, then the potential for war is high. Unfortunately we are in the latter condition as supported by Soviet first strike pronouncements.

Facing these three problems we must ask ourselves how are we defended today. The answer includes a dramatic shift in defense policy. With the advent of nuclear armed missiles during the 1960s, we adopted a new strategy called Mutual Assured Destruction. The appropriate abbreviation for this strategy is MAD. This strategy basically stated: it is impossible to build a perfect defense to stop all missiles and since a single missile would be so destructive, it would be foolish to build a defense. Therefore, rather than deploy a defense, we would protect our country by threatening devastating retaliation upon any attacker. As a result of adopting this strategy of MAD, we have allowed our air defense to degenerate into an impotent force, we have stopped and curtailed any meaningful civil defense program, and we have dismantled our single ABM system which we had deployed. Basically, after adopting this strategy, we find our country incapable of stopping even a single accidentally launched missile, and not able to effectively stop a bomber launched offense.

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Some people will ask that since MAD has worked for almost thirty years in preventing a nuclear war, why do we need to change our strategy? The basic problem is that our potential adversary, the Soviet Union has not adopted the same strategy. They have built up a tremendous defensive system including the world's only deployed anti-ballistic missile system (ABM), a massive air defense system, and an extensive civil defense system. Coupled with this, they have continually upgraded their offensive system. The problem we face today as a result of the Soviet buildup and our 20-25 year old B-52 bomber force, fifteen year old Minuteman missile fleet, lack of civil defense, lack of air defense, lack of an ABM, is that the MAD strategy has lost most of its value in deterring the Soviet Union. We now represent a tempting nuclear first strike target.

In addition, we are totally unprotected against the inevitable missile accident, and we will face increased danger as more and more countries proliferate by obtaining ICBM weapon systems.

Also, there is a moral problem with MAD since we base our deterrent mainly upon killing innocent civilians. The scenario of a first strike leaves us only with a retaliation against civilians in Russian cities since our missile fleet does not have the nuclear punch to take out any remaining hardened (stationary) Soviet ICBMs or locate and destroy their mobile ICBMs.

To illustrate the moral dilemma further, consider the three options the president of the United State has following a single accidentally launched ICBM against our cities. One option would be to do nothing and absorb the warheads. Another option would be to launch a missile and take out a similar number of cities. A third option would be to launch a massive nuclear retaliation.

Obviously, option number one to absorb the warheads is very poor. Our country would have suffered the greatest setback in its entire history. There are no meaningful reparations that could be made by the country that caused the accident. Option number two, to take out a similar number of cities, is morally bankrupt. There is no way that we could justify killing millions of innocent lives because of an accident. Number three, to launch a massive nuclear retaliation, would be unthinkably tragic. But these are the only options our president has today. Morally there is a great problem with them and also with basing our nuclear deterrent on holding the Russian citizens as nuclear hostages.

In addition, a nation without a vision for the future will perish. A serious negative attitude is created in the minds of our youth thinking that their lives could be extinguished within minutes by a nuclear attack. Why should they invest in a career, in education, in a family, etc. How much of the "live today for we die tomorrow" philosophy causes moral, drug, al-

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cohol, and apathy problems. Obviously the MAD doctrine is a negative doctrine on the youth of today and our future leaders of tomorrow.

Solutions

We have two choices to solve the nuclear weapons dilemma. They are either to establish arms control treaties or to deploy a defense. Both solutions can be tested for validity by applying them to the three problems associated with nuclear weapons. The results follow.

Assume that we have obtained a 'perfect' treaty – one in which there is no way either country can violate its terms. Obviously a perfect treaty is unobtainable, but it does illustrate the optimum results we can expect from the treaty solution. Also we must realize that even with a perfect arms control treaty, it is not possible to reduce the levels of these weapons down to zero. For if we do this, another country could obtain several missiles and possibly hold us hostage. Also, we must realize that as we approach the zero quantity of missiles, the proliferation pressure goes up dramatically. The reason for this is that other countries can threaten a super power by obtaining a similar small number of missiles. Therefore, we must settle on some arbitrary minimum number of missiles – possibly three to five hundred. Now, let's look at the problems.

Problem number one – "nuclear ICBM missile accident." With each side having three to five hundred missiles, the potential still exists for a missile accident. If that occurs, the treaty in itself will provide no protection for those cities and people who could be destroyed by the warheads. In contrast, a defense could strike down the errant missile with no loss of life or property.

Problem number two – "nuclear ICBM missile proliferation." In order to have a treaty prevent proliferation, we would need to obtain a binding treaty with each country that may acquire the missiles. Obviously since we have spent over twenty years *trying* to obtain a good, not perfect, treaty with the Soviets, it is unrealistic that we would be able to obtain treaties from other countries that would meaningfully prevent proliferation. On the other hand, the deployment of a defense changes the rules of the game. Since a small number of missiles can't penetrate the defense, countries must deploy hundreds of missiles to have a threatening offense. Since a large missile fleet would be too costly for other countries to deploy, the pressure for proliferation would be almost reduced to zero.

Problem number three – "nuclear first strike." If we are protected by a 'perfect' treaty and the Soviets decided to break the treaty (which they consistently do) and launch a first strike, the treaty would provide us with absolutely no security. However, a deployed defense changes the strategy of the potential attacker. The defense does this by making a successful at-

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tack uncertain and risky. In other words, with a defense protecting our missiles, the attacker does not know how many of our missiles he can destroy in their silos. As a result, he does not know how many of our missiles will retaliate on his country. That uncertainty in itself should prevent any potential attacker from making this fateful decision. As a result of defending our missile fields, the potential of first strike is collapsed, and we are protected.

Summary

In summary, there is a decisive contrast between the effectiveness of arms control as compared to a defense to solve the nuclear weapons problems. Even a 'perfect' treaty, which is not realistically achievable, gives us no security or protection, while a defense neutralizes the problems.

Since a defense is the solution, it is beneficial to define the term "defense." A defense consists of two parts, a passive portion and an active portion. The passive portion consists of civil defense, while the active portion destroys incoming enemy missiles and bombers. The two systems work together synergistically. In other words, having the two systems functioning together multiplies their effectiveness.

As to the question of a defense being moral, to defend oneself or his country from attack has been an inherent right for all ages. A defense harms no one. It is the moral approach to deter war and prevent blackmail.

Urgency

The urgency necessary to solve the problems caused by nuclear weapons poises the question – How soon can we build a defense to neutralize the threats to our country? We must address the twofold nature of a defense. Obviously, the *passive* defense can be built, since we have the technology and capacity to create a viable civil defense program. All it requires is to make the decision, and it will be done.

The *active* defense is also capable of being built. Since exotic defensive weapons using lasers and particle beams are not fully developed, we should immediately look to the technologies that are now available such as kinetic energy and ground launched defenses. The imminent possibility of an accident or first strike demands immediate action.

Kinetic energy is impact energy. Since our missile interceptors and the enemy warheads would have a combined impact velocity of approximately 18,000 mph, the war heads can be destroyed by impact with a small object. Tests have been made with an "aspirin sized" plastic pellet penetrating 4 inches of cast aluminum when impacted with a velocity of 15,680 mph.

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Utilizing this kinetic energy principle, one proposal would be to deploy thousands of small one foot long unguided rockets around each of our ICBM silos. These mini-rockets would be launched in clusters of thousands toward each incoming enemy warhead, just before the warheads reached our silos. This 'shotgun' approach would make it unlikely the attacker could destroy the bulk of our ICBMs in their silos, and as a result be uncertain of success in his attack. This technology is over 30 years old and could be deployed in under 3 years at less than 1/2 of 1% of the present defense budget.

Another system that could be deployed within 5 years is a ground launched guided missile that would destroy in space any incoming ICBM including an errant or accidentally launched missile. This system would supplement the small ground launched rocket system. Both systems together would cost us less than 1/2 of 1% of our present defense budget on a yearly basis for 5 years.

These basic systems give us a security level that we do not have today, by collapsing the first strike threat and the danger of an errant or missile accident. When we make the technological breakthroughs on the more exotic space defensive systems, we can add them for increased security.

Responsibility

If we have achievable solutions to the nuclear weapon problems, who has the responsibility to defend us? A basic responsibility of our federal government is to defend the freedom of our citizens. The preamble of our constitution states that our government is "to *provide* for the common defense." That we have no defense today against the most deadly enemy we have ever faced may be recorded as one of the great tragic decisions of all time. We must not let our federal government officials abdicate their responsibility.

Since our government has a prime responsibility to defend us, why are we not defended? We are undefended today as a result of adopting the MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) strategy in the early 1960s. In 1972 we made this strategy official doctrine with the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty. This treaty forbids the general defense of the United States against a missile attack. As a result, the treaty prevents our use of the defensive ground launched rockets and guided missiles previously mentioned. We are allowed, however, by this treaty one ABM launch site. After building and deploying this site, it was dismantled a very short time later to completely comply with the MAD strategy. The ABM Treaty may be abrogated upon a 6 month notice if either nation feels their security is threatened.

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If we are totally undefended, then what is SDI? SDI stands for the Strategic Defense Initiative. It is commonly referred to as 'Star Wars' and would be, if deployed, solely a defense against enemy missiles. SDI was formed as a result of President Reagan's March 23, 1983 speech to our nation on defense. In this speech our president declared, "wouldn't it be better to save lives rather than avenge them by destroying enemy missiles rather than people [Russian]. This approach would replace Mutual Assured Destruction with Assured Survival."

The objective of SDI is to research and develop the systems to accomplish this task. The SDI program does not include production or deployment of these systems. Its main emphasis has been on development of the more exotic defense weapons (laser and particle beam) rather than the kinetic (impact) energy technologies that could be deployed immediately.

Finally, what can we do as individuals to change the vulnerable position we find ourselves in? We need to become informed and then inform others. We need to exercise our influence in the civic arena to hold our representatives in government accountable on this crucial issue. To be effective we need to write our congressmen on a *regular* basis. They have been sworn in to uphold the constitution and have, as a result, a prime responsibility to defend our country. We need to make sure they know that there is a solution, and that we want action taken to change this situation, while the lamps of freedom are still burning.

Definitions

ABM – is the abbreviation for anti-ballistic missile. This is a device designed to destroy ICBMs and their war heads. It may be a projectile, a beam or guided object that can be either ground or space launched.

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency (US Government)

DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency (US Military)

First Strike – to strike your opponent first – to launch the war. In a nuclear attack its primary purpose would be to destroy the opponents nuclear offense. Its secondary purpose would be to destroy the opponents industrial capacity (major cities). The ICBM because of its short 30 minute flight time and tremendous destructive force is the critical weapon in a first strike. A first strike is not viable if the ICBM threat is neutralized by a defense.

High Frontier – a private non-profit organization that was formed in 1981 as the result of President Reagan's personal request to General Graham for a solution to the nuclear missile dilemma. High Frontier's solution to the problem is to replace Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)

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with Assured Survival by deploying a ground and space based defense to obsolete the ICBM.

ICBM—the abbreviation for Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. The ICBM is an offensive weapon with an inter-continental range. It carries 1 to 10 hydrogen bomb war-heads and flies on a ballistic trajectory (course is determined at launch.)

Kinetic Energy—The formula for kinetic energy is $KE = 1/2\ MV^2$ (Kinetic Energy = 1/2 mass of object times its velocity squared.

NORAD—North American Air Defense Command

APPENDICES

Appendix A

"The Soviets have far surpassed our country in military power and already have achieved *overwhelming military superiority* over the United States which *may soon prove decisive;* a superiority whose details are almost completely unknown to the American people"

(Quentin Crommelin, Jr. and David S. Sullivan, *Soviet Military Supremacy,* Defense and Strategic Studies Program, University of Southern California, 1985, p. II.)

Appendix B

"Today, the Soviet Union has concentrated its nuclear firepower in a massive, modern ICBM force that's *optimized for use in a preemptive strike against us*. In fact, if we were struck without warning by a Soviet preemptive attack, it's possible that ninety percent of our own ICBMs would be destroyed, that most, if not all, of our bombers would be gone, and that more than half of our strategic submarine fleet would be sunk in port.".

(Dr. George Keyworth, Science Adviser to President Reagan, *Air Force Magazine,* Nov. 1984, p. 128.)

Appendix C

"The *preponderant* base of evidence in the Soviet literature designed for internal use calls for their *striking first* against the west *with maximum surprise* when the situation calls for war and when the factors are in the Soviet favor."

(Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber, *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War*, Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press, 1979, p. 106.)

"The launching of the *first massed nuclear attack* acquires decisive importance for achieving the objectives of war."

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(Marshal K.S. Moskalenko, Soviet Deputy Minister of Defense, 1969, as quoted in *Can America Catch Up?* Committee on the Present Danger, Washington D.C., November 1984, p. 1.)

"There is profound error and harm in the disorienting claims of bourgeois idealogues that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war. The peoples of the world *will* put an end to imperialism, which is causing mankind incalculable suffering."

(Col. V.F. Khalipov, in Milovidov, et al., Editors, The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War, 1972, as quoted in *Can America Catch Up?* Committee on the Present Danger, Washington D.C., November 1984, p. 1.)

"The Soviet Union *has* military superiority over the United States. Henceforth the United States will be threatened. It had better get used to it."

(Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, 1979, as quoted in *Can America Catch Up?* Committee on the Present Danger, Washington D.C., November 1984, p. 1.)

"We have concluded that it is difficult for Americans to attack us with nuclear weapons. We lived in the fear of such a possibility for three decades, but not any more. I can promise you that there will be many an occasion that we shall again *astonish* you in the West."

(Aleksandr Yakovlev, Candidate Member of the Soviet Communist Party Politburo, *U.S. News & World Report,* June 1, 1987.)

Appendix D

"North America is a sieve. Any capable [Soviet] bomber pilot can underfly our radar coverage whether he be headed for Washington or wherever. It would require no great aviation skill to penetrate our current early warning system."

(Gen. John L. Piotrowski, USAF Commander, NORAD/Space Command, *Aviation Week & Space Tech,* April 16, 1987, p. 73.)

"The Soviet Union can credibly *threaten a first strike* to decapitate the United States' military capability today and we cannot do anything about it. This great country of ours today stands *utterly defenseless* against the danger of an annihilating nuclear attack. Yet, the polls indicate that at least 60 percent of our citizens are unaware of the nation's *vulnerability."*

(Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham (USA, Ret.), former Deputy
Director of the CIA and later DIA head, February 1987,
The American Legion, February 1987, p. 18.)

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Appendix E

"The most important development in international relations in 1985 was the growing *vulnerability* of the United States. American vulnerability is so new, so inconsistent with our history and our expectations, that we find it nearly *impossible to believe, to remember or to cope with."*

"The United States and Europe are *already* vulnerable to attack by the Soviet Union. How much more vulnerable do we dare to become to a power that daily demonstrates its will and skill in the use of deadly force?"

"Some progress has been made in restoring American strength, but each year the Soviet advantage *increases."*

(Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, quoted in *a Washington Post* syndicated column, January 5, 1986.)

"The Soviet Tupolev Tu-95 Bear-H bombers that routinely fly simulated strike missions within 50 miles of the North American coast are carrying *live cruise missiles* instead of training with empty bomb bays."

(Gen. John L. Piotrowski, USAF Commander, NORAD/Space Command,

Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 6, 1987, p. 73.)

"The Soviet Union is *now* in a position to launch, win and survive World War III...and with fewer casualties than it suffered in the last world war."

(Major General George Keegan, Jr., former U.S. Air Force Chief of Intelligence, *The American Legion,* May 1987, p. 55.)

Appendix F

"The *inability* to destroy hardened Soviet military targets is the greatest shortfall in the Strategic Air Command's operational capability."

(General Larry D. Welch, Air Force Chief of Staff, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 27, 1987.)

"The USSR has hardened its ICBM silos, launch facilities and key command and control centers to an *unprecedented* degree. Much of today's U.S. retaliatory force would be *ineffective* against those hardened targets."

(Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of the CIA, World Affairs Council of Northern California, November 25, 1986.)

"Minuteman, Poseidon and the bombers [U.S. offense] are *technically incapable* of putting at risk the hardened, time-sensitive targets [Soviet ICBMs] needed to enforce deterrence."

(House Armed Services Committee Report, May 10, 1985.)

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CRISIS INSTABILITY AND THE NEED FOR SDI

By K. Scott McMahon

Historical discussion of the nuclear predicament has focused primarily on the horror and destructiveness of nuclear weapons and mutual deterrence of their use by the superpowers. While the presence of several thousand nuclear weapons on each side of the Iron Curtain may constitute a convincing deterrent to purposeful war, the question of *inadvertent* nuclear war has not been properly addressed or prepared for. A combination of factors including complex warning and intelligence systems, human fallibility under stress, Soviet emphasis on pre-emptive attack, and the likely emergence of "launch under attack" (LUA) as the only credible doctrine for an undefended U.S. retaliatory nuclear force, have created a milieu that will be extremely unstable during any serious political or military crisis between the superpowers. Indeed, the relative peace humanity has experienced since the Second World War may be *in spite of* the deterrent postures of the two superpowers, not because of them.

The Free World must not rest its future security on the hope that superpower crises can be avoided and a spirit of East-West cooperation maintained. Peace will prevail only if the relationship can weather political/military storms where the president of the United States, in some situations, may have less than ten minutes to assess an apparent attack and order a response.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) offers a better option. With SDI deployed, the U.S. National Command Authority (NCA) would have time to verify intelligence concerning the nature of an attack on the West and then decide on a course of action. This would reduce the chance of an unwarranted launch of American nuclear forces on the basis of ambiguous warning and intelligence.

Lessons of the past include a number of instances in which American nuclear forces were put on alert in response to Soviet actions or a failure of the U.S. warning and intelligence system.

A sampling might include:

- As a demonstration of resolve, nuclear signals were sent to the Soviet Union five times during the Berlin crises from January of 1948 to June 1961.[1]
- During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, American nuclear bombers circled the Soviet Union and awaited orders to attack.

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- Failures of American warning and intelligence include some *fifteen hundred* false alarms at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) during the year 1979,[2] including one incident in which a test tape displaying a full-scale Soviet attack on the United States was mistakenly loaded into a computer and broadcast to an understandably shocked staff at NORAD headquarters. Minutes later, fighter aircraft from three different bases in the United States and Canada scrambled to airborne alert status and US ICBM and submarine bases nationwide switched automatically to higher readiness levels.[3]

The events mentioned above are examples of the kind of incidents that the US warning and intelligence establishment must contend with. It is crucial to note that in the cases of Soviet provocation (excluding the Cuban missile crisis) the USSR did *not* respond to increased American alerts by increasing the readiness levels of their own nuclear forces. In the cases of American warning and intelligence failures, it is important to remember that these incidents did *not* occur during a time of crisis between the superpowers. Had these events occurred in today's era of advanced first-strike weapons, the results might well have been tragic.

That these incidents did not lead to a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union is partly a credit to the contemporary national leadership of both sides, American appraisal of and reaction to the events, and partly a stroke of luck. Serious scrutiny of the crisis assessment systems currently employed by the superpowers suggests that while the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) may successfully prevent war during times of stability, the interaction of American and Soviet warning and intelligence procedures could create potentially explosive stress during periods in which either nation felt threatened. The results of such stress were recently demonstrated in the Persian Gulf when the American warship Vincennes mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian airliner. Having engaged naval targets earlier in the day, the captain and officers of the U.S.S. Vincennes legitimately felt that any approaching surface vessel or aircraft represented a potential aggressor. The Captain's wariness was heightened by the knowledge that his AEGIS guided missile cruiser was an offensive platform, lightly defended and vulnerable to attack by the anti-ship missiles carried on Iranian warplanes. In the heat of the moment, the Vincennes's captain and officers were unable to correctly identify the approaching airliner and chose to destroy it rather than risk a catastrophic loss of their ship and crew.[4] On a larger scale, the choice to "use it or loose it" during a superpower confrontation could lead to a complete breakdown of deterrence and the outbreak of thermonuclear war.

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Today, one might consider the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union to be one gigantic network of acting and reacting components. The warning and intelligence regimes on both sides are a catalyst between American and Soviet nuclear forces.[5] During the early stages of an East-West confrontation, the intelligence organs of both sides would closely monitor the movements of every troop formation, warship, and aircraft in an attempt to discern the intentions and resolve of enemy leadership. It is here that the danger of inadvertent nuclear war becomes a frighteningly real possibility.

As the crisis develops further, each side will feel compelled to take defensive actions to protect its strategic and tactical nuclear forces to demonstrate resolve and increase the deterrent value of these forces. Defensive actions may include the dispersal of bombers to various airfields, a mass exodus of ballistic missile submarines from port, and a distribution of tactical nuclear weapons to commanders in the European theater. However, while one superpower may take its actions as defensive measures, the warning and intelligence systems of the opposing side may be perfectly justified in considering these tactics to be preparation for a nuclear first strike.

During this period of action and reaction, the military and political leaders of both sides will have to make sense of a flood of real-time information on all aspects of the situation, attempt to assess the intentions of the opposing military forces, and remain clearheaded despite the knowledge that a submarine- launched ballistic missile (SLBM) may turn their locations into smoldering craters at any minute. Thus, it may be safe to assume that under this kind of extreme duress the creative problem-solving capabilities of each side's national leadership may be discarded in favor of standard operating procedures (SOPs) that were created long before the crisis began. At this point the nuclear doctrines of both the United States and the Soviet Union would further heighten the crisis mentality and suspicion of each country's leadership.

In the mid-1960s the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that peace would be best maintained through a war-deterring strategy based upon nuclear parity—MAD. Unfortunately, the nuclear strategies of the superpowers have evolved away from the MAD doctrine to the point where continued adherence to this all-offensive deterrent posture, especially during times of crisis, may contribute to the *outbreak* of general war rather than its prevention.

Just as the intertwining alert systems of the opposing superpowers cause instability in a crisis, so too will the offensive military strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union.

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Careful study of Soviet military doctrine reveals that while the USSR would rather prevent the outbreak of war between the superpowers and achieve the Soviet Union's objectives through other means, deterrence based upon nuclear parity does not guarantee continued peace between East and West. For this reason, the Soviet Union has invested extensively in a nuclear warfighting capability that includes pre-attack warning and intelligence assets, an active defense of their own National Command Authority, and post-attack civil defense.

The Soviets will never allow another surprise attack such as the Nazi blitzkrieg of June, 1941. Soviet military doctrine has placed a premium on the ability of the nation's various intelligence-gathering resources to ascertain exactly when deterrence will break down and hostilities will commence. The most dire threat currently faced by Soviet leadership is NATO's stated intent to break up any attack on Western Europe with a "first use" of nuclear weapons targeting Warsaw Pact forces and their associated command and control authorities.

Targets of a NATO attack on Soviet command and control may include the General Secretary of the Communist Party and the Politburo on the political side, and the General Staff on the military side. Indeed, the centralized structure of the Soviet political leadership and the military command virtually invites attack.

Destruction of the Communist Party (CPSU) of the Soviet Union

CPSU would lead to loss of political/military control of the nation and a probable end to the Soviet Union's role as the "vanguard of world socialism." For the Soviet leadership, this is simply not an acceptable outcome of any conflict with the West. It explains, however, the Soviets' obsession with the anti- ballistic missile system (ABM) that surrounds Moscow, and the extensive hardened facilities under and around the city.

To prevent a successful first use of nuclear weapons by NATO, the Soviets would rely on intelligence agents that have probably penetrated military organizations in most or all of the Western Allies to report on the intentions and capabilities of NATO forces. Satellite reconnaissance would monitor NATO mobilization procedures including the movement of naval formations, bomber groups, and armored divisions. Soviet intelligence agents under diplomatic cover in various Western embassies would report on political statements and government attempts to prepare their population for war.[6]

The Soviet military and political leadership would then use the early stages of a superpower crisis to analyze data from their intelligence-gathering assets and attempt to predict the exact moment that NATO leadership would decide to "go nuclear." When it is agreed that the mo-

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ment has arrived, the Soviets would then beat NATO to the punch with a pre-emptive strike of their own designed to destroy the entire spectrum of NATO's offensive forces. An attack of this kind would, at the very least, target between two and three nuclear warheads on all British, French, and American command and control structures, ICBMs, strategic bomber groups, and submarines in port.

Since these counter-force targets are completely undefended, the Soviet General Staff would have a high degree of confidence that this initial attack would be successful. Furthermore, the General Staff could use the remainder of its Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) as *third-strike* weapons to threaten the destruction of Western cities. This would nullify the retaliatory second- strike threat of American SLBMs. The Kremlin could then expect an American president to capitulate rather than subject hundreds of millions more Western citizens to nuclear annihilation.

A Soviet decision to launch a pre-emptive strike on NATO may not be the final interaction between the offensive strategies of the superpowers. In the age of highly accurate ICBMs and short-flying-time SLBMs, the ability to "ride out" a first strike and respond in kind with a second strike – the foundation of the MAD doctrine – may be a thing of the past.

If a crisis did develop between the superpowers, the American commander-in-chief would immediately be forced to consider the vulnerability of undefended U.S. strategic forces and the expressed Soviet intent to destroy these weapons in a pre-emptive nuclear first strike. Under these circumstances, the only way to maintain NATO's strategic forces as a credible deterrent would be to place them in a launch under attack mode.

Launch under attack or "launch on warning" (LOW) was the strategy in the earliest days of nuclear deterrence when bombers were the principle delivery systems. The theory held that when warning of an attack came, bombers could launch to the safety of the skies and avoid destruction on the ground. If the alert was false the bombers could always be recalled. The modern ICBM will not turn back on orders from the commander-in-chief. Furthermore, in the era of the strategic bomber, military and political leaders had several hours to discuss the validity of an impending attack and, if necessary, decide on a response. Today, the president may have less than ten minutes to analyze a mountain of ambiguous and even conflicting data from warning and intelligence sources worldwide and those circling the globe. As commander-in-chief, the president will know that he himself is a prime target and that he must make one of history's most momentous decisions in less time than it takes him to stroll the White House grounds. If the warning is false and he launches by mis-

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take in an attempt to save his retaliatory forces, he instantly becomes history's greatest criminal.

These possible responses to an apparent attack all assume that the president would function rationally under the extreme psychological pressure of a nuclear nightmare. Unfortunately, launch under attack leaves no time for human indecision or soul searching. If LUA is to be a credible posture under the MAD doctrine, then American missiles must be guaranteed to respond to an attack *no matter what*. This will require that the decision to launch devolve to commanders in the field at places such as SAC and NORAD, and to the individual men and women who will be expected to actually launch ICBMs by following standard operating procedures.

While it is clear that LUA raises the specter of inadvertent nuclear war to new heights, it is currently the only way the West can credibly threaten to retaliate as required by the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction.

Today the world rests at the edge of an abyss created by the MAD doctrine. Before the First World War, Europeans felt that the balance of power would ensure peace forever. In reality, Europe sat atop a volcano composed of intertwining alerts and mobilization procedures which eventually exploded, resulting in an unprecedented loss of life. Seventy years later humanity has forgotten the lessons of the Great War. Once again man has allowed himself to believe that peace in the past is a guarantee of peace in the future. But the situation today is far more desperate than it was three generations ago. Modern armies will not take weeks to mobilize for war. Today the men and machines of war are ready to fight at a moment's notice. Should the new "balance of terror" begin to fail, the superpowers would be locked into the ultimate cat-and-mouse game of warning and alert.

Pre-emption, first- and second-strike, launch under attack, first use: the names of the war plans have changed since 1914, but their effects will be the same. During a crisis each superpower will become hyper-sensitive to the actions of the other. The difference between offensive and defensive mobilization procedures will be lost in a fog of suspicion as each side perceives the other's actions as preparation for a first strike. Unlike 1914, however, modern military and political leadership will not have time to properly assess the intentions of opposing forces. The time constraints and "use 'em or lose 'em" mentality imposed upon NATO and the Warsaw Pact by an all-offensive deterrent posture will push the superpowers over the edge and into the abyss of thermonuclear war.

The senseless instability and threat to world peace created by adherence to the MAD doctrine is even more illogical when a solution to the problem is within our grasp. The first step toward peace and stability is to

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realize that the huge arsenals of highly accurate offensive missiles on both sides of the Atlantic have made riding out a nuclear first strike increasingly unlikely. The second step is to recognize that when weapons outgrow strategy, strategy must be changed to avert disaster.

In comparison to their predecessors, the people of the Free World are fortunate in that they have recognized the problem and proposed a solution—the Strategic Defense Initiative. Strategic defenses represent a change from the offensive doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction to a defensive one termed Mutually Assured Survival.

Ballistic missile defenses deployed by the superpowers—the USSR has finally admitted the existence of a domestic research program—would immediately remove many of the existing causes of crisis instability.

With SDI, the CPSU would no longer fear the loss of political control resulting from a decapitation-type first use of nuclear weapons by NATO. The president of the United States would not be forced to place his missiles on a launch-on-warning status for fear of losing them in a Soviet pre-emptive attack. Most importantly, the military and political leadership of both superpowers would have *time*. Time in the nuclear age enables the National Command Authority to properly assess warning and intelligence. Time allows more options to be discussed and creative problem-solving to occur, rather than an immediate regression to standard operating procedures that could worsen the crisis. Ultimately, the more time the NCA has to analyze a developing crisis, the less likely he is to order an unwarranted launch of his nuclear forces on the basis of ambiguous and conflicting information.

A fundamental strength of strategic defenses is their inability to increase tension during an East-West confrontation. The kinetic-kill and directed-energy weapons employed by strategic defenses cannot penetrate the Earth's atmosphere; thus they would be unable to take offensive actions against ground targets. In addition, peaceful launches such as satellites and manned space vehicles could be distinguished from ICBMs by their differing trajectories.

In contrast to an alert of offensive forces, the decision to activate defenses would not be a potential threat during a superpower crisis. Hence, SDI would not contribute to the reinforcing alerts that characterize the warning and intelligence regimes associated with offensive nuclear weapons. In fact, during a crisis a deployed anti-ballistic missile system would give the United States or the Soviet Union the option of enabling defenses alone while maintaining offensive systems at their day-to-day readiness levels. This would allow the NCA to demonstrate resolve and add credibility to his nation's offensive deterrent without his actions being misread by the opposing leadership as a hostile pre-attack maneuver.

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Strategic defenses have the chance to be a source of stability during a superpower confrontation; offensive nuclear systems no longer have any such chance.

The outdated doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction has placed mankind in an extremely dangerous position. We cannot realistically expect total nuclear disarmament in the near future, nor can we expect NATO and the Warsaw Pact to remain on a war footing yet peacefully coexist forever.

With time the current situation will only deteriorate further. Eventually the generations who survived the carnage of two World Wars will be gone, having taken the memories of general war with them. The West is already seeing the emergence of nuclear warfighting as a realistic option should deterrence fail. Indeed, the ability to fight and win a nuclear war has long been a key objective of Soviet military doctrine and force structure. When there is no longer anyone who remembers the horror of past world wars, who will counsel calm during the storm? When the MAD doctrine leaves the leaders of the nuclear weapon states no option but to seek victory through a first strike, who will recall the lessons of the past?

If in a future crisis the leaders of East and West feel that deterrence will fail, they must have more than the option to kill or be killed. The Strategic Defense Initiative will be a stabilizing factor during a crisis, decrease the chance of inadvertant nuclear war, reject nuclear warfighting as a viable scenario, and give men the option to protect rather than destroy. Ultimately, strategic defenses will offer the superpowers a chance to step back from the abyss of nuclear war. It is a chance *mankind* deserves.

FOOTNOTES

1. David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1986), 51.
2. Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1983), 56.
3. Bracken, 54.
4. Elizabeth Pond, "Strategic Arms Talks Seek Reductions—with Stability," *The Christian Science Monitor* 7 July 1988: pg. 1. 5. Bracken, 159.
5. Bracken, 159.
6. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, eds., *Managing Nuclear Operations* (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1987), 499.

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KILLER BEES, NEGATIVE GATES AND HIBERNATION: AN EFFECTIVE SDI SYSTEM FOR DEPLOYMENT NOW

By Klaus P. Heiss

March 31, 1988
Updated August 21, 1988

I. The "Kinetic" SDI Options: Current Technology and Outlook

The interception of (nuclear) ballistic missiles immediately after launch is the foremost promise of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The need for an immediate deployment of an SDI capability for operational readiness in the 1990s is self-evident:

(1) Intercept of accidental launches, the "impact cost" of which by itself ($10 billion to $100 billion+ randomly over the US) would justify the whole system cost;

(2) Soviet "social systems instabilities" in the 1990s, not dissimilar to those plaguing the demise of the Austro-Hungarian empire which did lead to World War I;

(3) Rogue Soviet submarine commanders, particularly if composed of dissident non-Russian nationalities or radical left-wing ideologues (Stalinists); and

(4) Third country missile threats.

Lest one forget, the movement of the Soviet Union toward more democratic forms of government and decision making is a recent one, and violent reactions within the Soviet system to these positive changes will be a major destabilizing element in world relations over the next decades. After all, after hundreds of years of dictatorships of one kind or another, and in view of a multitude of nationalities, faced with the "decentralizing" forces of economic reform, it would be too much to expect such dramatic change to occur without the prospect of major violence.

This primary factor for potential instability and strife of A NUCLEAR POWER is the primary reason for the need to deploy SDI now.

A variety of options are being pursued by SDIO, the kinetic systems having the greatest immediate (next decade) promise.

Much has been made by the ideologues of the MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) doctrine, and their stealthy allies in some of the academic community, that "SDI" is not workable for the next decade, and hence

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should not be considered other than for research purposes. These critics studiously ignore that:

(1) The Soviet Union already has deployed an SDI system for terminal defense around Moscow and continues to upgrade and improve it with technologies based "on other physical principles" (the language of the ABM treaty text, e.g. fiber optics); and

(2) The KKV (kinetic kill vehicles) technologies have rapidly advanced over the last few years to a point where the technical ability to intercept ICBMs in the all important boost phase (the first three minutes) is assured with high probability: after all, evasion, camouflage, deception is close to impossible in a massive event such as the launch of an ICBM.

While substantial progress is being made in this and related areas, the key obstacles to kinetic SDI systems certainly include:

(1) Complexity of detection, tracking, guidance, CCC and associated data processing requirements. In most SDI system designs, these nodes are highly concentrated;

(2) Vulnerability of these concentrated nodes and the KKV "garages" themselves, and the CCC system;

(3) Distance of the "garages" to the missiles to be intercepted;

(4) The need for multiple launches from any one "garage" at the same time;

(5) Power requirements for station keeping;

(6) Maintenance and refurbishment of the system;

(7) System monitoring and testing to assure operational readiness;

(8) Probability of intercept, given the distances to the likely targets to be intercepted – with further CCC requirements imposed on the defense for co-ordinating the relatively many missiles not killed in the boost phase. Decoys and countermeasures become orders of magnitude more effective after the boost phase; and

(9) The "Nitze" cost effectiveness criterion "at the margin" (cost combined with probability of intercept of missile(s) vs. costs of additional missiles or evasive measures);

Many of the systems considered by SDIO require extremely centralized co-ordination, command, control and communication functions on a global scale. In part these functions are imposed by the technologies considered (directed energy systems, KKV clusters), in part they are due to "Cultural Habits": it is difficult to convince central planners of the efficiency of decentralized market economies, and military professionals of the advantages of dispersed, unco-ordinated guerrilla warfare.

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Furthermore, the notion continues to persist, that the interception of nuclear missiles is a potential trigger for holocaust scenarios, while the fact is that KKVs have minimal destructive (explosive) effects.

What is needed is a simple, primitive system with close to 100% intercept capability. This is only possible by radically increasing the entropy (dispersion without central control – i.e., chaos) of the system design.

Such a radically different system is proposed herein. The underlying philosophy of the proposed system borrows heavily from basic propositions and insights long proven in economics, in risk management and in the theory of games.

On the technical side progress has been so vast, that recently Lowell Wood of Livermore has proposed "brilliant pebbles" of very limited size and cost ($50,000 or less per "pebble") for kinetic intercept of ICBMs. While indeed technology trends clearly make these devices feasible within current technology developments (say a Phase 2 KKV system for the late 1990s), one can proceed immediately with the deployment of individual KKVs of extreme simplicity, high reliability and a close to certain intercept probability of individual or a selected few ICBM launches.

Three main obstacles have plagued KKV systems:

(1) When bunched in garages, the average random distance to the ICBM may be 400 miles, imposing severe requirements on intercept speeds and ranges for the KKVs "at the margin." The "bunching" was deemed necessary because of the complexity of the energy, optics and command, control and communications requirements for KKV uses if coordinated centrally;

(2) The vulnerability of the detection, tracking, command, control and communications nodes in a centralized system; by destroying these nodes, the KKV SDI system is rendered ineffective; and

(3) The vastness of the software required to run/operate such a centralized KKV-SDI system.

To overcome these difficulties, a radically simplified KKV – SDI system is being proposed, in analogy to the logic governing bee colonies: individually deployed KKVs capable of independent detection, optimization and interception within its assigned coverage "circle."

Research has shown that bees are able to locate "targets" autonomously with a minimum of energy, information and intelligence, yet do so over long distances using economic flight patterns.

To appreciate the feasibility of a totally decentralized SDI system, the "critics" should remind themselves of the following simple facts:

(1) The proposed KKV systems can not intercept or cause damage within the atmosphere since each KKV will burn up during "accidental"

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re-entry: it has no ablative protection, nor does it need such protection in space. Hence the nightmares of "unauthorized" activation causing World War III are imaginings;

(2) KKVs can only destroy ICBMs AFTER LAUNCH: what possible reason can be advanced not to attempt to intercept such objects – with megaton nuclear warheads on them – at the earliest possible time right over the enemies territory? What is gained by waiting for these objects to reach domestic shores before intercept, or worse, to have no ability to intercept such missiles as is the case today for the U.S. – albeit not the Soviet Union?

II. BEE-KKVs: A High Entropy Simple Autonomous KKV System

The "BEE-KKV" system consists of autonomous KKVs with:

(1) Initial "technology demonstration" deployment of 100 to 200 units in "conformance" with the spirit of the ABM Treaty and the recent proposal by Senator Nunn on the need to indeed have such a capability (albeit in Nunn's case only a terminal one) – estimated total costs about $1 billion;

(2) Deployment of up to 10,000 individual KKVs after the technology demonstration phase and without Soviet agreement to radical reductions in ICBM forces as proposed by President Reagan – estimated costs about $10 billion;

(3) Autonomous intercept capability of each KKV when turned ON;

(4) A "Negative Gate" CCC structure: KKVs within CCC communications beams are OFF (dormant), while cessation of CCC links turns KKVs ON for autonomous detection and intercept;

(5) Hibernation state of BEE-KKVs for most (all) the time in non-crisis situations. Just as in hibernation "test" interrogations and other minimal functions would be performed to maintain operational readiness during dormancy;

(6) A "minimax" KKV intercept strategy: intercept of the minimum distance (closest to the decision center) enemy missile within a maximum (programmable) operations horizon;

(7) A two-dimensional ("bee type") intercept logic based on tracking distance within the decision circle;

(8) Supplemental refurbishment "hives" in space, at sea and on land with, say, up to 100 KKVs per hive, capable to release KKVs on demand.

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The keys to the efficiency of this approach are:

(a) The "Negative Gate" and Hibernation Approach: it allows most (all) KKVs to be dormant most of the time, thereby minimizing the exhorbitant power and fuel requirements incurred by constantly active systems;

(b) The two-dimensional "bee-type" intercept logic allows the KKVs to operate with minimum positioning knowledge (up or down): the KKV will home in on the target by observing parameter changes (e.g. two-dimensional distance) over time (proportional guidance);

(c) The high degree of dispersion and autonomy (disorder, enthropy) of the deployed KKVs, with a minimum of central control and co-ordination: random distances to boost-phase intercept targets are minimized, vulnerable nodes are eliminated; and

(d) A maximization of "survival" chances against primitive or sophisticated countermeasures aimed to destroy the KKVs. The cross-section of these BEE-KKVs is an order of magnitude smaller than the KKV garages contemplated by SDIO. Also, some primitive countermeasures can not be effectively employed against these highly dispersed and numerous KKVs, since doing so would effectively deny access to Space to the enemy power as well. In addition, the kill probability for eliminating the BEE-KKV capabilities would remain small: there are no central assets of any kind to be destroyed in the most basic case. What is not there can not be destroyed.

The approach is not dissimilar to changing a centrally planned economy to a market driven decentralized system with local optimization.

In addition to the primary "Negative Gate" systems design, a variety of simple, or complex, systems can be superimposed to activate individual KKVs, or groups of KKVs.

"BEE-KKVs" can be deployed based on current technology, at minimum cost, least complexity, minimum vulnerability, and great assurance of boost-phase intercept. The system provides global coverage and intercept capabilities equivalent to KKV reliability.

Just as in economics the idea of a vast central "computing authority" with all the attendant data processing requirements is vastly inferior to the decentralized approach taken in market economies, in which each individual optimizes within his horizon and with the information available to him, so it is in SDI: a highly dispersed, "chaotic," and autonomous system – at the lowest possible "individual level" – should vastly simplify the system requirements, increase the efficiency of the system and maximize the likelihood of intercepts – particularly in the most critical and productive boost phase. Such a "High Entropy" system is:

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(1) A totally 'dispersed' system in that each kinetic kill vehicle is deployed separately – e.g. 10,000 (as against 100 'garages' with 100 KKVs or 1,000 garages with 10 KKVs);

This would roughly double the number of known manmade Space objects in Earth orbit.

If equally spaced, each KKV would cover about 20,000 square miles from 200 to 300 miles altitude. More efficiently, the KKVs should be dispersed in a combination of polar and medium inclination orbits to maximize coverage of enemy sites – fixed and mobile.

Special coverage can be provided for clusters of enemy missile deployments: through orbit and deployment optimization and back-up "BEEHIVES" in stand-by orbits, launch on demand from land or sea, deployment of BEESWARMs over ICBM clusters.

Minimax algorithms can be developed to optimize such dispersal patterns. Given the high number of KKVs, a variety of "mixed strategies" can be used in the deployment and operation of this dispersed system.

(2) Each BEE-KKV is made fully 'autonomous', in that it is capable of acquiring and discriminating launch vehicle 'signatures', and when so recognized will initiate itself to launch and intercept (unless overridden) by a central CCC in an "active management" option (if affordable or survivable);

(3) Its decision whether to intercept or not will be based on (variable) minimax distances – without any central co-ordination, and minimum co-ordination with its 'neighbors' in maximum alert (automatic) operating mode;

(4) Simple local co-ordination logics between KKVs, e.g., when deployed in clusters for back-up purposes, can also be added. It has been shown that "swarm" behavior is based on minimal co- ordination procedures. Similarly, BEE-KKVs "swarms" can be provided with simple co-ordination rules, e.g., FIFO (first in first out) LIFO (last in first out), CIFO (closest in first out), with the decision and co-ordination rules designed to optimize intercepts within the SWARM CIRCLE. Designation(s) as to which swarms KKVs are assigned to – if any – could be varied;

(5) The system will also be able to individually activate specific KKVs, if and when so desired. More complex decision layers can be overlaid, but will not be necessary, for more discriminating operations;

(6) The intercept circles will overlap, but the minimax decision mode will assure the interception of the closest missile by the closest KKV. In some cases two KKVs will intercept the same missile, but better twice 'dead' than one live nuclear missile;

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(7) The programmed 'intercept' distances can be varied through updates from CCC: in the initial phases of deployment the KKVs will be deployed at relatively higher altitudes, with larger intercept 'circles' and longer intercept distances;

(8) With increasing deployment of KKVs, say from 1,000 to 5,000, the newly deployed KKVs will be at lower orbits, with smaller intercept circles and distances. It may not be cost effective to lower the initial KKVs, in which case overlap occurs. Or the initial KKVs can be reprogrammed for higher altitude intercepts, or back- up intercepts;

(9) "Depleted" KKVs can be replaced in wartime by individually launched KKVs, or supplemented by "swarms" launched on demand, and KKV "hives" parked in standby orbits for KKV replacements in space to fill any gaps created by enemy actions;

(10) The KKVs can be 'gravity gradient' stabilized, with no need for continuous 'pinpoint' accuracy before ignition, with the detection system designed so as to be able to operate within its 'circle' with the attitude accuracies given; and

(11) A two-dimensional "bee-type" intercept logic ("target, change of target over time within circle") may allow KKVs without any 'location' knowledge, alleviating the need for GPS or onboard positioning systems or knowledge. (Bees home in with a minimum of information: increase or decrease in measured parameter).

To-date the key obstacles to the consideration of such highly dispersed systems are the very high energy requirements for attitude control, orbit maintenance, data processing – IF THE TOTAL SYSTEM HAS TO BE OPTIMIZED AND CENTRALLY CO-ORDINATED.

But just as bee-colonies – and 'markets' – work by each individual optimizing SOLELY within his 'circle' of concerns, so should a highly dispersed KKV system. To allow such decentralization of decision making with 'local' optimization, the power requirements for KKVs and their subsystems need to be minimized. Power requirements are minimized, when the system is inactive.

Ideally, the system should be inactive most of the time, without losing any of its ability to intercept. This is achieved with a "Negative Gate" CCC design.

III. The 'NEGATIVE GATE' & HIBERNATION Approaches

To alleviate the high power requirements – and other resulting systems requirements – from the decentralization of the detection and decision function to each KKV, in the BEE-KKVs approach the tables are simply turned by having the KKVs turned OFF in a non-crisis situation (most, if

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not all of the time), and turned ON in a crisis situation. The OFF state is similar to the state of hibernation, wherein a few, low energy functions are continued, while most parts of the system are off, to conserve energy and assure longevity.

A crisis situation may be the detection of one single unannounced – or unauthorized – missile launch; or can be initiated by a presidential decision; etc.

The ON-OFF decision is controlled by communications beams from Geo – or any other CCC platform: as long as KKVs are 'illuminated' by these beams, the KKVs within the beams are OFF; when outside a covering beam the KKVs are automatically on.

Worldwide at most three simple communication satellites are needed, with multiple beams, so as to allow global coverage and the efficient 'regional' activation of KKVs, e.g., in the case of rogue missile attacks, mini-missile states of the 1990s, etc.

The more beams on the communications platform, the more detailed the management capabilities for the system.

The same CCC platforms should also house any early warning detection systems, and other co-ordinating and household functions, since these CCC platforms now become dearly beholden to the adversary: any interference, destruction etc. of these platforms will lead to the automatic activation of all KKVs within the region, the exact opposite of the effects desired.

Override logics can be build into the KKVs for 'friendly' missiles. CCC back-up systems should be in place in Space and on the ground.

Communications security – e.g., against enemy signals to de-activate the KKVs becomes paramount. This, however, can easily be assured by a variety of techniques. In the worst case optical (laser) communications to each KKV will assure security of override.

PLEASE NOTE: A 'NEGATIVE GATE' CCC STRUCTURE ONLY WORKS WITH A HIGH ENTROPY (AUTONOMOUS, DISPERSED) KKV SYSTEM. Garages require a variety of more complex co-ordinating functions from and with other platforms, and hence are open to vulnerability when active.

Also, with KKVs aggregated the random distances to the likely enemy targets to be intercepted are vastly increased (for similar numbers of KKVs deployed.

IV. Effectiveness of BEE-KKV System

Given the simplicity of the design, and the operations philosophy, a High Entropy BEE-KKVs approach will assure early deployment capability at minimum cost and high assurance of success:

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- The basic systems components are not dissimilar from a "STINGER" missile;

With the deployment of 10,000 dispersed KKVs:

- Intercept distances are minimized (150 to 200 miles max);
- Detection capabilities maximized;
- Intercept probabilities approach KKV reliability (95%, 99% ?);
- Co-ordination requirements are minimized (only between the KKVs of a given "swarm" and its operations circle);

Countermeasures are few, if any:

- The 'fast burn' option, much vaunted by critics, would be of minimal value in case of the highly dispersed system, since any one missile launch – from wherever worldwide – is likely to be within 150 miles or less of a KKV, with the enemy missile in fact approaching the interceptor during ascent on a rather deterministic trajectory, with little or no evasive capability;
- The system is indifferent to fixed or mobile ICBM threats;
- Multiple warheads, or decoys, are not yet an issue, with decoys to 'missile' launches readily discriminated;
- Loss of one interceptor means losing 1/10,000th of the capacity, rather than 1/100th or more;
- Clustering of launches can be countered with supplemental BEES-WARMS from standby, in-orbit hives, or by launches on demand, to saturate certain regions;
- The simple KKVs may be impervious to EMP and 'blinding' effects: the KKVs are OFF unless the CCC beam is OFF. This allows for extremely effective battle management (with narrow spot beams);
- Kinetic intercept methods are inapplicable to this design approach. Each individual KKV has an extremely small cross-section, there are 10,000 + of these objects, no central nodes of any magnitude exist or are required, and the number of "kinetic primitives" required would deny access to space by the enemy power in peace-time and assure destruction of their own ICBMs in war-time, a truly self-defeating "countermeasure";
- Disposal of KKVs after 'useful' life (hopefully unused) can be simple vertical launch toward designated ground areas (also useful as tests of the system);
- The first unit costs may be several million dollars. A Phase I (technology demonstration) development could be achieved for a TOTAL RDT&E cost of about $1 billion). The average costs for the KKVs with a produc-

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tion of 10,000 units may be at or below $1 million, for a total cost of $10 billion (a full boost phase intercept capability!);

- The deployment costs of the KKVs - through "BEEHIVE" launches of, say, 100 each can be minimized and are easily affordable even with existing ELV launch vehicles capable of multiple deployment (e.g. 19 deployments from one Titan launch were achieved over a decade ago); total deployment costs of 10,000 KKVs can be less than $10 billion even when using Titan IVs (say 100 KKVs per launch);
- The deterrent effect against "third country" ballistic missile threats (India, Pakistan, Libya, Iran, etc.) is achieved even with the initial deployment of, say, 100 KKVs, the number of interceptor missiles allowed under the ABM Treaty;
- Replenishment of KKVs can occur 'on demand' in case of 'depletion': one Titan or HLV launch could deploy up to 100 additional KKVs, or 10 launches could assure 1000 additional KKVs, dispersed as desired. Replenishment 'hives' could also be pre-deployed in Space;
- Navy launched BEESWARM KKV capabilities are also possible to 'augment' or 'supplement' any deployed space capabilities. These could be particularly effective in regional defense situations;
- Parts of the BEE-KKV technology will prove useful also in regional defense applications against ballistic missile threats; and
- If desired, BEE-KKVs can make use of more sophisticated CCC capabilities – and battle management assets, to be used also for intermediate and terminal defense capabilities. However, while these capabilities are clearly feasible (and more attractive than, e.g., terminal defenses only as proposed by MAD advocates), these additional uses of BEE-KKVs are not essential to their main mission and role: the boost-phase intercept of nuclear ICBMs IMMEDIATELY AFTER LAUNCH.

V. Conclusions.

The proposed system is well within the reach of US Space systems technology TODAY, the costs are easily estimated and exceedingly low when compared to other system cost figures usually associated with SDI, and with additional technological advances and optimization the effectiveness of the system may well approach 100% at easily affordable costs.

No new launch systems capabilities – or other technology advances are required. 100 or 200 BEE-KKVs can be deployed for about $1 billion. This is less than the cost of one random 1 Megaton nuclear missile impact anywhere over the continental United States. The Nitze criterion of cost effectiveness "at the margin" – or wherever else – is clearly met.

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THE FBI: PERENNIAL TARGET OF THE LEFT

By W. Raymond Wannall*

Beginning in the late 1930's and continuing into the 1960's, Congress passed a number of laws requiring FBI investigations into the controversial area known as subversion.[2] Among these were the Foreign Agents Registration Act (1938); the Smith Act (1940); the Internal Security Act of 1950; the Communist Control Act of 1954; and the riot and bombing statutes of the 1960's.

This type of legislation was controversial in its inception and passage and an anathema to the leftist elements in our society. Being unsuccessful in their efforts to prevent the adoption of these laws, they gradually began to concentrate their energies on preventing investigations necessary to enforce them. Soon these efforts were coordinated under established, well-funded organizations; such as, the Institute for Policy Studies and the American Civil Liberties Union. A brief word about each of these organizations is appropriate.

The Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)

The IPS was incorporated in 1963 by Richard Barnet, formerly with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Marcus Raskin, who had served on the staff of the National Security Council.[3]

S. Steven Powell, author of *Covert Cadre--Inside the Institute for Policy Studies*, on May 19, 1988, provided the following overview regarding the Institute:

> IPS has cooperated with the intelligence services of hostile foreign powers to thwart U.S. policies; created news services, investigative reporting groups and journals that blow the cover off U.S. intelligence operations; exposed classified information on U.S. defense plans; engaged in active measures to break up U.S.

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*Mr. Wannall originally prepared this article as a study for the Security and Intelligence Foundation, a tax-exempt educational center with offices at 2800 Shirlington Road, Suite 405, Arlington, Virginia, 22206.

[2]Defined in 1981 edition of Webster's *New Collegiate Dictionary* as, "A systematic attempt to overthrow or undermine a government or political system by persons working secretly within the country involved."

[3]Rael Jean Isaac, "The Institute for Policy Studies: Empire on the Left," *Midstream*, (June/July 1980).

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> alliances; raised money for communist governments and produced propaganda on behalf of those governments; opposed every new U.S. weapons system; and advocated unilateral steps toward disarmament.[4]

In his book on the IPS, Mr. Powell reported that Marcus Raskin, co-founder of the Institute, addressed the 1970 Washington Convention of Federal Employees for Peace, Equality, and Priorities. He told his audience that because "the Capitalist system in the United States is causing imperialism and aggression in other parts of the world...the FBI, Secret Service, intelligence services of other government agencies, and the military should be done away with...."[5]

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)

In 1977, the Church League of America issued a pamphlet outlining how the nation's internal security safeguards were being destroyed. It reported that over the years since its inception in 1920, the ACLU

> has consistently spoken out vehemently against the House Committee on Un-American Activities and its successor, the House Committee on Internal Security. Similarly, the Union has been violently against the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and the Subversive Activities Control Board, as well as the counter-subversive actions of the FBI and the CIA.[6]

Significantly, these congressional committees and the Subversive Activities Control Board have been abolished and the FBI's Internal Security Branch eliminated. The CIA's foreign counterintelligence operation headed by the now-deceased James J. Angleton was closed down in 1975 and only recently resurrected by Judge William H. Webster, present Director of Central Intelligence.

According to the Church League of America pamphlet, in its 1970-71 Annual Report the ACLU stated, "The ACLU has made the dissolution of the Nation's vast surveillance network a top priority....The ACLU's attack on the political surveillance is being pressed simultaneously through a research project, litigation, and legislative action." After citing

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[4]Personal letter dated May 19, 1988, received from S. Steven Powell. For details supporting this overview, see *Covert Cadre--Inside the Institute for Policy Studies* by Mr. Powell, published 1987 by Green Hill Publishers, Inc., Ottawa, IL.

[5]Powell, Op. Cit., p. 97.

[6]"Protecting Traitors, Spies and Terrorists," pub. by the National Laymen's Council of the Church League of America, (422 North Prospect Street, Wheaton, IL, 60187, 1977), p. 10.

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some of the investigative techniques the ACLU seeks to abolish (wiretapping, use of undercover agents, "subjection [sic] of enormous numbers of people...to routine police surveillance because of their political activities"), the conclusion was drawn: "The term 'political,' as used by ACLU, most often refers to communist subversive activity!"[7]

Coordination of Anti-intelligence Activities

In October, 1979, Mr. Francis J. McNamara, former Executive Secretary of the Security Activities Control Board, addressed the Fifth Annual Convention of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, held in Reston, Virginia. He reported that the nationwide campaign against the FBI, CIA, and other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community was then being coordinated by a group called the Campaign for Political Rights (CPR), previously known as the Campaign to Stop Government Spying. The CPR described itself as "a national coalition of over 80 religious, educational, environmental, civic, women's, black, Latino, and labor organizations" which "serves as a national information clearinghouse providing materials, organizing-assistance, press and publicity advice and speaker-scheduling to organizers across the country." This umbrella-type organization was said to have two basic aims: to end all covert action abroad and to terminate what it termed "political spying and harassment in the U.S."

Mr. McNamara stated that among the CPR's 51-member and 30 cooperating organizations were IPS, ACLU, Americans for Democratic Action, Center for National Security Studies, Federation of American Scientists, National Lawyers Guild, National Organization of Women, Committee for Public Justice, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and several communist fronts. Interestingly enough, Morton H. Halperin, present Director of the Washington Office of the ACLU, has headed both the Center for National Security Studies[8] and the CPR, as well as the latter's predecessor organization, the Campaign to Stop Government Spying.[9]

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[7] Ibid., pp. 10, 11.

[8] The anti-intelligence role of the Center for National Security Studies, a spin-off of the IPS, is described in Footnote 13, infra.

[9] *Periscope*, official organ of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, Volume IV, No. 4 (Fall, 1979), p. 5.

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The FBI--"Why Me?"

The enemies of the FBI are, indeed, articulate, formidable, and all pervasive. Better than most they understand the intelligence mission of the Bureau, and, left unchallenged, will remove the anti-bodies which keep the nation immune from threats which exist from within, and even from without, our borders.

Other than anti-intelligence forces, who have been well-educated on the subject, how many understand the differences in the roles played by the FBI and the CIA? CIA has no authority to operate within the U.S. without the concurrence of the FBI. It was established to perform outside the country, on the world scene of intelligence and counterintelligence. Investigations within our borders in the domestic security/intelligence area and the foreign counterintelligence field are the primary responsibility of the FBI. While, in the vernacular, CIA is considered a conglomeration of "spooks," the FBI has its own spook operation.

To fulfill his constitutional duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed,"[10] the President must rely on the nation's principal investigative arm, the FBI, to conduct investigations of activities which may violate federal laws. And these laws cover the spectrum from so-called "speech crimes" (Smith Act, Seditious Conspiracy Statute) to threats from spies, saboteurs, and international terrorists.

Title IV, Section 4, of our Constitution requires the Federal Government to protect each state in the union against invasion and against domestic violence. As executive power to accomplish this is vested in the President,[11] he must be aware of developments which may lead to invasion and, more likely, to domestic violence. He has the implied constitutional right to set up mechanisms to acquire the information (intelligence, if you will) sufficient to forestall activity which if uninterrupted could lead to invasion of, or domestic violence against, any state. This is a constitutional prerogative of the nation's Chief Executive Officer and efforts on the part of the Legislative Branch to limit, curtail, or eliminate it should be viewed with grave misgivings. It is within this context that we must consider any congressional efforts to disrupt the security, intelligence, and counterintelligence responsibilities of the FBI, to which the Chief Executive over the years has delegated the investigative functions he requires.

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[10] *U.S. Constitution*, Title II, Section 2.

[11] *U.S. Constitution*, Title II, Section 1.

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In view of the long and continuing efforts of the anti-intelligence lobby to eliminate intelligence operations of the FBI and, in effect, convert it to a Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation, people at the Bureau must surely be saying, "Why me?" As in any organization made up of a cross-section of Americans, the FBI has been involved in incidents generating criticism. However, all-in-all, its track record for performing its duties and discharging its responsibilities measures up to the performance of any element of the Government. Internationally, it is recognized as a leader in the fields of law enforcement, counterintelligence, and counter-terrorism. Foreign law-enforcement and intelligence officials travel to our country to take advantage of its training programs and to study its methods and procedures. Little wonder the FBI must be wondering, "Why me?"

There have been numerous efforts in the past to curtail, and in some instances to eliminate, the FBI's intelligence and counterintelligence functions, not just in its domestic security area, but in its important role of identifying and neutralizing foreign agents, spies, and terrorists. Several of these, in the form of proposed legislative charters for the Bureau, began following the politically oriented hearings conducted in 1975-76 by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence, chaired by former Senator Frank Church of Idaho and referred to as the Church Committee.

Orientation of the Church Committee

Richard Barnet, co-founder of IPS, had a personal rapport with Senator Frank Church. When Church formed his committee, which did so much damage to the U.S. Intelligence Community, he placed a number of people from the Center for International Policy (CIP) in key staff positions, among them William G. Miller who became Church's Staff Director and David Aaron who was a leader of one of his task forces. The CIP was formed with the help of the Director of the Transnational Institute, IPS's international arm, with Richard Barnet as a consultant.[12]

Other staff members of the Committee reflected the left-liberal bias of its chairman, Senator Church. F.A.O. Schwartz, Jr., who was selected as Chief Counsel, had served as counsel for an anti-Vietnam war organization controlled by Marxist-Leninists and as treasurer for an American

[12] Powell, Op. Cit., p. 61.

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committee with a consistent record of defending terrorist actions in black Africa.[13]

Throughout 1975 and 1976, the Church Committee was influenced by a report, "The Abuses of the Intelligence Agencies," published by the Center for National Security Studies (CNSS)[14] and widely circulated on Capitol Hill. The report was a mixture of fact and fiction, with documentation ranging from KGB agent Wilfred Burchett and CIA turncoat Philip Agee to government reports.[15]

In assessing the objectivity of the eleven Senators who made up the Church Committee, one must consider that six of them had their sights set on the White House, including the extremely liberal Frank Church, Walter Mondale, and Gary Hart. Staff Director William G. Miller took note of the fact that problems arising within the Committee derived from the "natural clash of egos and ambitions," especially as a result of the "large group of aggressive litigators who are seeking in part glory and are prone to the phototropism of televised hearings."[16]

Loch K. Johnson in his 1985 book on the Church Committee operations, *A Season of Inquiry*, reported that Miller said that Senator Church was "too abuse-oriented" and some thought this reflected the influence of Fritz Schwartz; others believed the Senator was "dazzled by the klieg lights."[17] Whichever, however, Senator Church led his Committee through a political inquisition which inflicted more damage on the FBI, CIA, and other intelligence agencies than the KGB had been able to accomplish in more than 40 years.

On April 26, 1976, the Committee issued *Book II, Final Report*, covering the FBI. It is anything but an impartial, detached view of the

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[13]David Martin, "Investigating the FBI," *Policy Review*, (Fall, 1981), p. 114.

[14]The IPS works closely with numerous organizations having limited agendas. One of these is the Center for National Security Studies (CNSS) which focuses on intelligence agencies. Formally a project of the Fund for Peace and the ACLU Foundation, the Center was an IPS "social invention." It is influential with Congress. While the image it tries to project is of a group concerned with finding a balance between intelligence needs and civil liberties, many of its associates have been involved with *Counterspy*. This magazine has called for the abolition of CIA and has in the past tried to make it impossible for that Agency to function by publishing the names and addresses of its agents worldwide. See Rael Jean Isaac and Erich Isaac, *The Coercive Utopians*, Regnery Gateway, Inc. (Chicago, 1983), pp. 109, 118.

[15]Powell, Op. Cit., pp. 69-70.

[16]Loch K. Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry*, (The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), p. 97.

[17]Ibid., p. 74.

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FBI. Its authors demonstrated biases and predilections, disregarded salient facts, and ignored findings of the Attorney General as well as those of a committee he appointed to review certain Bureau operations,[18] subjecting them to severe criticism. Further, the report writers proposed restrictive procedures for various operations without having sufficient background to form sound judgments. In criticizing the large number of domestic security investigations conducted by the FBI without resulting in criminal convictions, they completely ignored the provisions of statutes such as the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 which for 21 years was the basis for a great majority of domestic intelligence investigations conducted by the FBI.[19] After defining the threat posed by the world communist movement, Congress decreed, "The detention of persons who there is reasonable ground to believe probably will commit or conspire with others to commit espionage or sabotage is, in a time of internal security emergency, essential to the common defense and to the safety and security of the territory, the people and the Constitution of the United States." Under this detention statute, the FBI conducted tens of thousands of intelligence investigations during the period 1950 to 1971 to determine who might come within the congressional decree. These investigations had no criminal bases and were not directed toward prosecutive ends. The anti-intelligence forces came out strongly for the repeal of this statute and it was abrogated in September, 1971, partially removing the legislative basis for an entire category of domestic intelligence investigations.

The report of the Church Committee is subject to indictment for not only what it says, but for what it frequently fails to say.

The Legislative Assault

Within a year of the demise of the Church Committee, the intelligence antagonists began an assault on the FBI through legislation designed to set in concrete a series of rules to circumscribe its intelligence role.

In many respects, their proposals for reforms sought sustenance through a rootstock weakly anchored in the shaky sands of the Church

[18] Domestic counterintelligence programs known by the acronym COINTELPROs. For a presentation on the reasons for, and the justification and legality of, these programs, see "Setting Straight the FBI's Counterintelligence Record," by W. R. Wannall, *The World & I*, published by the Washington Times Corporation (January, 1987), pp. 167-177.

[19] Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C 811 et seq. (Subchapter II--Emergency Detention of Suspected Security Risks).

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Committee report. Some legislators and many of their staff members regarded this report as a compilation of basic truths about the FBI, a platform on which to build a morass of controls and restrictions which could adversely affect our Government's efforts to ferret out detractors and enemies who observe no controls or restrictions and for whom no holds are barred.

Three of the most active and outspoken of the scores of groups supporting anti-intelligence measures are the ACLU, The Center for National Security Studies, and The Committee for Public Justice. On February 12, 1977, at a Capitol Hill press conference, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark introduced a 19-page proposed congressional bill hailed as "A Law to Control the FBI." Co-sponsored by the three groups aforementioned, it was described as a comprehensive statute that would produce the kind of FBI which "civil libertarians" would like to see. A review of the suggested statute quickly revealed that it would have met even more enthusiastic--if not jubilant--approval from subversives, spies, and terrorists.

Aside from outlawing or drastically curtailing investigative techniques utilized in law-enforcement and/or intelligence operations ever since day one, the legislation, if adopted, would have eliminated all domestic and some foreign intelligence and counterintelligence functions of the FBI. A preface to the bill pointed out that it would leave "no doubt as to what is the Bureau's criminal enforcement jurisdiction and no room for the Executive Branch to mold the FBI to fit White House policies."[20] What was left unsaid was that it also would have denied the President the ability to acquire intelligence needed to discharge constitutional obligations--absent the creation of another investigative agency to perform this function.

The reference to "White House policies" suggests that in addition to efforts to shackle the Bureau, the sponsors of this legislation were also currying favor by carrying the ball for Congress, then engaged in a battle to seize control of powers which for many years had been exercised by the Executive Branch: foreign policy initiatives; covert actions; military decisions. In this respect, the FBI was caught in a political power struggle.

The draft legislation launched by Ramsey Clark was accompanied by a section-by-section analysis to explain reasons for the various proposals. Some reasons were fatuitous. For example, so-called "speech crimes" laws were to be repealed--Riot Act; Seditious Conspiracy Statute; Smith

[20] "Civil Libertarians Propose Curbs on FBI," *Washington Post*, (February 16, 1977), p. 4.

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Act; Voorhis Act; Peacetime Military Sedition Act; Wartime Military Sedition Act. The sponsors of the "Law" indicated that the very fact that the FBI was investigating actual or potential violations of these statutes was reason enough to repeal them.[21] They evinced no discernible concern for the potential results of repeal of laws passed in the first instance to protect our form of government.

All of the provisions of "A Law to Control the FBI" were incorporated in HR 6051 (95th Congress, 1st Session), introduced by former Congressman Herman Badillo of New York on April 7, 1977. HR 4173, introduced on March 1, 1977, by Congressman Ronald V. Dellums of California, and HR 10400, introduced December 15th by Congressman Don Edwards of California, followed the provisions of the "Law."

The extent to which the question of placing restrictions on the FBI had become politicized was highlighted by the fact that among the Congressmen introducing and co-sponsoring the three anti-FBI pieces of legislation there was not a single Republican.

What the drafters and supporters of "A Law to Control the FBI," including those Congressmen introducing or co-sponsoring legislation proposed for this purpose, seemed to have intended was to denude the United States of the ability to protect itself against its domestic and, in some instances, its foreign enemies. The drafters were intent on writing into law their own interpretation of the First Amendment to the Constitution, which interpretation, as reported hereinafter, was struck down by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Alliance to End Repression v City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (1984). The First Amendment has withstood the passage of time and changing circumstances through repeated judicial tests. In attempting to overemphasize the protection of civil liberties, the drafters could actually have subverted the Constitution. One of the purposes of that document was to promote the *general* welfare. It recognized a society of individuals governed by laws. In their overzealousness regarding individual *liberties*, the aforementioned drafters were actually promoting individual *license* to the detriment of society as a whole. This was more than evident in the proposals to repeal legislation which was passed to foster the general welfare by protecting the very foundations of our Government. Repealing the Riot Act would seem to be for the purpose of protecting rioters. The purpose in repealing the law relating to

[21] From "Analysis of Proposed Legislation," p. 7: "Since the FBI has been turning to existing statutes to rationalize [sic] its domestic intelligence operations in recent years, Section 105 [of the proposed bill] repeals those laws the FBI has been citing before congressional committees in its attempt [sic] to justify domestic intelligence."

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seditious conspiracy and a statute such as the Smith Act, covering advocating the overthrow of government by force or violence, would presumably have been to protect individual liberties. However, the First Amendment does not convey a license to riot or overthrow the Government.

What the ACLU and its supporters are saying in proposing repeal of statutes such as those enumerated is that there is no activity short of treason that a self-proclaimed politically motivated individual or group can undertake against the constituted authority of the United States that may be judged as criminal.

While the Badillo, Dellums, and Edwards bills died aborning, two years later the same forces which promoted them resurfaced to target a newly proposed FBI charter.[22] A legal aide to then-FBI Director William H. Webster advised the writer that this proposed charter, designated S.1612, had been developed with input by the FBI, the Department of Justice, ACLU representatives, and members of Senator Edward M. Kennedy's staff. There was no input invited or received from groups having political philosophies differing from those of the ACLU and Kennedy representatives.

Despite the ACLU input, the Washington Legislative Counsel for the Union informed an aide to the Senator, "While the ACLU endorses the need for a law to control the FBI....some [issues] will require substantive changes in the bill to satisfy civil liberties-grounded objection."[23]

S.1612 was perceived on Capitol Hill as a Democrat's bill. Republicans favoring a strong and effective FBI sponsored an offsetting piece of legislation, S.2928. The FBI again was the shuttlecock in a game of political badminton. Neither bill was enacted.

The Litigation Assault

While pursuing its legislative campaign against the so-called "vast surveillance network," the ACLU did not neglect its attack through litigation. It has counselled constituents, sympathizers, and even people Lenin would have called useful idiots on procedures for filing Freedom of Information Act requests. Once replies to these have been received, the ACLU and companion groups have aided in the pursuit of civil actions alleging violations of First Amendment rights on the part of individual FBI Agents and former Agents. As of May, 1988, the Department

[22]Senate Bill S.1612, "Federal Bureau of Investigation Charter Act of 1979."

[23]Jerry J. Berman's June 15, 1979, letter transmitting analysis and critique of S.1612 to Robert McNamara, Aide to Senator Kennedy.

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of Justice estimated there were 5000 cases of this type pending against individuals throughout the Federal Government—so-called Bivens-type civil actions. At that time about 500 law suits were pending against the FBI, 140 being the Bivens-type involving multiple defendants.[24]

An overused argument presented by the anti-intelligence forces, as phrased by ACLU Washington Office Director Morton H. Halperin on June 13, 1988, is, "The fear of possible Government surveillance can chill people from participating in certain activities."[25] Mr. Halperin and other ACLU officials and supporters are fully versed in "chilling" tactics. Theirs have achieved remarkable results.

During testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism on February 4, 1982, Judge William H. Webster, then-Director of the FBI stated:

> My problem today is not unleashing the FBI, my problem is convincing those in the FBI that they can work up to the level of our authority. Too many people have been sued, too many people have been harassed and their families and life savings tied up in litigation and threat of prosecution. So that we and others like us run the risk that we will not do our full duty in order to protect our individual selves.[26]

The harassment mentioned by Judge Webster referred to the fact that of more than 10,000 present and former Government employees named as defendants in Bivens-type actions in the past, damages have been awarded against less than 40. The civil actions are for the most part frivolous or vindictive by nature and intended to create a chilling effect, which they have.

This effect on the FBI can be best illustrated by describing the manner in which the Bureau caved in when two actions were brought against it.

On October 3, 1979, the Director of the FBI agreed that no investigation of IPS would be undertaken "unless in accordance with statute, executive order, or other lawful authority."[27] This agreement was made

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[24] Information received orally May 10, 1988, from FBI Legal Counsel Office.

[25] Prepared testimony of Mr. Halperin presented before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, June 13, 1988, p. 6.

[26] Report of the Subcommittee on "FBI Oversight Hearing," (February 4, 1982), Serial No. J-97-94, p. 19.

[27] Institute for Policy Studies, et al., Plaintiffs, v John N. Mitchell, et al., Defendants; Civil Action No. 74-316; Stipulated Settlement of Issues and Dismissal, (October 3, 1979).

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to settle an IPS action against the Federal Government alleging the FBI had illegally investigated IPS prior to 1974. The investigation did not result in any criminal action against the Institute. It was principally an intelligence-type investigation. In effect, by signing the agreement, the FBI Director was retreating from the position that the Bureau could conduct such investigations of U.S.-organized groups.

The second action in which the intimidating tactics of the anti-intelligence lobbyists initially paid off for them was in the Alliance to End Repression v City of Chicago Case. The suit was brought in 1973 by a number of plaintiffs, including the ACLU, and the FBI was accused of conducting investigations of them "in the name of domestic security," the goal and consequences of which were allegedly to harass and intimidate the plaintiffs.

In 1976, the Attorney General Guidelines on security investigations were published.[28] They set the stage for a settlement of the suit. Without going to trial, the FBI agreed that in conducting domestic security investigations in the Chicago area it would be concerned only with conduct and only such conduct as is forbidden by criminal law. In August, 1981, the judge in the case approved a consent decree containing this FBI commitment and including the extraordinary provision that every resident of Chicago, not just the plaintiffs in the case, could enforce the decree by application to the District Court.

In March, 1983, the Attorney General Guidelines were revised.[29] They established an earlier threshold for initiating domestic security terrorism investigations, declaring an investigation may be warranted when statements are made *advocating* criminal activity or *indicating an apparent intent* to engage in a crime.

Claiming these provisions violated the agreement terms, the plaintiffs in the Alliance case sought and received an injunction prohibiting the FBI from following the 1983 Attorney General Guidelines in the Chicago area. However, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals granted a hearing because of the sensitive issue of separation of powers raised by a judicial

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[28] Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic Security Investigations dated April 5, 1976. They placed security investigations on a criminal basis, providing: "Domestic security investigations are conducted when authorized...to ascertain information on the activities of individuals, or the activities of groups, which involve or will involve the use of force or violence *and* which involve or will involve the violation of federal law" (emphasis added).

[29] Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations.

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decision invalidating in a major city a part of the FBI's nationwide investigatory guidelines.

The Appellate Court invalidated the injunction, declaring it "a remarkable judicial intervention in vital executive functions." In its findings, the Court confirmed the legality of FBI domestic security/intelligence investigations and cast aside as inapplicable the "chilling effect" claim of the anti-intelligence proponents. Citing Socialist Workers Party v Attorney General, 510 F.2d, 253, 256 (2d Circuit 1974) (per curiam), the Court ruled:

> The FBI always has investigated people who advocate or threaten to commit serious violations of federal law, even if the violations are not imminent; and it always will. It *"has a right, indeed a duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crimes;* it is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention"....(Emphasis added.)
>
> Admittedly the repressive effect will not be zero. No one wants his name in an FBI investigatory file; and the knowledge that the FBI investigates groups that advocate violent change could deter some people from joining such groups and deter the groups themselves from engaging in lawful though minatory forms of advocacy. There would therefore be a cost to the values protected by the First Amendment, if the groups never stepped over the boundary that separates privileged from indictable speech. But we think the cost would be outweighed by the benefits in preventing crimes of violence.[30]

This judicial refutation of the arguments advanced by the ACLU and other anti-intelligence groups must have been a bitter pill to swallow. However, it has not dissuaded the FBI detractors from their campaign. They have now doubled their efforts through another civil suit and another charter initiative.

The CISPES Dispute

The Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) was formed in 1980 as a result of an organized tour by Farid Handal, an agent for the Salvadoran guerrilla group FMLN (Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front). During this tour, Handal, brother of Salvadoran Communist leader Shafik Handal, met with, and received assistance from, the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, the Institute

[30] Alliance to End Repression v City of Chicago, 742 F 2d 1007-1028 (1984).

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for Policy Studies, the Washington Office on Latin America, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, USA, and the office of Representative Ronald Dellums (D-California). The U.S. Peace Council, American affiliate of the Soviet front World Peace Council, is a CISPES steering committee member.[31]

After taking note of the foregoing information pertaining to the formation of CISPES and who assisted in the formation, Mr. Eric Breindel, Editor of the editorial pages of the *New York Post* and a nationally syndicated columnist, commented, "Ordinary Americans should ask themselves whether they think this background justifies a surveillance operation. Not arrests. Not efforts to ruin the group or to prevent it from recruiting new members. Just surveillance. Isn't this one key reason we have an FBI?"[32]

Following the October, 1983, U.S. landing in Grenada and the overthrow of its Cuban-backed regime, CISPES, the U.S. Peace Council, IPS, and other groups, including the IPS spin-off called World Peacemakers, helped organize a national "emergency response network." Its purpose was to engage in "direct action" to disrupt U.S. capabilities in the event of hostilities with Nicaragua.[33]

The FBI conducted two investigations of CISPES, one based on its possible violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and other Federal statutes (Seditious Conspiracy Act, Neutrality Act, Arms Control Export Act, immigration laws), the other in a foreign counterintelligence context.[34] This means that a subject under investigation might have connections with a foreign intelligence service, an international terrorist group, or in some other manner be working on behalf of a foreign principal. As in the case of domestic security/intelligence investigations, there are "Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations," issued April 1, 1983, by Attorney General William French Smith. While it is known that these are less stringent than the domestic guidelines, allowing the FBI more leeway in opening and pursuing an investigation, the full provisions are not publicly available because about 40% of them are classified.

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[31]Allen C. Brownfeld, "Direct Communist Influence on U.S. Congress Growing Dramatically," *Human Events*, (October 31, 1987), p. 12.

[32]Eric Breindel, "FBI in Peace and CISPES," *Washington Times*, (February 9, 1988), pp. F1, F4.

[33]"CISPES + CCR v The FBI," *Information Digest*, XXI #4 (February 12, 1988), p. 47.

[34]"CISPES Lawsuit," *Information Digest*, XXI # 16 & 17 (July 29, 1988), p. 179.

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The anti-intelligence bloc is determined, through a legislative charter for the FBI, to require the application of the more restrictive domestic guidelines to U.S. persons or organizations under investigation for any reason, whether it be violation of a criminal law or support of foreign terrorist groups.

Acknowledging that the FBI may have had sufficient basis to conduct an "initial limited investigation" of CISPES on a criminal basis, Morton H. Halperin of the ACLU, in prepared congressional testimony June 13, 1988, voiced strong objections to the counterintelligence-type inquiry covering CISPES's foreign connections. He called for such investigations to "be conducted according to public guidelines that should apply even when the persons are suspected to be agents of a foreign power or involved in international terrorism."[35] In this advocacy he is sure to be joined by the KGB, Muammar Qaddafi, terrorist guerrillas in El Salvador, and others who look for support among avaricious, traitorous, and other dissident elements in our country.

The Congressional Path to an FBI Charter

The ACLU and its supporters in its anti-intelligence forays against the FBI have found a strong adherent on Capitol Hill, one whose affiliations with and support of the ACLU objectives are matters of public record.

On February 1, 1988, three congressmen, Don Edwards (D-California), Robert W. Kastenmeier (D-Wisconsin), and John Conyers (D-Michigan), held a press conference to announce they would conduct a hearing on the handling of the CISPES investigation by the FBI. Representative Edwards chairs the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights which has oversight jurisdiction covering the FBI limited to its domestic operations. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence oversees its operations covering foreign intelligence, foreign counterintelligence, foreign intelligence support activities, and intelligence investigations of international terrorism.

Demonstrating a bias and prejudgment unbecoming his oversight role, Congressman Edwards applied the adjectives "unacceptable" and

[35] Prepared testimony and statement for the record of Morton H. Halperin, Director, Washington Office, ACLU, and Gary M. Stern, Research Associate, CNSS, on the FBI's CISPES investigation before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, June 13, 1988, pp. 3, 7.

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"chilling" to the FBI's investigation of CISPES.[36] This, however, does not appear out of character.

On June 13, 1988, the Oversight Chairman convened his Subcommittee and listened to accounts about the CISPES investigation from Mr. Halperin and three other witnesses, none of whom represented the FBI. At the conclusion of the hearing, Congressman Edwards said, "What we've tried to do in the past is rely on the Constitution for protecting individual rights. I am thinking seriously of sometime early next year taking another quick look at this issue and writing the beginnings of an FBI charter."[37] This could be a portent of conflict in two respects.

Firstly, it could further polarize the pro- and anti-intelligence forces in Congress. The type of charter Mr. Edwards would author is foreordained. His anti-intelligence propensities are well-established. The charter he sponsored for the FBI in December, 1977, H.R. 10400, was so designed as to eliminate all intelligence-gathering functions.[38] It also would have repealed the "speech crimes" laws.

Secondly, it could lead to a jurisdictional dispute between Edwards' Subcommittee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. To repeat, the latter conducts oversight of the FBI on all matters coming within the purview of the Attorney General's Guidelines relating to foreign intelligence, foreign counterintelligence, and intelligence investigations of international terrorism. Edwards has already usurped its prerogatives by taking testimony on at least two matters within the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Committee: (1) during the CISPES hearing on June 13, 1988; and (2) during a hearing on July 13, 1988, when he concerned himself with an FBI counterintelligence operation designed to identify Soviet spies and their targets, known as the Library Awareness Program.

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[36] *Information Digest*, XXI #4 (February 12, 1988), p. 35.

[37] "House Panel Wants Curbs on FBI Spying," *Washington Times*, (June 14, 1988), p. A6.

[38] Mr. Edwards' proposed charter provided in part: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have the authority to investigate all acts or omissions that violate Federal criminal law, except as expressly provided by Act of Congress; such investigations shall be initiated only upon a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts and rational inference from such facts, that the subject has committed, or is committing, a specific act or omission in violation of a Federal criminal law. The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have no other authority to investigate or to engage in law-enforcement activities except as expressly provided by Act of Congress." This would have placed *all* FBI authority on a criminal basis, wiping out its intelligence responsibilities even in the foreign counterintelligence field.

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Orientation of the Edwards Subcommittee

Like the Church Committee which vilified the FBI, the Edwards Subcommittee has a distinct leftist-liberal proclivity. This is readily apparent in its Chairman, but also noticeable in other members of the Majority.

Miguel Bolanos, a former Nicaraguan intelligence officer under the communist Sandinista Government, reported that a group in the U.S. known as the National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People was "under orders from the Sandinista director- ate" and "guided by intelligence organs of Cuba." In 1985, it changed its name to "Nicaraguan Network," and Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-Colorado), a member of the Subcommittee, signed a direct-mail, fund-raising appeal for the organization in July, 1985. The Rocky Mountain Regional Director and a Board member of the "Nicaraguan Network" was a congressionally employed nun who coordinated pro-Sandinista activities in Ms. Schroeder's office.[39]

A key Subcommittee member, Representative John Conyers, Jr., upon conclusion of the June 13th hearing issued a press release highly critical of the FBI, terming CISPES a "political organization," and alleging that the FBI was "spying on [it] simply because CISPES opposed U.S. policy in Central America."[40] In all honesty, it must be noted that Mr. Conyers' prejudice may have slipped into view since he, himself, is a vociferous opponent of the same policy.

Officials versed in foreign affairs matters are cognizant of the fact that the World Peace Council is the foremost Soviet front organization in the world, and has been for many years. It was identified in the Department of State publication "Foreign Affairs," issue of April, 1982, as "an instrument of Soviet foreign policy." During an interview conducted by Mr. Ben Wattenberg and aired by the Public Broadcasting Service on December 25, 1981, President Reagan said that the World Peace Council is "bought and paid for by the Soviet Union."

When this Soviet front organization conducted a disarmament and détente conference in Washington, D.C., in 1978, the Communist Party, USA, joined by non-communist groups, formed a national committee to welcome its head. Representative Conyers issued a hearty welcome to

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[39] Allan C. Brownfeld, Op. Cit., p. 12.

[40] Congressman John Conyers, Jr., *Conyers Calls for Charter to Impose New Restrictions on FBI Investigations*, press release, June 13, 1988.

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the group, declaring, "You have joined us to give us courage and inspiration in our fight for disarmament and against the neutron bomb."[41]

Chairman Edwards during this same Washington conference addressed a World Peace Council meeting on Capitol Hill.[42]

Unexplained, another activity of the Chairman is much more thought provoking. In 1957, Alfred and Martha Dodd Stern were indicted, charged with having controlled a Soviet spy ring in the U.S. Prior to the indictment they fled the country, going first to Mexico, then Cuba and Czechoslovakia. In 1971, they began showing signs of wanting to come home to the U.S. In 1977 during the Carter administration, Don Edwards injected himself into the picture, putting pressure on the Department of Justice and the White House to force the dismissal of the indictment. In spite of FBI insistence that the indicted spies submit to in-depth interviews before being allowed back into the U.S. and their refusal to do so, in March, 1979, the indictment was dismissed. One of the first persons to be notified of this action was Congressman Edwards. According to the December 1, 1980, issue of the *AIM Report*, published by Accuracy In Media, Washington, D.C., "Edwards was understandably pleased. The Sterns were pleased and grateful, and on October 24, 1979, the Don Edwards Congressional Campaign Fund logged in a $500 contribution from Alfred Stern of Prague, Czechoslovakia."[43]

Throughout this study mention has been made of the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) and its role in the anti-intelligence campaign. Mr. Edwards' direct and indirect ties with IPS and his anti-FBI stance in the past augur rough treatment for the Bureau.

IPS is able to exert considerable influence on Congress through a number of affiliated lobbying groups. One of these, the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, although it holds itself out as a nonpartisan, educational information service, has had continuing ties with IPS. The Executive Director of the Caucus, Edith Wilkie, coordinates its activities and legislative strategies with those of key IPS affiliates. Congressman Don Edwards married Edith Wilkie in 1981. He was a member of the IPS Twentieth Anniversary Committee in 1983. In a "Dear Colleague" letter dated March 1, 1984, he exhorted his fellow congressmen and their staff members to attend courses at IPS.[44]

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[41] John Barron, *KGB Today--The Hidden Hand* (New York, NY, 1985) p. 226.

[42] Powell, Op. Cit., p. 78.

[43] "Free the Spies: Punish the FBI," *AIM Report*, IX, 23 (December 1, 1980).

[44] Powell, Op. Cit., pp. 21, 22.

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Author S. Steven Powell in *Covert Cadre* reported that a majority of the members of the Edwards Subcommittee have endorsed IPS projects and Edwards himself has been very receptive to the ideas of John Conyers, "one of IPS's strongest supporters in Congress." Subcommittee members Edwards, Conyers, Schroeder, Kastenmeier, and Charles Schumer (D-New York) were said to be part of a tiny minority in the House of Representatives who voted against the Intelligence Agents Identities Protection Act, designed to prevent publication of the names of CIA officers, which imperiled their lives.

Mr. Powell also reported that Edwards has had close relations with Morton H. Halperin. In a congressional memo, Edwards said that he opposed FBI intelligence gathering on any radical group.[45]

In our society one normally expects an oversight body to be even-handed in discharging its responsibilities. Both the House and Senate intelligence committees have, despite some conflicts with their client agencies, established such a record. Before Senator Edward M. Kennedy as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee abolished the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism which in the Senate exercised the same oversight of the FBI which the Edwards Subcommittee exercises in the House, that Senate Subcommittee was supportive of the Bureau's domestic security/intelligence operations. But the Edwards oversight Subcommittee has demonstrated what can be termed nothing less than an enmity toward the FBI.

While Congressman Edwards is often identified as having served as an FBI Agent, his tenure lasted only a year, ending in December, 1941. By his actions since then one is led to believe that his short FBI service soured him on the Bureau, a condition from which he has never recovered. He has publicly criticized the organization's handling of numerous cases and programs: Abscam; CISPES; Library Awareness Program; a program involving interviews with persons returning from visits to Nicaragua.

In June, 1985, Edwards took charge of a campaign to get a new trial for Indian activist Leonard Peltier, sentenced in 1975 to two life terms for killing two FBI Agents in a shootout at Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota.[46]

House Republicans and Democrats alike criticized Mr. Edwards in June, 1985, because he blocked bipartisan attempts to hire 191 more FBI

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[45] Powell, Op. Cit., p. 76.

[46] John Bennett, "FBI's Nemesis on Capitol Hill Says He Keeps Agency in Line," *Scripps Howard News Service Release*, (July 1, 1985).

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Agents to combat domestic terrorism. Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wisconsin), the most vocal Republican on the Edwards Subcommittee, stated, "Edwards is the tool of the American Civil Liberties Union and other civil rights groups." But according to Mr. Edwards, "In my view, we're the best friends the FBI can have."[47] True--if the Bureau should happen to be seeking self-destruction and would welcome the Subcommittee's assistance.

The CISPES Suit

As this article goes to press, the latest information received in the CISPES matter is to the effect that the Chicago chapter of the organization, joined by two of its local organizers and three other groups, has filed suit against the FBI. It charges that the Bureau violated the First Amendment and the consent decree of August, 1981 whereby the FBI in effect sacrificed its domestic security/intelligence jurisdiction in the Chicago area.[48] In view of the subsequent circuit court decision which negated this action, it is difficult to understand how the current CISPES suit can prevail. However, the adverse publicity against the FBI may be considered more important than success in the litigation.

What of the Future?

It should be more than apparent that the forces seeking to further restrict, or even eliminate, the intelligence operations of the FBI are aiming at political goals. That is why the matter has become so politicized. They are well-organized and coordinate their campaigns with one another. On Capitol Hill they have extensive support among the political party which dominates both the House and Senate. They have played off that party against the Chief Executive, leader of the opposing party.

They are arrayed against a weakened and unorganized opposition. Those most knowledgeable regarding the importance and value of intelligence are men and women who have been involved in the intelligence-gathering and -exploitation process. The Church Committee presented such an unfavorable public image of the work of these people that they, individually, lack the strength to correct the flaws in that image. They surely have no umbrella-type organization, comparable to the Campaign for Political Rights, to act as a squad to speak and spread their message.

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[47] Bennett, Op. Cit.

[48] "CISPES Lawsuit," *Information Digest*, XXI #16 & 17 (July 29, 1988).

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We often hear references to the "silent majority" in our country. I firmly believe that this group supports laws adopted to protect our democratic form of government, those which the anti-intelligence forces refer to as "speech crimes." I believe that this group wants the FBI to conduct the type of investigations which the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals said the Bureau "always has...and always will." I doubt that this group knows that since the conclusion of the Church Committee hearings, the FBI caseload covering such investigations has dropped 99%--from 4868 to less than 50. I doubt that they realize that if the anti-intelligence lobby gets its way, the remaining 1% could be eliminated, and inroads possibly made into cases directed against the foreign threat of spies, saboteurs, and terrorists. Assuming the unlikely--that a legislative charter would not severely restrict or eliminate domestic security/intelligence operations--how would such a charter affect future needs of the country if changing conditions called for changed rules? The FBI now operates under rules (guidelines) laid down by its boss, the Attorney General. With the concurrence of Congress, he changed the rules in 1983 when change was required. If his rules as they now stand, or in some revised form, are incorporated into a statute, it would take an act of Congress to change them--and Congress is not the swiftest-moving body on earth.

The CISPES operation has demonstrated how domestic groups can be targeted by foreign groups to carry out the latter's biddings. Foreign forces have been known to target domestic groups in the past. A prime example was the use of the Communist Party, USA, by the Soviet Intelligence Services as a reservoir from which to recruit spies prior to and during World War II.

There is logic in having a single committee on each side of Congress responsible for all security/intelligence matters, whether domestic or foreign. Congress should consider transferring oversight of domestic security/intelligence matters handled by the FBI to the House and Senate intelligence committees which have demonstrated a good conception and understanding of the importance of intelligence, counterintelligence, and counter-terrorism operations.

There is a window of opportunity now for the "silent majority" to speak up in defense of our internal security safeguards. If the FBI's operations in this area are further cut back or eliminated, it's not the FBI which will suffer. It surely has enough responsibilities in other areas to keep its full personnel complement busily occupied. It is the people of our nation for whom the safeguards were originally established who may be the ultimate inheritors of the results of such action.

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INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT

Editor
Raymond B. Cattell

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SPACE FREEDOM: OUTLINE OF A REVOLUTIONARY U.S. SPACE STATION FOR THE 1990's BASED ON U.S. TRADITIONS AND PRINCIPLES

By Klaus P. Heiss

In the euphoria of President Reagan's success in changing the basis – even the premises – of political and strategic thinking world wide, one area of uppermost importance to the strategic and economic posture of the United States and free nations seems to have escaped redirection: Space.

On the contrary, the "Space" community seems oblivious to any notions of principled behavior. Rather, a veritable rush for co-operative space projects has set in to jointly proceed into Space. The "zero risk" agendas of some in the space community re-inforce a lemming-like plunge into a competitive and intellectual no-man's land.

1.0 The Fallacy of Joint Missions

Most prominent among these ideas are "joint" missions to Mars. This rush has been reinforced by the setbacks and stagnation of US space activities, often blamed on "budgetary constraints," but most notably due to a recession in engineering courage and spirit of enterprise.

The uppermost goal of the US Space bureaucracy – other than the careful maintenance of its monopoly position – seems to be the pursuit of a risk-free world with a minimum of stress and a maximum of overseas trips and conferences. The panacea of "joint missions" implies cost sharing (real or imaginary), relaxed time schedules to spend taxpayers' money, reduced competition and, in a catastrophe, the sharing of risks and blame.

Alas, the Soviet Space bureaucracy seems to have come to the same "safe haven" of delayed inaction through "joint missions." The prospect of increased "international meetings" and reciprocal visits may rank even higher in the Soviet list of priorities than is the case with its US counterparts. How can the lure of the "prize" be sustained when ingenuity and enterprise is sacrificed to the mush of consensus at each phase of the quest, and challenging timely goals are superseded by cautious preoccupation with the "process"?

How is it, indeed, that the United States could set out in 1961 and commit to landing man on the Moon and return to Earth in less than a decade (indeed eight years) with a practically non-existent technology base, while it takes the Space bureaucracy (Congress included) today about the same time to simply decide whether to have a Space Station and which design – all the while a much larger unit (Skylab) rots away in the Air and Space

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museum, the other unit having been allowed to burn up in Space for a lack of commitment and understanding in the late 1970s?

What is likely to result from this "joint mission" consensus is an increasing disinterest in Space, period. What is the sense of proceeding with Space exploration, if the element of competition and pride in one's own team is taken away? What is the excitement of going to a football game where both teams studiously rush to the same goal-line?

Equally important, these "joint" pursuits of space projects also tend to solidify ill-conceived principles of "Outer Space" activities formulated in the mid-1960s in the United Nations. These principles are the very opposite of free enterprise and competition, reflecting mistaken ideals of "totalitarian" or socialist notions inimical to property, profit and freedom. While we know better today in the management of economies world-wide, we persist in holding on to these fallacies in Space enterprise. Supreme US interests in Space are submerged in the muddy notions and waters of the East River.

This rush to joint missions in the name of "benefits of mankind" – will be fatal to the US Space program, and ultimately the space activities of nations worldwide. It will neutralize Space as an important, indeed critical, component of U.S. strategic power.

Would Columbus have set out on his new passage to India, if the spoils of that mission had to be shared with Portugal? Was it not the competitive pressure on Spain to overcome Portuguese domination of the Eastern passage around Africa that led Queen Isabella to finance his voyage – despite well-known objections from the academic community that the passage could not succeed because of the extraordinary length of the proposed trip? Was it not that same spirit that led Europe to reach out into the unknown – while China whiled away its substantial technological advantage contemplating the beauties of the harmony of "state monopoly" at the center of the world?

To re-establish Space as a critical dimension of U.S. activities, a revolutionary re-affirmation of basic US principles, and goals based thereon, is needed. If necessary, the United States should proceed alone on this new path. Others will surely follow.

2.0 Definition of Principles for US Space Enterprises

In due course the technical goals of the US Space program will be agreed upon, based on the iterations of numerous commissions of the past, and commissions yet to come. Indeed, the overall directions and possible accomplishments in Space enterprise are relatively certain and known for the next 50 years: manned Space station, lunar bases, manned missions to Mars, Mars bases.

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Few areas of public enterprise have such unanimous constituency support today as US Space activities, a marked change from the 1970s, when even minimum enabling programs such as the Space Shuttle were tenaciously opposed by some.

Whatever exciting program(s) the government may agree on – ranging from low cost access to Space, geosynchronous platforms, lunar bases, missions to Mars and beyond – all these endeavors would be futile, even counter-productive, if not pursued in the context of basic principles fundamental to free man and enterprise.

The groundrules for commercial, individual, and private initiative for Space enterprise have to be set so as to give such enterprise a chance to develop, at its risk and benefit, in Space as on Earth. It has been one of the major shortcomings so far in Space that the doors to such enterprise have been effectively controlled – and often closed. More obstacles have been added to-date by this administration – or rather the bureaucratic "totalitarians" amongst us. (Witness the Remote Sensing 'Commercialization' Act of 1984, or the by now re-organized 'efforts' to commercialize Space transportation.)

Worse, the United States has been party to a web of declarations, policies, proclaimed desires, and generic concepts – such as the 'benefit of mankind' (to which nobody objects; the question is how), 'common heritage' (shared principles?, cultural achievements?), etc. These inevitably have a way of degenerating further to terms such as 'common property', meaning the exclusion of private property, and other concepts inimical to the very foundations of freedom, which have to be vested in the individual, and not some collective nonsense. The notion that profit may actually be the highest form of contribution to the general welfare (for one, it can be taxed) seldom occurs to US policy makers, and the record of the UN on Outer Space matters is devoid of any such notion and statement. One easily gains the impression that the pursuit of profit in Space is the evil from which mankind has to be safeguarded – and safeguarded with a vengeance.

What is needed, foremost, is a statement of simple, basic principles of United States Space enterprise, principles which are the foundation of United States activities on Earth and, hence, ought also to apply universally in Space. Because of their simplicity, and the primacy of individual and United States freedoms exposed therein, the opposition to their affirmation will be fierce. Yet for this very reason these principles have to be affirmed and implemented.

Alas, there is little in the record of US Space policy and programs to date that addresses these issues. An accumulation of regulations, agree-

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ments, policies, understandings and even treaties in matters of Outer Space need rectification, renewed guidance, abolition or reaffirmation.

While the principles drafted below may seem self-evident to most – at least self-evident to the founding fathers of the United States – their application to enterprise in Outer Space, including that of the United States, has strayed far from any semblance to these principles. It is because of a failure to affirm these self-evident principles that private enterprise to-date has been effectively barred from Space.

Last, but not least, the international community may not be unanimous in support of these principles. This ought to be of only secondary concern: no harm is done to others if the United States and other free nations proceed to develop the resources of Space for private, hence public, gain. Any loss is only inflicted by inaction, since unused resources benefit none. And with the United States proceeding, others will have to follow – or be left behind.

3.0 PROPOSED DRAFT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

WHEREAS the United States has been founded on a set of well understood principles fundamental to the pursuit of happiness and freedom of man;

WHEREAS these principles have served the United States and the community of free nations well over centuries past; and

WHEREAS, in addition, the very discovery and development of these United States and the Americas were founded on the principles of the freedom of the seas, including the freedom to appropriate land and resources unclaimed or unused by others the United States hereby declares;

(1) Freedom of Navigation

The "Sea of Space" shall be open for anyone to navigate in and to undertake whatever enterprise in analogy to the freedom of the seas; the United States shall not agree to or be party to any treaty, policy, regulation or understanding that limits this freedom in whatever form; the United States sees no difference between the Open Seas of Earth and the 'Open Seas' of Space and hence no new principles have to be invented or agreed to that would limit such freedom of navigation and enterprise, for whatever purpose.

(2) The Right to Property

Private property is fundamental to the pursuit of enterprise, investment, exploration and freedom of man, be it on Earth or in Space; the United States shall not agree to or be party to any treaty, policy, regulation or understanding that limits any proprietary rights of land, resources, services, data or other economic and intellectual goods in Space or derived

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from Space. Again, the United States see no difference between activities of free man on Earth and in Space for whatever purpose, and in particular reaffirms the right to private property of any and all means in the pursuit of exploration, science and commerce to be inalienable and fundamental to such freedom. To the extent that the United States de-facto or unwittingly may have been a party to different understandings and treaties, these shall henceforth be declared null and void to the extent that they infringe on such property rights.

(3) Space Homesteading and Land Grants

To foster the early and broadest possible exploration of Space and use of its vast resources the United States hereby proclaim Space Homesteading and Land Grant rights in analogy the principles that opened the vast reaches of the United States to development for the benefit of their people – the United States will recognize the appropriation of any surface and underlying mineral and resource rights by anyone on the Moon or on any other Celestial body, with the size of homesteading rights or land grants to be determined for each of these bodies separately. Asteroids and Space debris can be appropriated in toto. These homesteading rights are granted to any person that takes physical possession of such surface or object, himself or through ventures financed by him at his risk and benefit. The proprietary rights have to be exercised through use within 99 years or revert to unclaimed Space status.

Lands and resources claimed in Space under the Homesteading or Grant principle for the United States shall be assembled and incorporated as the 51st State of the Union, and hence be subject to the rights and obligations of the United States Constitution.

(4) Low Cost Access to Space for Private Enterprise

Based on the principle that government is formed to serve the individual, his rights, pursuit of freedom and happiness, the United States government will henceforth make available at additive costs any facilities, services, hardware and intellectual government rights in the pursuit of private U.S. Space enterprise. This follows ample US precedent in the opening of the West, and the nation, to commerce and enterprise: harbors, waterways, railroad land grants, the interstate highway system, airports and air traffic system.

By 'additive costs' are meant the costs added by each specific private activity to government Space program, project or facility costs, and proven by government to have been added by those specific activities. Similar access will be granted to any other free market nation that grants similar rights and access to its facilities and which participates in significant cooperative programs in Space with the United States.

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(5) A Freedom of Information Base

To foster the principle of the freedom of speech, the United States will establish a worldwide Freedom of Information Base incorporating all Library of Congress documents, data and basic news information services for direct access by anyone on Earth by the mid-1990s unencumbered by ground control or networks of totalitarian control – through simple portable terminals.

Included herein shall also be the access to and the distribution of remote sensing data of the environment, land resources, agriculture crops, meteorological data, etc., either provided as a public service or, wherever possible, as a commercial service.

To such purpose the United States will ask WARC (the World Administrative Radio Conference) to set aside the necessary frequency allocations in the respective world regions in fulfillment in particular of the Helsinki accords which assure such free flow of information and the general principles on which the United Nations and free societies everywhere are based.

In the spirit of these provisions the United States will make available these same facilities to any other nation, group or individuals in the pursuit of such free flow of information. Should available capacity on the Freedom Base become limited, services shall be apportioned based on actual use of the information added to that of the Library of Congress by others. Services offered by the private sector will not be duplicated by the public sector.

(6) Competition

Earth and Space are best served by open competition of ideas and enterprise in free markets, so that the best may succeed. Consonant with this premise the people of the United States will pursue their goals and interests in Space as they see fit. No purpose is served by 'anticipatory' regulations, license requirements, laws and other provisions that stifle enterprise in open markets. (Health and public safety are well assured by existing statutory provisions.)

Nor is the exploration and use of Space served by 'co-ordinated' or co-operative programs for the sake of co-operation, if such programs deterred or stifled competition and enterprise by any nation and its people.

(7) Positive Exercise of Rights and Claims

Consonant with the positive principles of international law, the United States shall claim and recognize rights in Space only to the extend that such rights are vested in actual exercise and control of services, resources, land or location anywhere in Space. The United States will not recognize

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any claims or rights based on abstract, theoretical notions of others that would infringe in any way on free enterprise by the United States or any other Space faring nation or person of mankind or other civilizations yet to be encountered.

4.0 United States Space Goals

With a re-affirmation of US principles in space enterprise, a few daring goals worthy of a power such as the United States – and the aspirations of the next generation – can be defined. A short list of these includes:

4.1 The Strategic Defense Initiative:

Deployment of Phase I of SDI now (1989 - 1992), a highly decentralized KKV system for boost-phase intercepts of ICBMs, wherever the source, combined with an aggressive technology development program for the next generation (Phase II) SDI system for deployment in the late 1990s.

4.2 Manned Space Flight:

Establish a permanently manned lunar base by the end of the 1990s for developing a capability for man to live and survive in space independent of Earth and as a stepping stone to claim sovereign US domain on the Moon and beyond.

4.3 Space Applications and Sciences:

Develop and deploy GLOBAL INFORMATION FREEDOM PLATFORMS in geo-synchronous orbit to provide data and information, including all the information held in the Library of Congress, in a form accessible to portable terminals independent of local networks. This will assure people worldwide once and for all access to any and all information, undermining any attempt by totalitarian systems to "manage" the access to information. Such a true "information freedom" network will stimulate immeasurably the creative genius of people worldwide and bring to fruition untold Space-related and Space-based applications to enhance standards of living on Earth.

4.4 Space Commercialization:

Proclaim full and unencumbered property rights to all data, resources and investments in space. Furthermore, give US industry and US partners in space activities ADDITIVE COST ACCESS to any civil US space capability on the ground and in Space (Space Shuttle, Space Station, Lunar Bases, etc.).

These simple provisions will bring a revolution to the spirit and the intensity of US space activities, once again motivating all generations, and in particular the young, to pursue difficult but promising paths.

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5.0 A United States Declaration of Space Independence for 1992

In commemoration of the 500th anniversary of Columbus' voyage to the Americas, the United States should proclaim the above principles in a "Declaration of Space Independence" for all free nations, in complete analogy to the historic declarations on which the United States are founded. The striking similarities are shown in the attached "Draft." The question is: how many will sign up in the 1980s and 1990s – as compared to the forefathers of the United States, who risked wealth, life and liberty for expousing those principles that have served the United States so well over centuries past?

5.1 "Daft" Text of a July 4, 1992 Declaration of Space Independence

DECLARATION OF SPACE INDEPENDENCE

July 4, 1992

A Declaration by the REPRESENTATIVES [the PEOPLE] of the United States of America in GENERAL CONGRESS assembled

When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with others, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth the separate and outbound Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent Respect to the History of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.

We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Space Enterprise [Happiness] – That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends [1967 UN Outer Space Treaty], it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. [And where rightly the People themselves can and have claimed these rights, certainly the Representatives of these Peoples and their rightful Government can claim such Independence on behalf of the People they represent]. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient Causes; and accordingly all Experience has shown. that Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while Evils are suf-

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ferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute Despotism [in the cloak of "benefits of mankind"], it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such [rule(s) of] Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security [on Earth and, hence, certainly also rules that pertain to any activities in Space]. Such has been the patient Sufferance of these Space Explorers [Colonies]; and such is now the Necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government [of Space Enterprise]. The History of the present Outer Space Regime is a History of repeated Injuries [of Common Law Rights] and Usurpation [of uninfringed Rights to Property and Freedoms], all having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over all of Space [these States]. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid World.

This Regime [Bureaucracy, He] has refused its Assent to Laws [safeguarding private Property and Freedoms], the most wholesome and necessary for the public Good.

IT has forbidden its constituent Governments [Governors] to pass Laws of immediate and pressing Importance, unless suspended on their Operation till its [bureaucratic] Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.

IT has refused to pass other Laws for the Accommodation of large Districts of People, unless those People would relinquish the Right to private Property and Freedoms [of Representation in the Legislature], a Right inestimable to them, and formidable to Tyrants only.

IT has called together Legislative Bodies at Places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the Depository of their Space Capabilities [Public Records], for the sole Purpose of fatiguing them into Compliance with its Measures.

IT has dissolved [and otherwise prevented] Representative Space Enterprises [Houses] repeatedly, for opposing with manly Firmness its Invasion on the Rights of the People [in and to independent Space activities].

IT has refused for a long time, after such Dissolution [of Rights and Freedoms], to cause others to proceed [be elected]; whereby the [Space] Legislative Powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State [of Space Enterprise in Freedom]remaining in the mean time exposed to all the Dangers of Invasion from without, and Convulsions within.

IT has prevented the Population of these Stated; for that Purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners [to Space

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Enterprise]; refusing to pass others to encourage their Migrations into Space [hither], and raising the Conditions of new Appropriations of Lands, [indeed outlawing them altogether].

IT has made Judges [of independent Space Activities] dependent on its Will alone, for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and payment of their Salaries.

IT has erected a Multitude of new Offices, and sent hither Swarms of Officers to harass our People [united in Space Enterprise], and eat out their Substance.

IT has kept among us, in Times of Peace [People of Space Enterprise] Standing Armies [of Space Bureaucrats], without the consent of our [Space Constituency] Legislature.

IT has affected (sic!) to render the Military independent of, and superior to Civil [Space] Power.

IT has combined with others to subject us [in Space] to a Jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws [of old]; giving its assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation:

FOR cutting off our Trade [in and through Space] with all Parts of the World:

FOR imposing Taxes on us without our Consent:

FOR depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury:

FOR abolishing the free System of English Laws in Outer Space [a neighboring Province], establishing therein an arbitrary Government, and enlarging its Boundaries, so as to render at once an Example and fit Instrument for introducing the same absolute Rule in other Areas [these Colonies]:

FOR taking away [in Space] our Charters [and our Right to Charters], abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments [in Space]:

FOR [suspending our own Legislatures,] and declaring themselves invested with Power to legislate for us in all Cases whatsoever.

IT has abdicated [its Right to] Government in Space [here], by declaring us out of its Protection and waging [bureaucratic] War against us.

IT [threatens] to plunder our Space Applications [Seas], ravage our Space activities on Earth [Coasts], prevent any private Settlements in Space [Towns], and destroy the Lives of free [our] People [in Space].

In every stage of these Oppressions we have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble Terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated Injury. A System [Prince], whose Charter is thus marked by

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every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the Ruler of a free People [in Space].

Nor have we been wanting in Attention to our [United Nations, Free World and Developing Countries (British)] Brethren. We have warned them from Time to Time of Attempts by their Legislature[s] to extend an unwarranted Jurisdiction over us [in Space]. We have reminded them of the Circumstances of our [intended] Migration to and Settlement [on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies] here. We have appealed to their native Justice and Magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the Ties of our common Kindred to disavow these Usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our Connections and Correspondence. They too have been deaf to the Voice of Justice and of Consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the Necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of Mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace, Friends.

We, therefore, the Representatives of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of good People of Free Enterprise [these Colonies], solemnly Publish and declare, That these United People [Colonies] are, and of Right ought to be, Free and Independent to pursue any and all activities in Space with inalienable Rights to full and unencumbered private Property to any and all Resources – land, mining, information, data, intellectual property rights, to any and all celestial bodies such people in Free Enterprise take possession of and exercise control and use thereof [States]; that they are absolved from all Allegiance to the Cobweb of international and domestic rules, regulations, treaties, laws and other Provisions of past Space Bureaucracy [British Crown] to the extend that they encumber Freedom and Private Property, and that all political Connection between them and the Cobweb of Space Bureaucracy and Totalitarianism denying such fundamental Rights [the State of Great Britain] is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent People [States], they have full Power to establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent Space Enterprise [States] may of right do[, to assure success of such Enterprise in Freedom]. And for the support of this declaration, with a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.

Signers:

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Appendix

Concluding remarks of Friedrich Hayek in "The Road to Serfdom" written in exile in London – 1942 – on the foundation of free societies. His remarks – addressed to a different audience – England, his host country – at a different time, on the inherent dangers of totalitarianism, whether national or socialistic or both, have lost nothing in their importance, and could be addressed to "Space Commissions" on issues of Space enterprise as if written today for the benefit of all of us, the United States and mankind (pp.177f):

"The purpose of this book has not been to sketch a detailed programme of a desirable future order of society. If with regard to international affairs we have gone a little beyond its essentially critical task, it was because in this field we may soon be called upon to create a framework within which future growth may have to proceed for a long time to come. A great deal will depend on how we use the opportunity we shall then have. But whatever we do, it can only be the beginning of a new, long, and arduous process in which we all hope we shall gradually create a world very different from that which we knew during the last quarter of a century. It is at least doubtful whether at this stage a detailed blueprint of a desirable internal order of society would be of much use – or whether anyone is competent to furnish it. The important thing now is that we shall come to agree on certain principles and free ourselves from some of the errors which have governed us in the recent past. However distasteful such an admission may be, we must recognize that we had before this war once again reached a stage where it is more important to clear away the obstacles with which human folly has encumbered our path and to release the creative energy of individuals than to devise further machinery for "guiding" and "directing" them – to create conditions favorable to progress rather than to "plan progress." The first need is to free ourselves of that worst form of contemporary obscurantism which tries to persuade us that what we have done in the recent past was all either wise or inevitable. We shall not grow wiser before we learn that much that we have done was very foolish.

If we are to build a better world we must have the courage to make a new start – even if that means some 'reculer pour mieux sauter'. It is not those who believe in inevitable tendencies who show this courage, not those who preach a "New Order" which is no more than a projection of these tendencies of the last forty years, and who can think of nothing better than to imitate Hitler. It is indeed those who cry loudest for the New Order who are most completely under the sway of the ideas which have created this war and most of the evils from which we suffer. The young are right if they have little confidence in the ideas which rule most of their

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elders. But they are mistaken or misled when they believe that these are still the liberal ideas of the nineteenth century, which in fact the young generation hardly knows. Though we neither can wish, nor possess the power, to go back to the reality of the nineteenth century, we have the opportunity to realize its ideals – and they were not mean. We have little right to feel in this respect superior to our grandfathers; and we should never forget that it is we, the twentieth century, and not they, who have made a mess of things. If they had not yet fully learned what was necessary to create the world they wanted, the experience we have since gained ought to have equipped us better for the task. If in the first attempt to create a world of free men we have failed, we must try again. The guiding principle, that a policy of freedom for the individual is the only truly progressive policy, remains as true to-day as it was in the nineteenth century."

Wish England had listened then. Let the United States not fail in Space, where the stakes are so much larger.

P.S. Europeans, including Hayek, all too easily overlook that these same ideals were the foundation of the 18th century American revolution.

The spiritual roots of these ideas can be traced, beyond John Locke, well back to scholastic thought, including the idea of the social contract foundation of all Government powers and the role (preference) of private property over common property. (Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Marsilius of Padua – who would extend the social contract foundation even to matters of theology (c.1270 - 1342).

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EDUCATION AND ETHNICITY:
The U.S. Experiment in School Education

By Dr. Ralph Scott
Director, Educational Clinic, University of Northern Iowa

PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL DISADVANTAGE: A NEW DILEMMA FOR AMERICAN BLACKS



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School Achievement and Desegregation: Is There a Linkage?

Sex and Race Achievement Profiles.

Mandated School Busing and Student Learning.

Longitudinal Demographics on Black Achievement and Middle Class Flight.

"Push-Through" Educational Programs.

It is perplexing that circumstances have worsened for literally millions of minority youths during a period which has witnessed the burgeoning of special programs designed to help them. For more than three decades the entire structure of U.S. education has been dramatically reshaped. However, as U.S. schools become racially 'balanced,' educators were forced to deal with large ethnic achievement gaps at the high school level. It is not uncommon, for example, for a tenth grade student to have trouble reading a third grade textbook while sitting beside classmates capable of college work. Typically, ability grouping was abolished, and classrooms and instructional groupings were racially balanced. Other race-conscious intervention measures followed: informal quotas on student discipline, on grading practices and in composition of 'special' classrooms. Ethnic quotas on discipline and suspensions have forced teachers to tolerate behavior which is most efficaciously curbed during the formative years. Racial quotas for exceptional students have radically altered what is meant by the terms 'mentally retarded,' 'gifted' and 'learning disabled.' Uncritical promotions have led to unacceptably high failure rates in high school and universities. The sensitive racial topics consideed throughout this book are intended to promote rethinking of basic educational strategies which have proven to be harmful for both black and white students alike.

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THE BALANCE OF POWER FOUNDATION FOR CONTEMPORARY ARMS CONTROL PRAXIS

By Anthony J. Eksterowicz

The balance of power approach to world order provides a foundation for contemporary arms control praxis. This approach accommodates two diverse images of international reality and two contending foreign policy elite belief systems. Both of these images and belief systems possess implications for contemporary arms control efforts. A traditional image of international reality along with a "Cold War Internationalist" foreign policy belief system have influenced the Reagan Administration's views on arms control. As a result, deep arms control divisions resulted in arms control policy stalemate until the 1986 Reykjavik summit.Contemporary arms control debates can appear quite confusing to both the layman and the policymaker. Although there have been many attempts, the various thoughts and beliefs of both advocates and critics of arms control are difficult to synthesize. This article represents an attempt at such a synthesis. Figure one illustrates the argument of this essay. The reader is urged to refer to it during the course of the textual argument.

This essay is based upon a number of premises. First, the balance of power approach to world order provides a foundation for contemporary arms control praxis. This world order approach has come to mean many things to many people. For some, it implies the preservation of the international systemic status quo by diplomatic means. For others, it may imply such preservation via national militant hegemony. Thus, it may be useful to think of a balance of power approach to world order along a continuum ranging from militant hegemony to the diplomatic preservation of the international status quo. A balance of power among such states either

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hegemonically imposed or arrived at through the consent of various nations in an equilibric relationship, thus becomes one type of international systemic order. As Hedley Bull noted:

. . . . The balance of power is wrongly regarded as a synonym for international anarchy; rightly regarded as something which mitigates an anarchy which might otherwise be more rampant. It is not a panacea. But it exists now and among those forces which make for international security and can be built upon by action that can be taken now it is one of the strongest.

For balance of power proponents the problem is how to make the state system work. One method by which this can be accomplished is to extend elements of consensus among states concerning their common interests, roles and institutions.

Second, discussions of arms control ideas and measures ultimately evolve into discussions of world order. In this context one can view the continuity of thought from past to present scholars and policy-makers.

Third, within the balance of power approach to world order, it is possible to accommodate not only the various contemporary arms control beliefs but also the current, post Vietnam contending foreign policy elite belief systems.

Fourth, there are two images of international reality which flow from a balance of power foundation for world order, a traditionalist image and an interdependence image. Both images of international reality possess arms control implications which can be linked, albeit roughly, with the two contending contemporary foreign policy elite belief systems.

Finally, each image of international reality possesses philosophic and historic roots which transcend the current century. We will first examine the two images of international reality, traditionalism and interdependence. This examination should provide some insight into current arms control problems.

The Traditionalist Image of International Reality

The contemporary version of the traditionalist image of international politics asserted itself after World War II. It was as much a reaction against Wilsonian idealism as it was a forward looking theory based upon "realistic" premises. The traditionalists argued that failure in international affairs

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stemmed from an unrealistic view of the international environment. The right pole of the arms control and disarmament continuum in figure one is embedded in the philosophical rock of realism.

Ian Clark has suggested a polar model of international politics in his study, Reform and Resistance In the International Order. Clark argues that there exists a tension between the realists and the utopians in international politics. An examination of the utopian pole is beyond the scope of this essay. It shall suffice to note, however, that utopian scholars base their view of a transformed international system upon the supposed achievable harmony of interests between nation states. Their philosophical roots can be traced to Kant. Realists challenge these beliefs.

The resistance or realism pole of the continuum is marked by the following precepts. First, realists deny the possibility of progress towards the transformation of the present international system. Power politics will always be the name of the game in international relations. Second, realists possess a deterministic view of history. Possibilities through human intervention in the international order are limited. Third, the realist rejects the assumption of a utopian harmony of interests within the international system. National interests will inevitably conflict with national interests precluding harmony. Fourth, realists emphasize the distinction between the morality of the individual and the state. Finally, realists note that the international system is locked in perpetual conflict because of national mistrust. Clark selected Rousseau as the scholar-philosopher who most fundamentally represents the pole of resistance. Rousseau examined various schemes for world order and ultimately despaired of these schemes. In the end he settled upon a balance of power approach to world order.

For the realist the struggle for power and peace takes place within an international milieu composed of nation states seeking to maximize interests through the assertion of power. Moreover, this conception of power involves a distinct military coloration for the survival of the nation state predominates over all interests. As Osgood and Tucker argue:

A realistic view of political behavior, however, must reject the assumption that individuals have common interests so compelling as to obviate serious conflicts of interests among states or the need of states to support their interests through force. Given the reality of man's primary loyalty to autonomous states the need for force springs from compelling functional needs -- most fundamentally, from the need of states to rely primarily on self help in order to secure the conditions of their survival and welfare.

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Figure One

Disarmament and Arms Control Implications of the Balance of Power Approach to World Order



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Due to these precepts, many traditional scholars of realism reject attempts to outlaw war or to establish international mechanisms for the purposes of mitigating conflict. Realism also exhibits a belief that war is another phase of politics. This belief has led Anatol Rapaport to categorize some realists (especially Raymond Aron and Herman Kahn) as Neo-Clausewitzians.

These are the major tenets of realism in the traditionalist image of international politics. Arms control analysts like Hedley Bull and Thomas Schelling share some of these views. There are, however, some differences for one implication of arms control linked to the traditional image of international reality possesses decidedly anti-arms control tendencies. Some (for example, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard Perle), though rhetorically advocating arms control, in reality seem to be seeking a balance of military power which would result in United States nuclear superiority. In contrast, other "traditionalists" (such as Paul Nitze, the President's advisor on strategic arms control) seek the dynamics of the balance of power to achieve arms control based upon a "relative nuclear advantage" for the United States. We will discuss these different "traditionalist" implications for arms control shortly, but first an examination of the interdependence image of international politics is in order.

The Interdependence Image of International Reality

While the traditional view emphasized international relations as a state of war with violence and force as a legitimate means of maximizing interest among nation states, the interdependence school of thought perceives a cluster of anomalies within the traditional view. Where, for example, does one place such phenomena as OPEC, terrorism and multinational corporations? The world seems a much more complex place within the interdependence image of international reality. In this image nation states are joined by transnational actors which operate within, through and apart (transnationally) from established national governments and bureaucracies.

Structural diversity implies different international dynamics. While the traditional view rejects the assumption that individuals possess common interests which may obviate serious conflicts, interdependence theorists accept this assumption. This task is not assumed lightly for the new forces in international politics create a more complex and anarchial world. Interdependence theorists face a world management task. Rosecrance and

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Stein, for example, have argued that interdependence is increasing and is greatest among highly developed powers with similar economic systems. While they agree with Kenneth Waltz that nationalism is still a growing force in the world they argue that nationalism may perhaps lead to an increase in a negative type of interdependence. In other words, interdependence does not necessarily preclude a harsh uncompromising international environment.

Interdependence scholars assume a new conception of power that differs fundamentally from the military based conception of power at the heart of the traditional image. David Baldwin has argued, for instance, that the weakness inherent in traditional power analyses is the failure to specify contextually the scope and domain of the power or force. Additionally, some scholars note that other power bases can be just as effective as force in certain specified situations. James N. Rosenau indicates a few capabilities for control:

. . . . Bargaining over differences, trading issues off against each other, promises of future support, threats of future opposition, persuasion through appeals to common values, persuasion through the presentation of scientific proof -- these are the prime control techniques through which the problems of interdependence must be addressed. They are, of course, as old as diplomacy itself, but they have taken on new meaning in light of the decline of force as a viable technique and in view of the complex nature of the interdependence issues.

Finally, one of the methods by which interdependence proponents propose to control or "manage" these complex interdependence issues is to depoliticize them. If issues can somehow be depoliticized then a consensus may be reached.

The arms control implications of the interdependence image suggest links with the pure balance of power aspect of the traditional image but also mark a dilution of the premise of this image. It is at this stage that categorical ambiguity ensues for a certain amount of overlap exists between the arms control implications of both images of international reality. One can see the overlap developing by examining the balance of power heritage of both traditionalism and interdependence.

Interdependence, Traditionalism and the Balance of Power

How new is the interdependence image of international reality, and how

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does it differ from the traditional premises of the balance of power approach to world order? The interdependence view assumes new transnational actors, new capabilities for diplomatic and political control and the presence of international common interests. Are these "purportedly" new phenomena really new?

In the mid-nineteenth century British functionalists such as Richard Cobden advocated a trade policy based upon a "harmony of interests." This notion appears quite similar to modern interdependence beliefs. Indeed by the latter portion of the nineteenth century it seemed as though the dreams of men like Cobden had come true. As A. J. P. Taylor observed:

. . . . Men were too busy growing rich to have time for war. Though protective tariffs remained everywhere except in Great Britain international trade was otherwise free. There was no governmental interference no danger of debts being repudiated. The gold standard was universal. Passports disappeared, except in Russia and Turkey. If a man in London decided at nine o'clock in the morning to go to Rome or Vienna, he could leave at ten a.m. without either passport or travellers cheques -- merely with a purse of sovereigns in his pocket. Europe had never known such peace and unity since the Age of Antonines.

By the close of the nineteenth century more of the world was closely interlocked economically and financially than at any time before. Politics became entwined with economics. This led to domestic influences upon foreign policy, e.g., imperialism. Therefore, domestic constraints and influence upon international politics possess historic roots.

Transnational actors also existed in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the labor movement, the International Federation of Trade Unions, represented a multinational group of laborers. American multinational corporations grew and expanded abroad between 1893 and 1914. Indeed it was possible to argue that the emerging multinational corporation possessed more control than their late 20th Century successors because competition between corporations remained relatively minimal. One must also be careful about asserting that multinational corporations have reduced the economic barriers of nation states. The nation state still exists. It has and will continue to exert control upon the multinational enterprise. Finally, terrorism also existed before, and was a major catalyst to, World War I.

In summation, one may argue about the range, scope and success of these early transnational actors and structures of interdependence, but one cannot presently argue, without great difficulty, that they represent new phenomena. As Kenneth Waltz noted the world long ago was more inter-

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dependent than it is today.

The historic roots of interdependence lead to an overlap between traditional and interdependence images of international reality. Brian Porter, commenting upon Martin Wight's International Theory, observed:

. . . . Wight delineated three main traditions of thought and practice, to which he initially gave the names Realism, Rationalism, Revolutionism. . . .

Wight largely drew his traditions from the works of classic Western thinkers, and it is interesting to note that in the later versions of these lectures he had come to prefer, as descriptive of his three main categories or "paradigms" as he called them, the terms Machiavellian, Grotian and Kantian.

These paradigms which Wight referred to possess implications for not only the traditional and interdependence images of international reality, but also for arms control and disarmament.

Grotius, for example, believed in a series of rules to limit conflict. He proposed a great society of international states subject to restraint through laws derived from nature, man's rational and social nature and the laws of nations based upon the will and consent of states. On the other hand Machiavelli, as he is traditionally interpreted, believed in the self-interest of states as the main reason for international interaction. He merged self-interest and the utility of force. Force was one of the instruments by which self-interest could be achieved. Have traditional theorists of today mirrored the ideas of Machiavelli? What implication might this possess for arms control efforts?

It has been argued that the interdependence view possesses similarities to a previous "classical balance of power" period --the Concert of Europe. The traditionalists, however, seem to reflect the harsher balance of power period known as the Bismarkian system. Even more fundamentally:

. . . . The emphasis on confrontation and self-interest pushes back to the very dawn of the modern nation-state system, i.e., the period during which the medieval order finally gave way before the prototype of the state system which emerged on the Italian peninsula. Thus, in this sense, the historical and philosophical referent for what is termed traditionalism runs to Machiavelli (or perhaps Hobbes) but not to Vattel, Hume, Gentz, Castlereagh or Metternich.

If the historical referents of traditionalism and interdependence are correct, then neither image presents a radical or revolutionary policy with respect to contemporary international politics for both seek a legitimate order. After all, one must remember that Metternich's Concert reflected

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not a revolutionary policy but one of status quo. This was the crux of the dilemma of conservative statesmen living during the revolutionary age that Kissinger analyzed so brilliantly.

To draw this similarity between traditionalist and interdependence views or images is not to deny their fundamental conflict. Traditionalists fear the condition of interdependence as anarchial -- an environment in which conflict is endemic. They advocate the reassertion of American hegemony to mitigate this vicious condition of interdependence. Force must be met with force. The interdependence theorist, on the other hand, believes that the pursuit of self-interest at the core of the traditionalist view, can only lead to self-destruction. The task from their perspective becomes a management one, using many capabilities for control besides and including the military capability. If interdependence can be managed then perhaps it can be transcended. Both images of international reality possess implications for contemporary arms control.

Arms Control Implications of Traditional and Interdependence Images

Within the traditional image of international politics there are two arms control implications. The first is distinctively anti-arms control. The second allows for the possibility of arms control from the perspective of relative advantage to the interests of the United States. Both of these views are consistent with the characteristics of the "Cold War Internationalist" belief system described by Rosenau and Holsti.

According to Rosenau and Holsti, Cold War Internationalists believe that the structure of the international system is basically bipolar. Interdependent international relationships revolve around the concept of security issues. The fundamental focus of conflict facing the United States concerns East-West issues for the main threat to the United States is the Soviet Union. Thus the international arena is dominated by the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union for influence, particularly in the Third World. This belief system is not new but rather a continuation of the once dominant belief system established in the post World War II era.

The first arms control implication of this traditional "Cold War Internationalist" belief system manifests itself in a decidedly anti-arms control fashion. Policy-makers adhering to this belief system will pursue arms control policies, if at all, only from a position of advantage for the purposes of legitimizing such an advantage. The early Reagan Administration is a case in point:

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Ronald Reagan entered office with a deep seated distaste for arms control as it had been conducted in the past. His inclination was summed up succinctly by his counselor, Edwin Meese, early in 1981: arms control should be subject to "benign neglect" while the United States went about the business of rearming.

The Reagan Administration was hesitant to accept a minimalist position on arms control which would acknowledge that realistic arms control could compliment and enhance national security. American nuclear hegemony had to be reimposed upon the Soviet Union. This, it was believed, would allow the United States a measure of maneuverability perhaps in other foreign policy areas where the Soviets might be forced to back down. But would this reassertion of American nuclear strength lead to these desired results? Could the United States ever reestablish nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, or would the Soviet Union have to be dealt with on equal or near equal terms as a "great power"?

A proper reading of the second arms control implication of the traditional image is more complex. While adherents to this balance of power approach can be linked to the predominately anti-arms control position of the traditional image, there are also differences. For example, these policy-makers desire an arms control agreement which would be to the advantage of the United States but they tend to be more realistic concerning American arms control opportunities. Perhaps a distinguishing characteristic between the anti-arms control-advantage position of the traditional image and the pro-arms control position of the traditional image could revolve around the term "relative advantage." The latter category of arms control policy-makers would more readily settle for a relative American advantage in arms control negotiations when all of the elements within an arms control agreement are considered. The difference between these two arms control implications of the traditional image of international politics can best be exemplified by the differences between the former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard Perle, and the President's chief arms control advisor, Paul Nitze.

Perle is known for his antipathy towards the SALT process. He has compared the SALT II agreement to Chamberlain's concessions at Munich in 1938. SALT II was an exercise in appeasement. Perle, in testimony before the Strategic Warfare subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee concerned with verification of a treaty prohibiting anti-satellite weapons, took the position that it would be impossible to verify such an agreement. His views conflicted with the views of scientists who favor such a treaty. The line of reasoning which Mr. Perle utilized brings into ques-

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tion his commitment to any treaty regarding these weapons. As the New York Times reported:

Mr. Perle, however, argued that the undetected development of a Soviet anti-satellite weapon would permit it to knock out low orbit American reconnaissance satellites in a crisis and force the United States to "escalate faster" in a conventional conflict. . . .

Mr. Perle also said that "for all we know there are anti-satellite weapons up there now. We can't rule it out."

If you cannot rule out such a possibility, then you can argue against the ASAT ban. Indeed, if this becomes an accepted line of reasoning, then the entire process of arms control would be suspect for we could never possess enough knowledge of Soviet activities to safely engage in any arms control treaty.

Paul Nitze's position differs from that of Perle's. While the two men share a distrusting and even strident attitude towards the Soviet Union, Nitze seems more concerned to bargain realistically with the Soviet Union. To Nitze the SALT II agreement represented a badly negotiated agreement, one which would not ensure advantages for the United States. Nitze represents that segment of the "Cold War Internationalists" who believe that arms control can, if realistically pursued, end in a relative American advantage.

It should be noted that when we speak of arms control implications, one should think in terms of a continuum instead of separate segments of arms control implications. A continuum implies theoretical and procedural overlap. As an examination of the continuum illustrated in figure one indicates, arms control implications of the traditional image move from those policy-makers concerned with instituting or reinstituting American nuclear preponderance to those concerned with relative American nuclear advantage to those concerned with arms control for the preservation of nuclear stability. Arms control implications of the interdependence image, on the other hand, overlap and include those policy-makers concerned about nuclear stability and those who believe in arms control and disarmament measures that would not preclude the establishment of some form of what Stanley Hoffmann has termed, "relevant utopias."

Richard Perle might possibly represent a traditionalist Machiavellian historical referent or perhaps a Bismarkian one. Perle, however, has publicly supported the INF Treaty. This is a rather curious development considering his prior, steadfast opposition to strategic arms control. There are two possible explanations. First it is possible to view the INF Treaty as

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enhancing or establishing NATO nuclear superiority over the Warsaw Pact. After all the French and the British nuclear forces are exempt from the agreement as are United States nuclear submarines. Quantitatively the Soviet Union must relinquish greater numbers of weapons than the United States. In addition, new NATO deployment options for nuclear capable fighter aircraft, battlefield missiles and air launched cruise missiles of reduced range are not precluded by the INF Treaty. Second, it is possible to view the INF Treaty as having a political rather than a military effect. As Elizabeth Pond noted:

For a number of those hardliners in the (Reagan) Administration who oppose arms control in principle, the INF deal was a harmless deal that could divert popular interest in arms control to this minor category and remove pressure for a major deal in strategic arms control.

Grotius, however, with his belief in a series of rules to limit conflict would probably best be linked to arms controllers like Hedley Bull or Thomas Schelling. Notice that Nitze occupies a position somewhere between these two historical referents. Henry Kissinger remains a curious case. Kissinger has been accused of operating out of both a Bismarkian and Metternichian conception of international politics. If one reads his doctoral dissertation, however, it seems that a historical referent to Metternich is more accurate. Kissinger advocated a legitimate international order based upon balance of power principles with diplomacy being utilized as the instrument for success. He argued that statesmen must recognize the international equilibrium and preserve it.

Kissinger remains a very controversial policy-maker. It has been argued that his purpose in the early 1970s was to ensnare the Soviet Union in a web of international superpower detente. Within this arrangement the Soviet Union would have to act not only as a responsible great power but also responsible to the dictates of the United States. If this interpretation is correct then Kissinger could be moved closer to Nitze's position on the continuum. We should note that the difficulty in assessing Kissinger's position is, in part, the fault of Kissinger himself. It has become increasingly difficult to separate Kissinger's true foreign and defense policy positions from his more politically expedient positions.

As we move to and from Kissinger's position on the continuum, we begin to enter an interdependence image of international politics exhibiting a "Post-Cold War Internationalist" belief system. According to Rosenau and Holsti, Post-Cold War Internationalists believe in a multipolar structure of the international system where international interaction revolves around economic issues. Primary problems for the United States include North-

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South issues as well as East-West ones. Besides the Soviet Union, the United States faces other threats such as poverty, inequitable distribution of resources and Third World regional antagonisms. The purpose of the United States in international politics should be to facilitate movement from international confrontation to world order.

Arms control policy-makers operating out of a "Post-Cold War International" belief system advocate arms control and disarmament measures based upon the present international reality but do not necessarily preclude moving from this reality to a new one. Stanley Hoffmann, for example, asks the question, ".... Given the world as it is, what would be a morally acceptable international milieu and how can one achieve it?" Hoffmann urges the defining of national interests in moral terms. He aims at realism but refuses to accept the present condition as satisfactory. He urges reform from a Machiavellian conception of international reality and opts for a middle ground between utopianism and realism. Hoffmann serves as a bridge for those in the arms control community who wish to use arms control measures incrementally to achieve some sort of disarmament. As a result, his position on the continuum is close to the transformation barrier beyond which discussions and plans to transform the present international system are considered.

As we move to the left of the arms control and disarmament continuum, we move from arms control to disarmament schemes. These schemes overlap as long as disarmament plans remain incremental in nature and build upon contemporary international political reality, but as we move farther to the left we also move towards the beginning of transformationist thought and beyond the scope of this essay.

The position of George Kennan is particularly interesting and deserves further comment. Former Ambassador Kennan was the father of the American containment doctrine which would have originally placed him farther to the right on the disarmament and arms control implication continuum. There is debate concerning the nature of the containment policy which Ambassador Kennan proposed. He claims that he stressed primarily diplomatic and economic not military instrumentalities for containment. Accepting these claims, Ambassador Kennan would have occupied a place on the continuum just to the left of Paul Nitze. Professor Kennan, however, has recently advocated deep reductions in superpower arsenals. This proposal places Kennan in the disarmament camp but still to the right of the international system transformers, for he is using arms reductions to break the armament cycle within the present international context.

In closing, it is important to note that the categories arranged along the

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Disarmament and Arms Control Implication Continuum are not simply the product of scholarly intuition. There exists empirical support for these categories. Before the 1984 election the Public Agenda Foundation conducted interviews with elite policy-makers and scholars. They discovered that elite opinion concerning strategic arms control was divided. Through assumption analyses the Foundation derived four groups of experts which closely correspond to the categories on the continuum in figure one.

Summary and Conclusions

This article has argued that the balance of power approach to world order provides a foundation for contemporary arms control praxis. Arms control discussions can thus be linked to discussions of world order. Furthermore, two diverse images of international reality and two foreign policy elite belief systems can also be linked to the balance of power approach. These images and elite belief systems possess implications for arms control efforts. Arms control implications are graphically illustrated on the continuum in figure one. Figure one represents an attempt at understanding the divisions which existed during much of the Reagan Administration.

If the years of the SALT regime represent arms control efforts to institute nuclear stability then the United States, at least until the 1986 Reykjavik summit, clearly moved away from this position on the continuum. The Reagan Administration for much of its two terms hovered between the positions of arms control based on relative nuclear advantage (State Department) and nuclear preponderance (Defense Department). Superpower negotiations and the INF Treaty represent a triumph of the State Department's views concerning arms control and some policy-makers in the Reagan Administration view it as a prelude to greater accomplishments in the strategic nuclear realm. In the last days of the Reagan Administration, especially with the resignations of Perle and Weinberger, the advocates of relative nuclear seemed to have gained in diplomatic strength. What can be accomplished in the remaining days of the Reagan Administration, however, remains an open question.

Two things are clear. First, the internal Administration debate has consumed precious time which could have been devoted to arriving at a consensus on arms control policy. Second, presidential candidates should pay attention to the divisive arms control policy struggles within the Reagan Administration in order to avert such struggles. To this end, a new administration must carefully and selectively pursue appointments in this delicate

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policy area.

ENDNOTES

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JUSTIFYING ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: THE THEORY OF THE PRIMARY STAGE OF SOCIALISM

By Charles M. Redenius

At the 13th Party Congress, which met in Beijing from October 25 to November 1, 1987, Zhao Ziyang, the newly-confirmed General Secretary of the Communist Party, set out the principal tasks for the Party leadership over the next five years and beyond; Reform and the open policy would be accelerated and deepened; the rejuvenation of the Party leadership would be continued; and the building of a socialist political system with a high degree of democracy would be vigorously pursued.

The centerpiece of Zhao's report to the Congress, however, was the theory of the primary stage of socialism. This theory represented both a dramatic break with orthodox interpretations of Marxism and a determined effort by Party theorists to Justify and to reconcile economic and political reforms with Marxist ideology. Since the notion of the primary stage of socialism is expected to guide the nation's economic development until the middle of the next century, it has both immediate and long-term implications for virtually every aspect of China's modernization efforts.

Given the theoretical significance and the prospective reach of this new theory, it seems particularly apropos to explore its rationale for departing from Marxist orthodoxy, its conception of what constitutes an appropriate form of socialism for China, and its relationship to the tasks of the 13th Party Congress. In undertaking such an exploration, we will be able to see how deeply the "practices" of economic reform have affected not only the content of the theory of the primary stage of socialism but also how those practices shape the scope and reach of ideology itself.

Most of the material gathered to support the positions taken in this paper was acquired during a five month period of study in China from mid-August 1987 to mid-January 1988. My research in China took me to Beijing, Guilin, Kaifeng, Shanghai, Xian and Zhengzhou. In addition to the provinces in which these cities are located, I traveled widely in Hebei, Hubei, and Hunan provinces.1 As a result of this experience, I believe I am in a good position to provide some insight into the meaning and the implications of the theory of the primary stage of socialism.

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The Rationale for Departing from Marxist Orthodoxy

Justifying the departure from an orthodox interpretation of Marxism was necessary because those who favored orthodoxy represented an obstacle within the Party itself to political and economic reform. In developing the theory of the primary stage of socialism, Party leaders hoped to win over or to neutralize the recalcitrant. That resistance to the reforms was a source of considerable concern to the Party leadership is evident from the fact that both Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang have worked hard to create a positive perception of reform and the open policy among both the educated elite and the common people. Reprinting Zhao's report to the 13th Party Congress in its entirety is a leading example of this effort.2

Besides undercutting opposition to the reforms, their public statements, along with those of others both within and outside the Party, have also sought to persuade the people that the theory of the primary stage of socialism is in fact in accord with Marxist ideology. Xue Muqiao, one of China's top economists, for example, has claimed that rather than "abandoning Marxism and Leninism, the theory of the primary stage of socialism has fitted Marxism and Leninism to the current historical realities. What it really abandons is dogmatism and rigid models copied from foreigners."3

This recognition of "historical realities" marks a significant departure from orthodox interpretations of Marxism which stressed that ideology should guide action. Now the Party leadership lays great emphasis on the fact that Chinese socialism "has emerged from the womb of a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society, with the productive forces lagging far behind those of the developed capitalist countries." As a consequence, China is "destined to go through a very long primary stage" of socialism.4

In recognizing these facts, Party leaders have also been compelled to acknowledge that China"s historical experience is at variance with Karl Marx's prediction of when the communist revolution would take place. The revolution occurred before capitalism was highly developed in that country. Given this historical anomaly, the Party leadership now sees its modernization efforts as a new development of Marxism. It necessarily follows then that China cannot and must not "blindly follow what the books say" nor should it "mechanically imitate the examples of other countries."5

China can overstep the stage of developed capitalism in building a socialist system but it cannot overstep the period of commercial

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economic development to realize socialist modernization. To accomplish this goal, however, will call for China to move even further away from an orthodox interpretation of Marxism with its emphasis on State ownership of all means of production, on central planning to guide the development of productive forces, and on a political system which directly oversees virtually all political and economic matters.

As the Party leadership now sees it, the Major flaw in Marxist orthodoxy is the failure to distinguish what is inherently socialist and favorable to economic development from what is inherently capitalist and to be opposed. From the 1950s to the late 1970s, China was plagued with fits and spurts in its modernization efforts. The unevenness was due, present-day leaders charge, to the fact that under the influence of "Left" factions within the Party, China sought to modernize on the basis of a model developed in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s.6

In rejecting the Soviet model, the Party leadership noted that it encompassed several important features that were at odds with China's circumstances. First, the Soviet Union was at a more advanced stage of economic development than China at a comparable period in time. Second, the model employed in the Soviet Union was inappropriate for building "socialism with Chinese characteristics." Finally, whereas the Soviet model was rigid and inflexible, the situation in China called for a model that experimented with different paths of economic development.

The primary goal of the Party leadership in pursuing this line of analysis was to make clear to the Chinese people that they were irretrievably committed to reform and that there would be no turning back to an unchanging orthodoxy. Orthodoxy, in their view, had proven to be a blind alley in terms of China's modernization efforts. Party leaders were now convinced and hoped to convince the Chinese people in turn that there were "many economic models leading to socialism, and socialist economic systems should not be ones that defies any changes."7 On the contrary, a highly developed socialist society is one that is open to the winds of change.

To buttress their position and to demonstrate how effective the new economic policies have been, the Party leadership has pointed to the fact that since the economic reforms began taking place in 1978, China's GNP, state revenues, and the average income of both urban and rural residents have all nearly doubled. Moreover, in the process of achieving these results, 70 million new jobs were created and 80 million peasants shifted full time or part time from farming to industry.8 Such robust

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growth would surely make the departure from orthodoxy palatable to all but the most intransigent.

By calling for a further rejuvenation of the Party's leadership, the newly-elected Political Bureau would also be able to undercut whatever opposition remained. It is clear that overcoming internal resistance to reform is behind this call because Party leaders have stressed that the new generation of leadership should be technically competent and pragmatic. The new leaders could be expected to focus their energies on problems of modernization and development rather than seek answers in fruitless, ideological inquiry.

Yet Party leaders are quick to make it clear that they remain committed to Marxist ideology and the building of a socialist society in China. Economic and political reform, they insist, will be pursued strictly within the framework of the four cardinal principles. Keeping to the socialist road, upholding the people's democratic dictatorship, adhering to the leadership of the Communist Party, and cleaving to Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought.

Given their stake in both political and economic reform, it is obvious that the Party leadership sees no necessary conflict between these principles and such reform. On the contrary, from their perspective, adhering to the four cardinal principles and persevering in the general policy of reform and opening to the outside world are inextricably interrelated and neither can be dispensed with."'-1 It is on this basis that Party leaders have set out the theory of the primary stage of socialism.

The Primary State of Socialism

The thesis that China is in the primary stage of socialism was first set forth in the CPC Central Committee's 1981 Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Pounding of the People's Republic of China. Despite the importance of transforming that thesis into a full-blown theory, it was not until Zhao Ziyang delivered his report to the 13th Party Congress in October 1987 that that task was finally accomplished.10

Given these dates, it can be readily seen that both the thesis and the theory of the primary stage of socialism represent post hoc hoc efforts to provide a theoretical explanation for what had been taking place in China since 1978. In that year, the Third Plenary Session of the 13th Party Central Committee forged the political and economic reforms that have formed the basis for a strategic plan for economic

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development. At the 13th Party Congress that strategic plan received an ideological Justification which strengthened the leadership's resolve to employ the theory of the primary stage of socialism as a guide for development until the middle of the 21st century.

Unlike Marxist orthodoxy, then, the theory of the primary stage of socialism has grown out of practice. And, the fact that practice has guided ideology rather than the other way around has caused considerable uneasiness among the Party leaders. In the report to the Party Congress, for example, Zhao admitted somewhat apologetically that "[T]he study of Marxist theories in the Party lags far behind the progress of our great undertaking. Reform and the open policy have been pursued for several years, but little has been done to study them theoretically." 11

This lag is likely to be aggravated as the economic reforms proceed. Given though the Party leadership expects the primary stage of socialism to serve as a guide for economic development until the middle of the next century, as China incorporates more and more of Western technology and Western thinking into its modernization efforts, this theory will have to be refined to meet new challenges. Indeed, over the long term, the economic (and political) reforms will compel Party leaders to grapple with the larger theoretical problem of almost continually redefining the boundaries between socialism and capitalism.

Despite the difficulties facing China's leaders, the theory of the primary stage of socialism gives them a powerful and flexible weapon to deal with them. This can be readily seen by examining the key features of the theory. 12 These features include such startling departures from Marxist orthodoxy as the notion that while public ownership should be predominant other forms of ownership are essential to achieving a fully developed economy. The theory also holds that it is both possible and desirable to combine planning and the market to enhance the growth of productive forces.

To develop an efficient socialist market system, supply and demand must be regulated by a rational pricing system rather than by mandatory planning alone. Finally, the theory holds that the optimum distribution of resources depends on both the socialist principle of distribution according to work and on a mode of distribution that permits, indeed even provides, incentives for an inequality of incomes. All these features reveal just how far the Party leadership has diverged from Marxist orthodoxy.

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But, in the eyes of Party leaders, diverging from orthodoxy is not deviation from Marxism. Prom their perspective, "[t]he socialist economy conceived by Marx and Engels has only one distinct characteristic: Bringing about productivity higher than that offered by capitalism."13 By adopting such a view, only the end is preordained and China's leaders are free to choose among various means to reach that end. Marxism, Party leaders insist, never intended to prescribe one and only one pattern of economic development. On the contrary, Marxism permits the construction of diversified socialist economic models to fit the needs of different socialist countries at various stages of development.

It is in this light that one must examine the central features of the theory of the primary stage of socialism. Patterns of ownership, the role of the state and of the government, the scope of planning and of the market, and the principles and modes of distribution are to be determined by practical considerations and historical circumstances rather than ideological criteria.

By proceeding in this fashion, Party leaders can be guided by current realities and thus should be able to develop soundly-conceived plans to guide China's future modernization efforts Such a strategy is particularly important for determining the most appropriate patterns of ownership during the primary stage of socialism. Diversification of ownership is a demonstrated necessity because "China's experience over the past 30 years shows that State-owned industry and commerce and collective agriculture alone cannot satisfy the people's various needs. The gaps have to be and can be filled in large measure by the private economy and personal enterprises."14

In filling those gaps, the most appropriate pattern of ownership can be determined by a close examination of "the level of productive forces, the objective nature of the organization of these forces, and the objective demand to develop the productive forces."15 Such a method is far superior to that of using ideological criteria divorced from concrete data. Thus, even within the framework of the theory of the primary stage of socialism, experience will guide ideology rather than the other way around.

In words that would appear unremarkable in a capitalist society, but must surely be perceived as provocative in a socialist society, Zhao Ziyang has flatly stated that "Practice has proved that a certain degree of development of the private sector promotes production, stimulates the market, provides employment and helps in many ways to meet

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people"s needs. It is thus a necessary and useful supplement to the public sector."16 The factor that makes such a statement acceptable is contained in the last sentence. The private sector is to be only a "supplement" to the public sector.

Thus, while private ownership will be permitted, indeed, even encouraged public ownership is to remain the predominant form of ownership. Given within this constraint, however, the search for economic growth will see increasing emphasis on diversifying ownership well beyond what exists in China today. Ultimately, Chinese socialism will be characterized by an ownership structure in which the public sector has been substantially augmented "by collective, private, foreign, and other sectors, with different ownerships penetrating into and fusing with one another."17

Accompanying the changing pattern of ownership will be a changing role for the government and for the state. Indeed, the upheavals occasioned by the economic reforms have led to some interesting developments in the concepts of the state and of the government. This is amply evident in a statement made by Tong Dalin, vice-director of the Committee of Economic Structural Reform. He noted "that the government alone is not the state. In modern countries, the concept of the State refers to the government, enterprises, and individual households. The combination of those interests constitutes the general interest of the State." 18

On the basis of this understanding of the state, Party leaders can easily justify both a diverse pattern of ownership and a separation of the government from business enterprises. Even if this were not the case, the Party leadership, after studying the record of China's economic performance over the last three decades has concluded that mixing governmental functions and business functions has seriously hampered the development of the productive forces and of the socialist commodity economy. 19

Thus, whatever ground is chosen, either conceptual or historical, China's leaders recognize that healthy economic growth will be promoted by enhancing the "economic responsibility system." This system involves separating ownership from managerial authority, giving managers real decision making power, and making them responsible for their own profits and losses. To put such a system in place, the Party leadership is attempting not only to separate government from both publicly and privately owned enterprises, but also to distinguish between political officials and professional or technical managers. Once

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the latter goal is reached, business leaders would no longer be classified as government cadres.

Top jobs in the economic sector would also no longer be filled by appointment with virtual lifetime tenure. Rather, business leaders would compete with one another for the top posts. The "winner" would be the individual who had most clearly outlined operational objectives and who had designed well-conceived plans to improve the enterprise.20 Rather than life tenure, the appointee would sign a contract for a set number of years. At the end of the contracted period, he or she would have to compete with others once again for the leadership position.

To overcome bureaucratic resistance to these steps, the Party leadership has, in addition to calling for the separation of government and business, also sought to decentralize decision making. Over the next several years, the central government is expected to shift gradually the authority to make most decisions to local authorities or to enterprises. Party leaders see such a step resulting in more vigorous enterprises with higher quality products, improved labor productivity, and increased profits.

But these results will not be possible unless the enterprises are also allowed to develop their own markets. The Party leadership recognizes that for enterprises to do so, they will have to reduce the amount of central planning in the economy as a whole. In yet another departure from Marxist orthodoxy, Party leaders have taken the necessary steps to reduce central planning and their goal is to have only about 30% of the economy subject to central planning within two to three years.21

Ultimately, the Party leadership expects "that the Chinese economic structure will become one in which the state regulates the market and lets the market guide the enterprises."22 To accomplish this, China will gradually expand the scope of market regulation and reduce that of control through planning. Eventually, the planned economy will make up only a very small proportion of the total economy. Although it is difficult to specify exactly how this will occur, it is clear that the Party leadership is committed to finding innovative ways to combine planning and market forces.

Once again, the driving force behind this reform is the recognition that overcentralized economic management and mixing up the functions of the government and the enterprises have hindered economic development. Hand in hand with this recognition is a new appreciation of the role of enterprises in economic growth. Indeed, in words that

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would warm the hearts of most capitalists, Tong Dalin has stated that "[E]nterprises are the main source of social wealth, out of which governments collect taxes, markets get products and individual employees get their pay. Without the prosperity of enterprises, nobody could get rich."23

If this sounds like capitalism, Party leaders are prepared to lived with it for next half-century or so. As Xue Muqiao has remarked. "[I]t would be against common sense to not make use of certain aspects of capitalism during the long primary stage of socialism."24 And in answer to the ideologies, Zhao Ziyang has insisted that "it is necessary to emancipate the mind, seek truth from facts, and take practice as the sole criterion of truth."25 When all these statements are taken together, the abandonment of Marxist orthodoxy appears almost total.

While the Party leadership has been careful to retain the language of Marxism, the reforms have affected the very heart of that ideology. For example, Party leaders still insist that China must adhere to the principle of distribution according to work. But they quickly go on to say that: "'The policies of distribution we formulate should encourage some enterprises and individuals to become prosperous before others through good management and honest work, thus widening the differences in personal income to a reasonable degree."26

From their perspective, Marxism does not require strict egalitarianism. "reasonable" differences in incomes are permissible. Nor does Marxism rule out all unearned income; income from stocks and bonds is perfectly legal.27 What Marxism does require is that the principle of distribution according to work remain predominant. As long as that principle is predominant policies that allow for an unequal distribution of income are acceptable during the primary stage of socialism.

Such policies are also endorsed for another, more subtle, reason' individual interest and the national interest are no longer viewed as being in conflict with one another. Although Party leaders do not explicitly agree with Adam Smith's notion of a harmony of interests that is, individuals rationally pursuing their self-interest foster the public interest), they come very close to doing so when they say: "Interest pushes the life of a nation forward, Lenin once observed. The recognition and promotion of both the national interest and personal interests is one of the chief driving forces behind reform."28 In striving to put a firm foundation under their policies the Party leadership invokes the name of Lenin but the specter of Adam Smith seems transparently

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evident.

In all this it seems clear that the primary stage of socialism does not so much as discard traditional ideas as give them a new content. Orthodox interpretations of Marxism, in vivid contrast to this approach, have historically prescribed one inflexible model and excoriated all deviations from that model. With the theory of the primary stage of socialism calling for both public ownership and private ownership, for both planning and the market, and for both distribution according to work and distribution permitting unequal incomes, Marxism has been transmuted in some fundamental ways.

That transmutation has occurred because of China's preoccupation with economic growth. Future developments will almost certainly lead to further modifications of the theory of the primary stage of socialism. yet precisely how it will evolve is a great unknown. Zhao Ziyang has candidly observed that. "We do not yet know much about the conditions, contradictions and changes in this stage or the laws governing its development. Many of our principles, policies and theories have yet to be tested, and they will have to be constantly enriched, revised and improved through practice."29

Economic growth, however, is not the ultimate goal nor purpose of the political and economic changes taking place in China. Rather, "[t]he purpose of reforming both the political and economic structures is, under the leadership of the Party and the socialist system, to better develop the productive forces and to take full advantage of the superiority of socialism. In other words, we shall catch up with the developed capitalist countries economically and, politically, we shall create a democracy that is of a higher level and more effective than the democracy of those countries. ... The merits of the reform should be judged on the basis of whether these objectives are attained."30

The theory of the primary stage of socialism is the weapon that has been forged to achieve those objectives. It has led to the almost total abandonment of Marxist orthodoxy in China. yet this theory has given Marxism a new vitality, a new flexibility, and a new appeal. By stressing that ideology grows and evolves through both logic and practice, it has set economic reform on a path that however steep seems certain of attainment. The primary stage of socialism also provides the Party leadership with a framework for achieving broader social and political goals. One could hardly ask for any more of a theory.

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Conclusion

Since 1978, China has moved ever more steadily away from an orthodox interpretation of Marxism. It was not until the 13th Party Congress in October 1987, however, that a theory was finally produced to justify that departure from orthodoxy. The theory that China is in the primary stage of socialism represents both an attempt to spell out pragmatically what the nation must do in implementing political and economic reform and a Justification for diverging from what had been ever since the Revolution in 1949 the only acceptable interpretation of Marxism.

In forging this theory the Party leadership has faced stiff ideological opposition to economic and political reform from within the ranks of the Party itself. To overcome this resistance, Party leaders have called for the rejuvenation of the Party leadership, for the separation of the Party from the government, for the decentralization of decision making in both the political and economic spheres, and for an end to bureaucratic interference in business enterprises.

In examining the changes being introduced by the economic reforms, the reasons why the opposition has been so adamant becomes apparent. The theory of the primary stage of socialism holds that both public ownership and private ownership are essential to a fully developed economy. Moreover, it contends that it is both possible and desirable to combine planning and the market to enhance the growth of productive forces. Finally the theory calls not only for distribution according to work but also for a mode of distribution permitting unequal incomes.

When all this is accompanied by an insistence on hard facts rather than on logic, by a reliance on practice as well as ideology, and by the assertion that there may be several equally valid models of socialism, it is clear that China is committed to building "'socialism with Chinese characteristics" in ways that are deeply at variance with Marxist orthodoxy. What the end result of the reforms will be even the Party leadership is loathe to predict.

Yet the overall purpose of the economic and political reforms is clear: to reach the level of economic development of the capitalist countries and to build a democracy more effective than exists in those countries. In attaining this purpose, the Chinese seek to demonstrate the superiority of socialism. The theory of the primary stage of socialism, they believe, has given them a powerful new Marxist weapon which will enable them to achieve their goals by the middle of the next century.

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Notes

1. I would be remiss if I failed to express my gratitude to all the faculty and students I talked with at a number of Chinese universities. Most especially, I am indebted to the students in the American studies program at Huanghe University and three of my colleagues, Mei-ling Sander, Uli Sander, and Xie Zhiliang.

2. Zhao Ziyang, "Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," *Beijing Review,* November 9 - 15, 1987, pp. I - XXVII. Hereafter cited as Zhao, " The Road of Socialism." Other problems that the Party leadership had to deal with in the first years of the reforms are explored in: Cheng Chu-Yuan, *China's Economic Develonment: Growth and Structural Change* (Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1982); *China from Mao to Deng* ed. by the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1983); and *China's Changed Road to Development* ed. by Neville Maxwell and Bruce McFarlane (Pergamon, New York, 1984).

3. "Theories of socialism heatedly discussed, *China Daily*, November 18, 1987, p. 1.

4. Zhao, "The Road of Socialism," p. IV.

5. Zhao, ""The Road of Socialism," p. IV.

6. "Party Congress Highlights Reform," *Beijing Review,* November 2 - 8, 1987, pp. 6 - 7. Other important constraints on economic growth during this period are explored in Ronald A. Morse (ed), *Limits of Reform in China* (Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1983).

7. "Economic reform permits flexibility, *China Daily,* September 8, 1987, p. 4.

8. Zhao, "The Road of Socialism," p. I; and "Veteran leader on achievements of Party Congress," *China Daily*, December 28, 1987, p. 1.

9. Zhao, '"The Road of Socialism, pp. VI and XXV.

10. "An Important Thesis on Building Socialism," *Beijing Review,* November 9 -15, p. 4. The thesis of the primary stage of socialism was reaffirmed in 1986 by the Central Committee's Resolution on the Guiding principles for Building Socialist Society With an Advanced Culture and Ideology.

11. Zhao, "The Road of Socialism," p. XXVI.

12. Zhao, "The Road of Socialism,"" pp. III - XV, furnishes an overview of the theory of the primary stage of socialism and how that theory impacts on China's development efforts.

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13. "Higher production is key to success," *China Daily*, October 29, 1987, p. 4.
14. "Theories of socialism heatedly discussed," *China Daily*, November 18, 1987, p. 1.
15. "Economic reform permits flexibility," *China Daily*, September 8, 1987, p. 4.
16. Zhao, "The Road of Socialism," p. XIV.
17. "Economic reform permits flexibility, *China Daily*, September 8, 1987, p. 4. China, it should be noted, has created the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as an arena in which various patterns of ownership can be experimented with. For an interesting study of the SEZs see: Michael Osborne, *China's Special Economic Zones* (OECD, Paris, 1986). Chapter 1 is especially worthwhile because it reviews the policy context within which the SEZs evolved.

18. Markets set stage for state's progress, "*China Daily,* November 4, 1987, p. 4.
19. Zhao, "The Road of Socialism," p. IV.
20. "Top jobs can go to the best people," *China Daily,* October 29, 1987, p. 4.
21. "Planning to Rule Only 30% of Economy," *Beijing Review,* November 9 - 15, 1987, p. 6. The broader context within which the shift from planning to market forces is taking place is examined in *China, Socialist Economic Development* (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1983, 3 volumes. See especially Volume I, pp. 146 - 171.
22. "500,000 Cadres," *China Daily,* November 14, 1987, p. 4.
23. "Markets set stage for state's progress," *China Daily*, November 4, 1987, p. 4.
24. "Theories of socialism heatedly discussed," *China Daily*, November 18, 1987, p. 1.
25. Zhao, "The Road of Socialism," p. XXV.
26. Zhao, "The Road of Socialism,"" p. XIV. Although not the focus of inquiry, some of the pitfalls in allowing unequal incomes are examined by Peter Van Ness and Satish Raichur, "Dilemmas of Socialist Development: An Analysis of Strategic Lines in China, 1949-1981," in *China from Mao to Deng*, ed. by the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1983), pp. 77 - 89.
27. "An Important Thesis on Building Socialism," *Beijing Review,* November 9 - 15, 1987, p. 5, and Zhao, "The Road of Socialism," p. XI.

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28. "Road to reform is not all smooth," *China Daily*, November 11, 1987, p. 4.
29. Zhao, "The Road of Socialism," p. XXVI.
30. Zhao, "The Road of Socialism," p. XV.

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

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

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